Majority
In this action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting to plaintiff by reason of negligence of the defendant, the complaint was filed and summons issued April 17, 1926. On August 3, 1926, an order for publication of summons was signed and filed. This order was granted upon the sole ground that from the affidavit of the plaintiff filed therewith it satisfactorily appeared to the judge that the defendant “cannot after due diligence be found within this state”; that the complaint showed a good cause of action; that summons had been duly issued and that personal service thereof could not be made upon the defendant for- the reason above stated and by said affidavit made to appear.
Aside from publication and mailing in accordance with said order, there was no service of summons until April 28, 1929, when personal service was made on the defendant. Thereupon the defendant upon due notice presented his motion to quash and vacate the summons and the pretended service thereof upon certain stated grounds, and also that the action be dismissed upon the ground the summons was not served within three years from the date thereof. That motion having been granted, and the court having entered
An order for publication of summons, based solely upon a finding that the defendant “cannot after due diligence be found within this state”, is void when the affidavit which constituted the evidence in support of that finding does not contain any evidence tending to prove any diligent effort to find the defendant. In the attempt to make such service the quality of diligence must be present, at least to the extent of a reasonable degree of perseverance. “A judgment or order is said to be void on its face when the invalidity is apparent upon an inspection of the judgment-roll. (People v. Davis, 143 Cal. 673 [ 77 Pac. 651 ].) It follows, therefore, that if the affidavit upon which the order directing publication of summons was had in this action fails, as urged by the appellant, to comply with the provisions of section 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the default judgment thereafter entered on such defective service would be void on its face, and the trial court at any time could have properly set it aside.” (Morgan v. Clapp, 207 Cal. 221 , 224 [ 277 Pac. 490 ].) “There is no doubt of the right of a judge to vacate an order for publication of summons where, upon examination of the affidavit, he finds a total lack of a statement of facts sufficient to authorize the order to be made in the first instance; and we may say further that such right might exist where it appeared that the affidavit was fraudulent.” (Porter v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 608 , 611 [ 159 Pac. 222 ].)
In the case at bar, the affidavit for publication of summons was made by the plaintiff. It did not state any fact known to the plaintiff and tending to prove that the defendant could not be found at his place of residence in the city of Los Angeles, although that place of residence was known and was actually stated in the affidavit. Affiant did state that his attorney had “placed copies of the original complaint and summons in the hands of process servers, who have made numerous attempts to serve defendant at his residence . . . but have been unable to find the within named defendant”; also that said process servers had been repeatedly told by the wife of defendant that the defendant “is to be found at the Paymaster Mine in Imperial County”. It is plain on the face of the affidavit that the plaintiff was
Since there was no service of summons within three years after commencement of the action, the court was authorized to enter its order of dismissal. (Code Civ. Proc., see. 581a.)
The order is affirmed, and the judgment of dismissal is affirmed.
Houser, J., and York, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- People v. Davis 143 Cal. 673 p. 507
- Morgan v. Clapp 207 Cal. 221 at 224 p. 507
- Porter v. Superior Court 30 Cal. App. 608 at 611 p. 507