Majority
Headnote
Promissory Notes—Consideration—Legality—Settlement of Shortage of Accounts by Manager of Corporation—Threat to Recover upon Official Bond.—Promissory notes executed by the manager of a corporation to cover a shortage in his accounts, who was under a bond for the faithful discharge of his duties as such manager, were upon a sufficient consideration, and the consideration was not rendered illegal or void by a mere threat of the corporation, within its rights, that if the shortage were not settled, it must be recovered upon his official bond, unaccompanied by any threat of arrest or of criminal prosecution for embezzlement; and the mere fact that the manager feared such a prosecution from the bonding company cannot affect the legality of the consideration.Action to recover upon five promissory notes made and delivered by defendants to plaintiff’s assignor. Judgment went for plaintiff, from which defendants appeal upon a bill of exceptions.
The defense is based upon the alleged fact that in part the notes were without consideration, and that all were procured by fraud and threats to have defendant Sullivan arrested for embezzlement. The notes were duly made and delivered to the Acme Door and Glass Company, which transferred them to plaintiff. On June 21, 1906, one W. E. Little, who was a stockholder and president of the Acme Door and Glass Company, entered into an agreement with defendant Sullivan, whereby the latter was employed as manager of the Acme Door and Glass Company for a period of one year. Under the terms of the agreement Sullivan’s compensation was to be $150 per month and thirty per cent of the dividends derived from the stock owned by said Little in the corporation, which sum of thirty per cent was to be due and payable after the stock had been carefully invoiced and had been figured and rechecked for accuracy. Sullivan entered upon his duties and continued in the employ of the company for the period of one year covered by his contract, drawing his salary of $150 per month, and, in addition thereto, received $311.60 on account of the thirty per cent of the amount paid Little as dividends upon his stock, which dividends were based upon an inventory
From these and other findings it clearly appears that the execution and delivery of the notes were not procured by fraud, duress, intimidation or threats to have Sullivan arrested for embezzlement, or any other offense. While the evidence touching the question is conflicting, the testimony of Little clearly tends to support the court’s findings. It is true that when he discovered the shortage, and after being unable to obtain an adjustment from Sullivan, he called upon the agent of the bonding company, told him of Sullivan’s shortage, made inquiry as to the company’s liability upon the bond, and asked what he should do with reference to the matter. The agent advised him to notify the company, which he did by letter dated September 6th. When he had the interview with Sullivan on September 7th, he told Sullivan in the course of the conversation that unless .the matter was satisfactorily adjusted, they would bring action to recover against the sum claimed. “He told me,” says Sullivan, “that I was under $5,000 bond there and that he would recover that way”; “that he would rely on the bond to collect the amount due in some way.” But this was not a threat of arrest, even though Sullivan believed, as he says he did, that his failure to pay the shortage might result through the bonding company in a prosecution for embezzlement. Little had a right to look to the bond for protection, and his telling Sullivan that he would rely upon the bond, unless the matter was adjusted, was clearly within such right. The case at bar bears no analogy to the cases of Morrill v. Nightingale, 93 Cal. 452 , [ 27 Am. St. Rep. 207 , 28 Pac. 1068 ], and Mitchell v. Finnell, 101 Cal. 618 , [ 36 Pac. 123 ], in the first of which a criminal prosecution was instituted and dismissed in consideration of the giving of the notes, and in the second, a criminal proseen
Appellant insists that there was no consideration for that portion of the note embracing the dividend of $311.60 paid Sullivan. “The compromise of a doubtful claim asserted and maintained in good faith constitutes a sufficient consideration for a new promise, even though it may ultimately be found that the claimant could not have prevailed.” (Union Collection Co. v. Buckman, 150 Cal. 163 , [ 119 Am. St. Rep. 164 , 88 Pac. 708 , 9 L. R. A., N. S., 568 ].) Not only does the claim appear to have been in dispute, but it was asserted in good faith. Moreover, we think the acceptance of notes and extending the time within which to pay the amount conceded to be due, and waiver of right of action to recover upon Sullivan’s bond, if such right existed, would constitute a sufficient consideration for-the note covering the amount of the dividend.
In his answer Sullivan alleged that Little and other directors of the Acme Door and Glass Company had entered into
It is unnecessary to discuss other points made by appellant, other than to say that an examination thereof discloses no merit in them.
The judgment is affirmed.
Allen, P. J., and James, J., concurred.
A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on April 24, 1911.
Cases cited
- Morrill v. Nightingale 93 Cal. 452 p. 478