Majority
Headnote
Sale of Horses—Condition of Satisfaction—Action to Recover Back Monet Paid—Demand and Refusal—Rescission not Involved—Breach of Contract.—An action by a corporation to recover back money paid for the purchase of horses from the defendants under contract, that if, after trial, they should prove unsatisfactory, they should be returned at the expense of defendants, and that they should repay the purchase money, which defendants refused to perform, after notice that the horses had proved unsatisfactory, and an offer of plaintiff to return them, with demand for repayment, involves no question of rescission, but is based upon a breach of contract, the cause of action for which accrued when defendants refused to perform their part of the contract.Action for money. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, from which judgment, and an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals.
Plaintiff avers in its complaint that it purchased a span of horses from defendants upon an agreement that if, after trial, the same should prove unsatisfactory, such horses should be returned and defendants would repay the purchase money, together with expenses of shipping to the place of trial, and expenses incident to such trial. Further, that the team, upon trial, was found to be unsatisfactory, and plaintiff immediately notified defendants of such fact, offered to return said horses, and demanded the repayment of the money, all of which defendants refused. Defendants deny all of the allegations. The evidence in the record is sufficient to support the verdict. No question of rescission is involved. The action is based upon a contract, the breach of which is clearly shown. The articles of incorporation of the plaintiff, with the filing marks thereon, were evidence of the proper filing of such articles and the due incorporation of the plaintiff, even were such proof necessary, when we consider the written receipt in evidence from which it appears that the defendants contracted with the plaintiff in its corporate name and received money admitted thereby to have been money of the plaintiff. This written receipt was competent evidence in the regard just mentioned, as well as tending to prove the actual receipt of the money, which was denied.
We discover no merit in the many other specifications of error in anywise prejudicial to defendants, or worthy of notice.
Judgment and order affirmed.
Gray, P. J., and Smith, J., concurred.
A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on June 4, 1906.