Majority
This is an action in interpleader. From the judgment one of the claimants has appealed under section 953a of the Code of Civil Procedure. As commissioner to conduct a sale under a decree of mortgage foreclosure the plaintiff received moneys. By consent of all the
The action was commenced on January 6, 1930. At that time the plaintiff held over $18,000 which he asked permission to pay into court and be discharged. The record discloses no legal reason why the order applied for was not made at that time. Later, by consent of the parties, the undisputed' claims of P. M. Eeidy for $8,458.34 and of the sheriff of Los Angeles County for $7,558.93, were paid. That left in the plaintiff’s hand $2,2'84.35. At the beginning of the trial by consent of the parties the plaintiff was authorized to pay himself $25 for costs and to pay the remainder, $2,259.35, to the clerk of the court to abide the judgment. At the same time the plaintiff asked to be discharged. No legal reason appears in the record why he was not discharged, but he was ordered to remain in court until the end of the ease and at that time was discharged. While the matter was controverted, nevertheless there was a stipulation that the plaintiff should not be charged with interest. No fact appears in the record that would have warranted any charge against him for interest.
Mrs. Mills, the mortgagor, appeared and filed an answer. The defendant P. M. Eeidy appeared and filed an answer and a cross-complaint. The defendant George A. Vanderbeck did the same. The cross-complaints were answered and on the issues so framed the action was tried. At the end of the trial the court made findings specifically disposing of every issue made by the pleadings. The defendant Vanderbeck attacks many of the findings and claims that they are not sustained by the evidence.
On March 2, 1929, a judgment of foreclosure was rendered in an action entitled The Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Lydia Mills for the sum of $6,996.85. The property described in the mortgage was lot 4 in block 6 of Lafayette Square. E.
Millsap assigned his claim, $232.90, to Reidy. The latter pleaded the assignment in his cross-complaint. The trial court allowed said amount to the latter. The appellant contests the item and quotes evidence to the effect that Mill-sap did not hold a license under the California Real Estate Act (1 Deering’s Gen. Laws, 1931, p. 25). He did not need one. The act performed by him was not an act covered by the statute. Again, it is asserted that Millsap’s claim did not come within the purview of his contract. As recited above, his contract was twofold. The contracting parties agreed to pay him ten per cent of the net profits. In the second place Vanderbeck induced Reidy to agree to pay Millsap $232.90 in addition to the first item. The latter sum was properly awarded in the judgment to Reidy.
In the original contract between Vanderbeck and Eeidy it was recited that there was $3,000 still due the plaintiff on his judgment against Mrs. Mills. As a part of the contract Vanderbeck agreed to assign said judgment to secure Eeidy. He also agreed to deliver to Eeidy the certificate of redemption properly assigned in the case of The Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Mills. Before delivering the latter instrument Vanderbeck noted that he had overestimated the balance due on his judgment and that the balance was $1164.95. If it had been as originally represented the interest of Eeidy would have been $1500, that is, one-half of $3,000-, Vanderbeck said he was willing that Eeidy should receive $1164.95 and asked Eeidy to consent in writing. Eeidy executed a writing to Vanderbeck reciting that
The appellant states the items and finds that there was due from Mrs. Mills at the time of the redemption $325 as the reasonable value of the automobile and personal property, and $52 for legal disbursements, making $377, and that she was entitled to a credit of $92 for rents collected, leaving a balance of $285. Deducting that sum from $1200 he says there was due her $915 and not $971. The trouble is he overlooked the material fact that his demand on Mrs. Mills compelled her to pay “$1200 together with interest at 7% from April 10, 1929”, to December 12, 1929—in other words, $1256 principal and interest. Deducting therefrom $285 leaves $971, the amount found by the court to be due Mrs. Mills.
The defendant Vanderbeck complains because interest was not allowed. All items of the fund except $2,259.35 were disbursed by consent of the parties. On the opening of the trial, by consent, the balance of the fund was paid into court. From that date no interest should be charged. (Conner v. Bank of Bakersfield, 183 Cal. 199 , 203 [ 190 Pac.
We find no error in the record. The judgment is affirmed.
Nourse, P. J., and Spence, J., concurred.
A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on July 21, 1933.
Cases cited
- Conner v. Bank of Bakersfield 183 Cal. 199 at 203 p. 247