Majority
Headnote
Pleading—Leave to Answer After Demurrer Overruled—Discretion of Court.—The superior court has legal authority to deny a. defendant the privilege to file an answer after he has interposed a demurrer which has been overruled, subject, however, to review in ease of arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of its discretion.An action was originally commenced in the justice court of No. 10 township in Placer County by
It is the contention of petitioner that respondent had no authority to render judgment on the merits without having disposed of the demurrer. It is not disputed that the demurrer presented an issue of law which it was the duty of the court to determine and,that the adjudication of that issue was a jurisdictional prerequisite to the determination of the cause upon its merits. It is, however, the claim of respondent that the order made by the court was in effect an order overruling the demurrer and denying defendant permission to answer and therefore within its jurisdiction.
That a superior court has legal authority to deny a defendant the privilege to file an answer after he has interposed a demurrer and it has been overruled, cannot be disputed. Section 472 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that “when the demurrer to a complaint is overruled and there is no answer filed, the court may, upon such terms as may be just,
The trouble here is, though, that said order is entirely silent as to the demurrer. No reference is made to it and, although we may suspect that it was the intention of the learned trial judge to overrule said demurrer and withhold from defendant the privilege of filing an answer, such intention, if it existed, should have been expressed, we think, in the formal order. We can, of course, consider only the record as presented and we look in vain for any mandatory disposition of said issue of law. To hold that the language used was sufficient for the purpose would be to encourage an unwarranted invasion of the right of litigants to demand reasonable certainty in judicial proceedings to the end that prescribed methods of redress may not be obscured or destroyed and that complete justice may be effected.
It is, of course, no answer to say that the result would have been the same if the court had expressly overruled the demurrer and directed the default of defendant. The question is not what the final result would be, but, rather, whether the court has followed the steps required by the law in reaching that result.
While no case directly in point has been called to our attention, Null v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. App. 207 , [ 87 Pac. 392 ], and Kraker v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 651 , [ 115 Pac. 663 ], are instructive as to the general principle involved. In the former it was held that ‘ ‘ The superior court has no jurisdiction to try a case de novo on appeal from the justice court, where no issues of fact have been tried in the justice’s court. If the only question presented is one of law as to the jurisdiction of the justice’s court, it is the duty of the superior court to affirm or reverse the decision, and, if reversed, to remand the case for trial upon the issues of fact; and where it has improperly tried such an appeal de novo and rendered judg
The conclusion we have reached leaves the cause pending in the trial court with the demurrer and motion to strike out undisposed of. If the decision as to these should be against defendant, no doubt the court will carefully consider the propriety of permitting him to file his answer; which, it appears, he sought leave to present after said judgment was rendered against him. If the court has reason to believe that he is acting in good faith, such permission, of course, ought to be granted that the cause may be fully tried upon its merits.
We think the said judgment should be annulled and it is so ordered.
Chipman, P. J., and Hart, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Borland v. Thornton 12 Cal. 440 p. 193
- Null v. Superior Court 4 Cal. App. 207 p. 193
- Kraker v. Superior Court 15 Cal. App. 651 p. 193