Majority
Headnote
Appeal—Dismissal fob Failure to File Transcript in Time—Improper Reliance of Attorney upon Clerk.—Where an appeal was taken under the old method, it must be dismissed for failure to file the printed transcript within the time prescribed by Rule II of the supreme court, where the certificate of the clerk is made setting forth the facts required by Rule VI of that court. It is no legal excuse that the attorney for appellant had taken a former appeal under the new method prescribed by section 941b of the Code of Civil Procedure, and relied upon the promise of the clerk to certify and transmit the transcript within the time required by law in this case.Respondent has moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that “the appellant, Napa Valley Brewing
The matter has been submitted without argument, and the only showing made by appellant in opposition to the motion is contained in an affidavit of Hon. Frank L.- Coombs, who declares therein that “he acted for the attorney of appellant in filing the notice of appeal in the said cause; that affiant had previously taken an appeal under section 941b of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in this appeal he followed the same course adopted by the clerk of the superior court of the county of Napa in the said previous case; that upon the filing of the notice of appeal in the above-entitled case he requested the clerk to prepare a transcript of the judgment-roll and papers necessary upon said appeal, and to transmit the same to the clerk of the said court of appeal with the necessary certificate, agreeing to pay the said clerk the expenses therefor. That the said clerk consented to do the same; that thereafter and upon several occasions affiant called the attention of the said clerk to said matter of preparing and transmitting said transcript, and understood and supposed the same would be done within the time required by law.” It is thus not disputed that under the rule it was the duty of appellant to file the printed transcript within the forty days, but it is sought to excuse the default on the ground that the attorney depended upon the clerk of the court to perform that duty. It was supposed that he would pursue the same course that he did under another appeal taken under a different section of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The following cases, though different in their facts, serve to illustrate the view of this same question taken by the appellate courts of the state:
In Union Lumber Co. v. Metropolis Construction Co., 13 Cal. App. 584 , [ 110 Pac. 329 ], it is held that a failure to serve and file the transcript is not excused by a showing of the pendency of an appeal from the order denying a motion for the change of the place of trial of such action and an intention to obtain leave to incorporate in the record of appeal from the order, the record also constituting the transcript on appeal from the judgment.
In Gervais v. Joyce, 15 Cal. App. 189 , [ 114 Pac. 409 ], it is held that the failure to file the transcript is not excused by reason of the fact that the transcript was left with the attorney for respondent for examination and it was returned within ample time for filing, but the attorney for appellant “was unaware of the exact time that the same was signed, and through his inadvertence and neglect overlooked the time required within which to file the same in the appellate court.”
In Hamaker v. Keating, 158 Cal. 109 , [ 110 Pac. 109 ], for failure to file the transcript the excuse was offered that the attorney, “after filing the notice of appeal, elected to have the record prepared in accordance with section 953a, and thereupon conceived the idea that the notice to be given to the clerk for the preparation of the transcript under that section would not have any effect and would not be mandatory upon the clerk, unless there was on file in his office at the time a duly served notice to the appellant’s attorney of the entry of the order appealed from, and that with this idea in mind, he deferred giving any notice to the clerk and awaited the service of notice to himself of the entry of the order from which the appeal was taken and of which he already had full knowledge.” It was held that such a mistake did not constitute a ground for relief.
But, for another reason set out in the Keating ease, supra, the default should not be set aside. Therein the supreme court
The appeal is therefore dismissed.
Hart, J., and Chipman, P. J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Union Lumber Co. v. Metropolis Construction Co. 13 Cal. App. 584 p. 43
- Gervais v. Joyce 15 Cal. App. 189 p. 43
- Hamaker v. Keating 158 Cal. 109 p. 43