Majority
Headnote
Action fob Damages—Death of Hospital Patient—Negligence—• Insufficient Circumstantial Evidence.—In an action against two hospital associations to recover damages for the death of the minor son of the plaintiff, while a patient in one of such hospitals for treatment for pulmonary pneumonia, based upon the alleged negligence of the defendants in leaving a solution of bichloride of mercury in the room where it could be reached by the patient, which it is alleged that the deceased got out of bed and drank while delirious and irrational and in the absence from the room of the attendant, a verdict in favor of the plaintiff is based upon mere conjecture, where there is no evidence of the presence of the solution in the room for the twelve-hour period next preceding the alleged drinking thereof, or any evidence as to th"e quantity or strength of the solution, and the evidence of the condition of the patient after the alleged drinking of the poison was to the effect that it was not accompanied by symptoms which manifest themselves in cases of such poisoning, but on the other hand that his symptoms were such as would follow a recurrence of acute pneumonia due to a relapse.This action was instituted by plaintiff, a widow, against defendants, both of which are corporations, to recover damages for the loss of her minor son, whose death it is alleged occurred as a result of negligence on the part of defendants.
A trial was had by a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff, upon which verdict judgment was entered against both defendants and from which judgment, and an order denying its motion for a new trial, the Emergency Hospital Association appeals; and the American Hospital Association likewise appeals from an order denying a like motion for a new trial made by it.
The judgment-roll is accompanied by a bill of exceptions upon which the motions for new trial were made.
The material facts upon which the action is based are as follows: Plaintiff’s son, Eugene L. Wilbur, of the age of about 18 years, was a member in good standing of the American Hospital Association which, in case of sickness of its members, undertook, in consideration of stipulated sums paid by them at regular intervals, to furnish them with such medical attendance, nursing, and hospital care as might be necessary and required during such illness. The American Hospital Association had no hospital of its own, but there existed between it and its codefendant an arrangement under and pursuant to which the Emergency Hospital Association received members of the former association who were ill and in need of hospital service, thus acting as agent for and on behalf of the association of which Eugene L. Wilbur was such member. In July, 1908, while suffering from an attack of pulmonary pneumonia, the American Hospital Association, through its regular physicians and employees, took charge of said Eugene L. Wilbur and placed him in the hospital so conducted by the Emergency Hospital Association, which latter association undertook to and did furnish nurses and hospital service in
The chief contention of appellants is that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict in that the conclusion reached by the jury, to the effect that deceased drank the bichloride solution as a result of which he died, is based upon mere conjecture. In considering this question it is necessary to refer at length to the evidence bearing upon the subject.
When deceased entered the hospital, about July 23d, his condition was such that Dr. Clark, the attending physician, who was an employee of the American Hospital Association, caused a special nurse to be assigned to his care. This nurse was Mrs. Rosmer, who testified that upon assuming charge of the patient she for the purpose of disinfecting the thermometer with which at frequent intervals she took his temperature, prepared a solution of bichloride of mercury in a small glass, said to be a jelly glass, and which from said time until she surrendered her charge at 1:30 p. m., August 1st, she kept upon a chiffonier in the room occupied by Wilbur. It appears that the condition of the patient on August 1st was such as to have justified defendants in dispensing with the special nurse, and no negligence is predicated upon the act of defendants in so doing. Upon Mrs. Rosmer’s departure she left the glass containing the solution upon the chiffonier in Wilbur’s room. The record is silent as to any occurrences between 1:30 o ’clock and 7 o ’clock p. m. of said day, but at 7 p. m. of the day that Mrs. Rosmer left, Miss Pawsey went on duty, remaining until 7 A. m. the next day, and Wilbur, among several other patients occupying rooms in the vicinity of his room, was assigned to her for care and such attention
The contention of respondent is that Wilbur’s death was due to poisoning from drinking the bichloride of mercury, as alleged in the complaint, rather than to a recurrence of acute pneumonia due to relapse. It may be conceded that, considered as an abstract question of law, it was negligence to have the bichloride solution in the room where it could be reached by the patient. The question however, is, Did such
Moreover, not only was there no evidence as to the quantity of the solution, but there was no testimony rising to the dignity of evidence as to the strength of the solution. The evidence conclusively shows that bichloride of mercury is used medicinally, administered in doses of one-twelfth to one-sixteenth of a grain, and that as thus administered it is not poisonous. The only evidence upon which respondent relies as showing the solution to have been of poisonous strength is that of Dr. King, upon his cross-examination when called as a witness for defendants, wherein he says: ‘ ‘ There is not any usual quantity of bichloride of mercury used in the hospital for disinfecting the thermometer. Some people use one amount, and some another. There is no fixed quantity. Q. Suppose that there was enough bichloride of mercury in the glass to act as a disinfectant- A. Some use 1 to four thousand, and some use 1 to ten thousand. One part in a thousand is about what is generally used. One to 500 means about a grain to the ounce; five or six grains in six to eight ounces of water. That is a poison dose. However, it is hardly ever used in that strength. Q. Supposing one to a thousand ? A. Yes, three grains. That is a poison dose. That does not always kill, but it has. If a patient suffering from pneumonia had taken a dose of that kind he would probably have bichloride of mercury poisoning. If I thought he had bichloride symptoms, I would expect a collapse in a short time, and vomiting, and a little later I would expect probably diarrhoea. Q. You say it would take a very much less quantity of bichloride of mercury to affect a person in that condition than a well man? A. Yes, rather. Presumably there would be enough in the glass to be a poisonous dose.
