Majority
The appellant pleaded guilty to the crime of burglary. Judgment was pronounced on July 21, 1930, the court finding the crime to be burglary in the first degree. It now appears that no evidence as to the degree of the crime was taken by the court and that, in fact, the crime committed was burglary in the second degree.
The attorney-general has moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that a notice of appeal was not announced in open court at the time the order was made, as required by section 1239 of the Penal Code.
While this section is usually taken as contemplating an oral notice of appeal at the time an order is made, the essential requirement seems to be that notice of appeal shall then be given “by announcing in open court”, rather than that the announcement shall be in a particular form. The instant case presents an unusual situation in which it was impossible for the appellant to make that announcement in the ordinary and usual manner, although he informed the court and all concerned, in writing, that he appealed from the order. He was not represented by counsel and his request to be allowed to be present at the hearing was denied. Under such circumstances he filed in advance a written notice of appeal with the request that it be entered in the event his motion was denied. This was the only thing he could do and the only way in which it was possible for him to claim the right to which he was entitled under the statute. Under such circumstances, we think the written notice of appeal filed was such a substantial compliance with the statute as should be considered sufficient. The record indicates
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.
Marks, J., and Jennings, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on April 2, 1934, and an application by respondent to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on April 19, 1934.