Majority
Headnote
Criminal Law—Bobbery—Evidence—Use of Stolen Automobile— Prejudicial Error.—Where, in a prosecution for robbery, it is shown that the persons engaged in the commission of the crime drove to the scene thereof in a Ford automobile about 7 o’clock in the evening, and the evidence is barely, if at all, sufficient to justify the verdict that the defendant participated in the robbery, it is prejudicial error to permit the owner of a Ford automobile to testify, over objection made by the defendant, that he left his machine at a corner about 4 o’clock in the afternoon, that it was gone when he returned there to get it about 8 o’clock, and that he found it at another place some hours later, in the absence of evidence identifying such machine as the automobile used by the perpetrators of the crime, except that both were Ford machines and the isinglass was out of the back thereof.Defendant was convicted of the crime of robbery and now appeals from the judgment and from an order denying his motion for a new trial. The grounds of appeal are that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict, and that the court erred in some of its rulings upon objections to offered testimony.
Over objections made by the defendant, one Gronsky was permitted to testify that he was the owner of a Ford machine which he left at the corner of Ninth and Spring Streets at 4 o’clock that afternoon; that the machine was gone when he returned there to get it at about 8 o’clock P. M., and that he found it at another place some hours later. There is no evidence identifying Gronsky’s automobile with the one in which the defendant was seen by the other witnesses, except that all three of these witnesses describe a Ford machine which was not new, and each witness states that the isinglass was out of the back of the machine which he saw. One Frank Richards testified that at about a quarter after 7 he passed along Stephenson Avenue opposite the Rosenbusch shop and his attention was
While the evidence is sufficient to establish the existence of suspicious circumstances concerning the defendant, it is barely, if at all, sufficient to justify the verdict that Ben-wick participated in the Bosenbusch robbery. Assuming it to be legally sufficient, the evidence of that fact is purely circumstantial, and leaves the case in that condition where errors in the admission or rejection of testimony would easily turn the scale and be seriously prejudicial to the defendant.
The testimony of Gronsky had no relation to the case, unless it was introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant or some of his associates had stolen Gronsky’s automobile and were using a stolen automobile at the time of the Bosenbusch robbery. The evidence was insufficient to establish that fact, and even if it had been sufficient therefor, the evidence was not admissible for that purpose in this action. It was not a case wherein the prosecution was entitled to aid its proof of the charge on which Ben-wick then was being tried by proving that he had previously committed some ' other crime. Nevertheless, this would very probably have the effect of creating prejudice against the defendant in the - minds of the jurors, and
On behalf of the defendant, Edward Biehl and his wife, Prances Biehl, testified that Benwick and his wife, some months before the date of this robbery, had occupied rooms in their apartment house at the corner of Washington Street and Maple Avenue; that Benwick came to that apartment house at about a quarter before 7 o’clock on the evening of February 28th and made inquiry to find out whether they would again permit him to occupy an apartment in their house; that Benwick remained there with them until at least as late as half-past 7; that prior to the evening of February 28th Benwick had not been there since the latter part of January. In rebuttal of this testimony the prosecution introduced as a witness Mrs. Gertrude Gorham, who had occupied rooms in the apartment house of the Biehls on February 28th. She stated that she saw Benwick call at Mrs. Biehl’s on the morning of February 28th. She also stated that she saw Mr. and Mrs. Biehl that evening at their supper between 6 and 7 o’clock, and that at that time Mrs. Biehl told her that Benwick had been back there to rent rooms. Mr. and Mrs. Biehl had testified that they did not have their dinner that evening until a quarter to 8.
Mrs. Gorham was the last witness at the trial, and her testimony seems to have been given at the close of the day, and the last thing occurring before adjourning was the district attorney’s statement, “We rest.” On the opening of court the next morning defendant’s counsel requested that he be permitted to call back Mrs. Gorham in surrebuttal. The court responded: “I will not open the case for any more evidence.” Defendant’s attorney replied: “I did not close last night, your Honor; I didn’t rest my case, and I have positive information that the jury ought to hear from this witness, Mrs. Gorham, that she does not know within a month’s time of the 28th whether the defendant Benwick was at the house there, and she will so testify if I put her on the stand.” The court again refused the request and no further evidence was introduced. It can easily be seen that if the testimony of the witnesses Biehl was true, the defendant could not be guilty in this case. The testimony of Mrs. Gorham furnished the only evidence directly con
The judgment and order are reversed.
James, J., and Shaw, J., concurred.