Again, the condition of Wilbur after the alleged taking of the solution was not accompanied by symptoms shown, without contradiction, by reputable physicians and nurses to manifest themselves in cases of such poisoning. They all agree that bichloride of mercury is an irritant poison and a poisonous dose is always accompanied with burning of the mouth, throat, and stomach, resultant pain therefrom, vomiting, and generally diarrhoea. None of these, except the vomiting, manifested itself in this case, and that, as it clearly appears, was due to the administering of whites of eggs as an antidote. Other symptoms exhibited, such as a high degree of temperature and greatly accelerated heart action, were conclusively shown to be inconsistent with the theory that Wilbur died as a result of taking a poisonous solution of bichloride of mercury. The disappearance of the solution, assuming that it was of poisonous strength and quantity, is just as consistent with the theory that it was thrown out of the window as it is with a theory that Wilbur drank it; indeed, more so, since had he drank it the effect of so doing would have manifested itself in certain symptoms, none of which was exhibited by deceased. The language adopted by the supreme court in discussing a like question involved in People v. Staples, 149 Cal. 405 , [ 86 Pac. 886 ], is peculiarly applicable to the facts of this case. It is there said: “It will be perceived that the evidence in the ease relied on to establish the guilt of the defendant is practically circumstantial, and it is elementary law that where the evidence is of such a character it must be not only consistent with the hypothesis of guilt but inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis. The deduction to be drawn from these circumstances is ordinarily one for the jury, but where, in a case such as this, every circumstance relied on as incriminating is equally compatible with innocence, there is a failure of proof necessary to sustain a conviction, and the question presented is one of law for the court.” While that was a criminal case, the rule of evidence declared is equally applie
Over defendants’ objection, Mrs. Rosmer was permitted to testify that Miss Brown, the matron in charge of the nurses and an employee of the Emergency Hospital Association, instructed her not to tell Mrs. Wilbur about her son having drank the bichloride of mercury. This was error and well calculated to prejudice defendants in the minds of the jurors. Not only was it in the nature of hearsay, but the suggestion made by Miss Brown in nowise tended to prove the issue as to whether or not Wilbur had drunk the solution. Moreover, it was a declaration concerning a past transaction as to which Miss Brown is not shown to have had any personal knowledge. “The opinion of an agent, based upon past occurrences, is never to be received as an admission of his principals; and this is doubly true where the agent was not a party to those occurrences.” (Insurance Co. v. Mahone, 21 Wall. 157 , [ 22 L. Ed. 593 ].) In Beasley v. San Jose Fruit-Packing Co., 92 Cal. 388 , [ 28 Pac. 485 ], it is said: “The declarations of an agent or servant do not, in general, bind the principal. To be admissible, they must be in the nature of original, and not of hearsay evidence.” Conceding that Miss Brown, by rea
Defendants’ objection interposed to the question asked of Mrs. Wilbur as to what, if any, property she had at the time of her son’s death, was overruled, and she was permitted to testify that she had nothing. Counsel for plaintiff devote much space in their brief in an effort to sustain this 'ruling. In so doing they concede that the supreme court of this state has held directly against their contention. This being true, there could be no purpose in an extended discussion of the question as to whether or not the ruling constituted error. Suffice it to say, the supreme court has so decided; hence it is not an open question. Some of these cases are the following : ‘ ‘ Considering a like question in Mahoney v. San Francisco etc. Ry. Co., 110 Cal. 471 , [ 42 Pac. 968 ], it was said: “It was, however, in my opinion, clear error to allow plaintiffs to prove that the children of the deceased had no means of their own. Such testimony could have been offered for no other purpose than to create prejudice, and should have been excluded.” In Green v. Southern Pacific Co., 122 Cal. 563 , [ 55 Pac. 577 ], it is said: “Such evidence is never admissible in a ease of this character, for the very simple reason that the extent of a defendant’s responsibility for the results of his negligence is not to be measured by the condition as to affluence or poverty of the injured party at the time of suffering the injury, since that is a condition for which the defendant is in no way responsible.” And in the very late case of Story v. Green, 164 Cal. 768 , [Ann. Cas. 1914B, 961, 130 Pac. 870 ], it is said: “It has long been established that the plaintiff may not in such a case introduce proof of his poverty, because the damages are not in any manner dependent upon his financial condition. ’ ’
In view of the conclusion reached, we deem it unnecessary to consider other alleged errors to which appellants direct attention.
The judgment and orders from which the appeals are prosecuted are reversed.
Conrey, P. J., and James, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Puckhaber v. Southern Pacific Co. 132 Cal. 363 p. 756
- Cary v. The L.A. Ry. 157 Cal. 599 p. 756
- People v. Staples 149 Cal. 405 p. 758
- Insurance Co. v. Mahone 22 L. Ed. 593 p. 759
- Beasley v. San José Fruit-Packing Co. 92 Cal. 388 p. 759
- Luman v. Golden Ancient Channel Mining Co. 140 Cal. 700 p. 760
- Boone v. Oakland Transit Co. 139 Cal. 490 p. 760
- Mahoney v. San Francisco & San Mateo Railway Co. 110 Cal. 471 p. 760
- Green v. Southern Pacific Co. 122 Cal. 563 p. 760
- Story v. Green 164 Cal. 768 p. 760