Majority
Headnote
Divorce—Decree for Wife on Cross-complaint—Demurrer—Appeal from Order Denying New Trial—Review.—In an action for divorce by the husband, where the wife obtained a decree by cross-complaint, a demurrer to which was overruled, upon the husband’s appeal solely from an order denying his motion for a new trial, the action of the court in overruling his demurrer to the cross-complaint cannot be reviewed.Plaintiff brought this action to obtain a decree of divorce from his wife, Honora Aston. Defendant, however, obtained a decree of divorce from plaintiff upon the grounds of desertion and adultery, pleaded in her amended and supplemental cross-complaint. By the decree defendant was awarded all the community property.
Plaintiff moved for a new trial, and from the order denying his motion he appealed to this court. There is no appeal from the judgment.
Appellant urges that the court erred in overruling his demurrer to the amended and supplemental cross-complaint. But the action of the court in overruling a demurrer is not open to review upon an appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial. (Moore v. Douglas, 132 Cal. 400 , [ 64 Pac. 905 ]; Morse v. Wilson, 138 Cal. 559 , [ 71 Pac. 801 ].)
Appellant also urges that the court erred in awarding all the community property to respondent. This is also an attack upon the judgment that may only be raised by an appeal from the judgment. But the divorce in this case was granted both for desertion and adultery committed by appellant. By reason of the divorce being granted for adultery, the court had the power in its discretion to give all the community property to the innocent party. (Miller v. Miller, 33 Cal. 353 .)
Appellant contends that the finding that appellant committed adultery with a woman named Perez, at a house numbered 709 Fifth street, in the city of Oakland, is not sustained by the evidence.
Appellant left the home of plaintiff and defendant at Santa Cruz in 1891. The evidence tends to show that in 1905 appellant was living with a woman at 709 Fifth street in the city of Oakland. That this woman, with appellant’s knowledge and apparent consent, referred to him as her husband, used his name, and he likewise referred to her as his wife and designated her as Mrs. R. A. Aston.
This is particularly evidenced by a writing, signed by this woman, as follows: “My husband Philip
The children of this woman addressed the appellant as “Papa.” The evidence tends to show that this woman’s real name was Perez. Upon the day of the above transaction appellant and the Perez woman were found apparently living in the same house, and clearly represented themselves as husband and wife.
Adultery may be established by circumstantial evidence (Evans v. Evans, 41 Cal. 103 ), and that is the usual way in which it is proven. The evidence supports the inference that appellant and the woman (Perez, alias Mrs. R. A. Aston) were living together in adultery, and the finding as to the adultery of the appellant is supported by the evidence.
Appellant also contends that the court erred in admitting in evidence the writing referred to in the above document as the “contract with E. D. Wilbur, dated at Oakland, Cal., October 16th, 1905,” and some correspondence between “Mrs. R. A. Aston” and Wilbur occurring intermediate October 16, 1905, and October 21, 1905. None of these writings was signed in the presence of appellant, and they were objected to when offered. Upon objection being made to the offer of the first of these writings, dated October 16, 1905, and signed “Mrs. R. A. Aston,” the court asked the attorney for defendant if he proposed “to follow this up with other proof that will connect it,” to which he replied that he did, and thereupon the court overruled the objection. While the same question and answer were not put and made when the other writings were offered, we think it is apparent that the court and counsel understood that they were offered and received under the same conditions. Finally, defendant did put in evidence the instrument dated October 21, 1905, signed by both appellant and “Mrs. R.
We find no error requiring a reversal of the order denying the motion for a new trial, and the order is affirmed.
Cooper, P. J., and Kerrigan, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Miller v. Miller 33 Cal. 353 p. 324
- Evans v. Evans 41 Cal. 103 p. 325