Majority
Headnote
Insolvent Bank—Rehabilitation by New Bank—Exchange of Claims for Bonds—Dividend—Agreement for Reassignment— Executed Payment of Debt—Rights of Receiver of New Bank. Where an insolvent bank was sought to be rehabilitated by a new bank, which took assignments of its claims and issued its bonds to the claimants, and a dividend of fifty cents on the dollar was declared by the insolvent bank, and appellants, as claimants of bonds, being indebted to the receiver of the insolvent bank forOn June 25, 1908, the Market Street Bank of San Francisco, a corporation, was adjudged insolvent, and Louis H. Mooser was appointed receiver thereof to liquidate its affairs. Shortly thereafter certain persons interested in various ways with the bank conceived a plan of rehabilitating that institution, and for the purpose of carrying out that plan organized a corporation under the name of the Market Street Securities Company. That corporation issued to the creditors and depositors of the Market Street Bank bonds in exchange for claims and accounts against the bank, the ultimate purpose being to buy in, if possible, all of the bank’s outstanding obligations. Subsequently the securities company passed a resolution and gave public notice to the effect that if the proposed rehabilitation of the insolvent bank was not successful, it would return the claims, consisting of bank books and other evidences of indebtedness, to the parties who had assigned them to the securities company,
The terms of this resolution are not contained in the transcript, but its existence seems to have been recognized by the parties to the litigation, and its terms are to be gathered from the briefs of counsel. It has, however, but a remote bearing upon the questions involved in the appeal, as the rights of the appellants, if any, arise out of a specific agreement alleged to have been made between them and the securities company.
Among other creditors of the insolvent' bank who entered into the plan of its rehabilitation was the firm of Kelleher & Browne, appellants herein, who became the owners of o some $8,000 worth of the bonds of the securities company issued as indicated, part thereof being in exchange for their deposit account with the insolvent bank, and the remainder having been acquired by them either directly from the securities company in exchange for assignments of other accounts against said bank, or intermediately from persons to whom they had been directly issued.
Kelleher & Browne were tenants of the Market Street Bank, and it is undisputed that they were indebted to Louis H. Mooser, as receiver, in the sum of $875 for unpaid rent.
Upon a sale of the assets of the insolvent bank the court, on or about February 4, 1909, declared a dividend of fifty cents on the dollar to be paid to the owners and holders of claims against said bank.
On January 7, 1909, the appellants, although they at this time were merely the owners of bonds of the securities company, filed a claim with the receiver of the insolvent bank for some $8,000, apparently in anticipation of redelivering their bonds to the securities company and receiving from it the claims and accounts for which the bonds had been issued, and they indorsed upon this claim an assignment of the sum of $875 thereof to Receiver Mooser to enable Mooser to retain this sum out of any money becoming payable by him to the appellants.
In the month of June, 1909, appellants arrived at an agreement with the securities company, through its president, F. M. Meigs, for the return to that company of the bonds held by
Petitions were filed by both Harrison and the appellants, each claiming to be the owner of the whole of said claims and entitled to the dividend thereon. Receiver Mooser answered, setting up the payment to himself as receiver of the $875 as aforesaid in satisfaction of the rent due from the appellants, and leaving himself at the disposition of the court as to whom he should recognize as the owner of the claims upon which the dividend was still unpaid.
Kelleher & Browne appeal from both said orders. They claim, as against Harrison, to be the owners of the claims; and as against Mooser, that he accepted certain specific bonds of the face value of $1,750 in payment of his rent, and that the claims the dividend upon which he paid to himself were not those for which said bonds Were issued, "but were claims issued against bonds owned and still in the possession of appellants—from which it is argued that the receiver has twice been paid the rent due him.
We think both the orders appealed from were correct and proper.
As to the order concerning Harrison, the execution of the agreement between Meigs and appellants did not proceed far enough to give to the latter any valid title to the claims. If, instead of allowing the transaction to proceed as it did, the appellants had themselves taken from the securities company a reassignment of the claims, and redelivered to that company the bonds, the transaction would have been complete, and would have resulted in substituting appellants as the owners of " said claims. But the transaction followed a different course. Meigs proceeded himself to collect the dividend on the claims—undoubtedly with the intention of turning it over to appellants -and receiving from them the bonds when he should do so. He even offered them the first and only payment that he received from Mooser on account of the dividend; and this the appellants very ill-advisedly rejected. The securities company had received nothing from the appellants under this agreement, and upon the rejection by appellants of the check for $1,500, it had the right not to proceed any further in the transaction—which course Receiver Harrison, who was subsequently appointed, chose to pursue.
As to the order permitting Mooser to retain the $875, dividend on $1,750 worth of claims delivered to him by Meigs, it must not be overlooked that the appellants had themselves assigned to Mooser so much of their claims as this dividend would represent; and although at the time they did so they
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
Hall, J., and Lennon, P. J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the district court of appeal on May 18, 1912, and a petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on June 17, 1912.