Majority
Headnote
Negligence—Injuries to Driver of Delivery Wagon—Explosion of Ammonia — Proximate Cause of Injury — Pleadings and Evidence—Failure to Fasten Cork.—In this action for personal injuries received by the driver of a delivery wagon from burns caused by the popping out of the cork from a demijohn of concentrated ammonia which he was engaged in delivering, it is held that, in view of the admissions of the answer and the testimony of the plaintiff—who alone was able to describe the accident and the circumstances surrounding it—4he jury were warranted in the implied findings that the defendant was guilty of negligence in sending out the demijohn without securing the cork by seal, wire, or other means, and that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence in the way he loaded or drove his wagon, or in the matter of the handling of the demijohn after it had been placed therein.Plaintiff brings the action, by his guardian ad litem, to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been suffered while in the employ of defendant. He recovered judgment, from, which and from the order denying a motion for a new trial defendant appeals.
It is alleged in the complaint that, in the month of February, 1912, plaintiff, who was then of the age of nineteen years, was employed by defendant in the work of driving an automobile truck and the delivery of packages from defendant’s place of business to its various customers in Los Angeles County, and that, after so working for about four months, defendant shifted plaintiff’s employment to driving a delivery wagon drawn by a horse; that at no time during said employment did plaintiff have any knowledge of drugs and chemicals of any kind nor did he understand the natural dangers of said employment or dangers of handling the drugs and chemicals placed in his possession for delivery. The circumstances attending the injury are stated as follows: “That on the twenty-eighth day of June, 1912, and while so engaged as aforesaid with the said defendant, the said defendant caused to be placed in said wagon aforesaid, for delivery, a gallon demijohn filled with and labeled concentrated ammonia, ’ to be by said Leland Congdon delivered to one of its customers in said city of Los Angeles; that the said Leland Congdon thereafter started on his way with said horse and wagon and said demijohn so labeled concentrated ammonia’ to deliver the same as directed by said defendant; that in the course of the trip from the said place of business of the said defendant, then located at numbers 843 and 855 Stephenson Avenue, said city of Los Angeles, the jolting of said wagon in passing over the rough places in the street caused the said demijohn to be turned over on its side, and it was shifting about in the bottom of said wagon, when the said Leland Congdon halted said horse and alighted from the said wagon, and took hold of the said demijohn and was about to place the same in a box and place some excelsior around it to prevent it from again turning over or working about in said wagon, when the cork in said demijohn which had not been secured in any way,
Summing up the defense, it is alleged that plaintiff’s injury was caused solely by his carelessness and negligent act, first, in placing the demijohn in the wagon before it was ready for transportation; second, in failing to place it in a box surrounded with excelsior; third, in driving the wagon negligently so as to cause the demijohn to be jolted and moved about in the wagon; and, fourth, in attempting to lift the demijohn in such manner that its opening where the cork was situated was directed toward plaintiff.
We have given the pleadings somewhat at length, for it will thus be seen that the issues are thereby considerably narrowed.
The answer alleges that plaintiff “did know the character of said concentrated ammonia and did know its liability to explode and did know that the same was dangerous.” If plaintiff knew these facts it must be assumed that defendant believed them to exist.
The answer admits that plaintiff took hold of said demijohn “and was about to place the same in a box and was about to place some excelsior around it to prevent it from again turning over or working about in said wagon.” The answer also admitted that “by being jolted around in said wagon and by reason of the action of the warm weather thereon the said ammonia did expand and the cork, not being secured, did pop out of said demijohn and the said ammonia flew therefrom.” The answer admits “that said cork should have been secured in said demijohn by seal, wire, or other means so as to prevent its being forced out.”
The controverted issues of fact may be reduced to the following : Was it defendant’s duty to see to it that the liquid in the demijohn, or concentrated ammonia, was secured by a cork
The uncontroverted evidence was that plaintiff was twenty years old in June, 1912; had received a grammar school education and business course in high school—“just took bookkeeping but knew nothing of chemistry”; he entered defendant’s employment as driver of a gasoline delivery truck in February, 1912, and later changed to driving a horse and wagon and continued in defendant’s service until June 28, 1912, the day of the accident.
• Plaintiff testified that he reported to Mr. Bryant, defendant’s shipping clerk, for duty and that nothing special was said about his work; “he give me my orders to take goods to a certain place. He just give me a bill of goods to deliver. He give me some tissue with the numbers of boxes and I carried the boxes out and put them in the truck and delivered the goods. The goods were put up in the boxes by him and turned over to me. I took the boxes and put them in the truck and delivered them pursuant to what instructions were on the tissues. These tissues were the same as bills, tissue paper, and there was a bill for each box. . The address was on it. . . . This manner of employment continued right along during the time that I was in the employ of the defendant. Each day I would receive these orders and these boxes and go out and deliver them. . . . Q. Now, in the course of your employment there, did any of these gentlemen ever say anything to you about any of these packages that you were delivering? A. They did not, nor did they call my attention to any particular manner in which any of them should be packed, particularly the demijohns. We did not have anything to do with the packing at all. My duties did not involve the preparation of any of these packages for delivery. Q. And what was the general custom there in setting these packages out for delivery—were they placed in a particular
His cross-examination developed nothing to materially affect his testimony in chief. As to the method of loading the wagon he testified: “Sometimes Mr. Bryant put them in the back and we would load them up at the front end. We would place them in the truck in the way we wanted to carry
We do not deem it necessary to give the testimony of the different physicians who treated plaintiff. There was abundant evidence to show that he was given proper medical attention and that the injury complained of was the direct result of the accident, and in no wise was attributable to improper treatment.
Some testimony was submitted by defendant tending to show that concentrated ammonia is not explosive; that when the cork is removed from the container fumes pass out but no liquid; that it is not caustic and will not burn the cuticle when in contact with it; that general instructions were given to drivers of delivery wagons to use care in handling chemicals,
It is urged that the law would impute to plaintiff the knowledge that “almost any drug or chemical is injurious when brought in direct contact with the eyeball,” and that, “as matter of law the defendant had a right to assume that plaintiff was possessed of common knowledge, and as a matter of law the defendant was not obliged to instruct the plaintiff as to any matter of which he had knowledge or presumed knowledge.” It may be that plaintiff knew ammonia brought in contact with the eyeball would injure it, and that he needed no instruction on that fact, still there remained to be considered by the jury the question whether in sending out the demijohn of ammonia without properly securing the cork defendant was not negligent and whether or not such negligence contributed to the injury.
In this connection it is claimed that the court erred in giving instructions to the jury which held the plaintiff “to a different degree of care for his own preservation than he would have been if he were a year older, whereas there is nothing in the proof or the circumstances which would justify the inference that the plaintiff was under any disability by reason of his age.” One of the instructions was as follows: “You are further instructed that the conduct of a minor and the question as to whether he acted negligently or not must in the nature of the case be a question of fact for the jury, rather than of law, as it is the province of the jury to determine whether or not the minor duly exercised such judgment
Other instructions followed in which this difference of responsibility is pointed out, the court saying: “His [plaintiff’s] conduct is to be judged in accordance with the knowledge, experience, and judgment he may possess when called upon to act. And it is a question for you, gentlemen of the jury, to say whether in the performance of his task Leland Congdon duly exercised such judgment as he should possess, taking into consideration his years, his experience, and his ability in connection with his employment, and the risks and dangers thereof.” Defendant cites Lemasters v. Southern Pacific Co., 131 Gal. 105, [ 63 Pac. 128 ].
"When we consider the nature of plaintiff’s employment, his intelligence, and his experience in the kind of work he was doing, we do not think the fact of his minority (he was twenty years old) should have been presented to the jury as an element affecting his responsibility. Coupled, however, with the qualification that he “exercised such judgment as he possessed, taking into consideration his years, experience, and ability,” and further stating that “his conduct is to be judged in accordance with the knowledge, experience, and judgment he may possess when called upon to act, . . . taking into consideration his years, his experience, and his ability in connection with his employment, and the risks and dangers thereof ’ ’ —we feel assured that the jury were not influenced in any material degree by being reminded by the court of the fact that plaintiff was a minor, for, notwithstanding that fact, the jury were told that his conduct was to be judged by “the knowledge, experience, and judgment he possessed.”
The judgment and order are affirmed.
Burnett, J., and Hart, J., concurred.
A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on February 14, 1916.