People v. Khan

Having been convicted of the crime of passing a check without having sufficient funds on deposit in the drawee bank to pay the same, defendant appeals from a judgment of imprisonment entered against him.

The crime charged was that described in section 476a of the Penal Code, which makes it a felony for a person, “with intent to defraud,” to draw or deliver to another a Check or draft on a bank, knowing at the time that he has not sufficient funds in or credit with the bank to meet the

[1] Under the first contention appellant insists that, in order for an intent to defraud to exist within the meaning of the section, the probability must appear that damage may result to the person to whom the check is delivered, and that where such check is given for a debt past due and the recipient parts with no new consideration, it is impossible that he may be damaged. We do not think that the words of the section as requiring that an intent to defraud shall exist should be so narrowly construed; we do not think that it is necessary that it be shown, in order to establish such intent, that the recipient of the check be actually defrauded as the result of the passing thereof. [2] To our minds, the fraudulent intent here was shown when it was made to appear that the appellant gave the check, representing thereby that it was good and valid, and that it was given and received with the intent that it should pay appellant’s debt. It seems to us immaterial as to whether the acceptance of the worthless check actually had the effect of extinguishing the debt. The language of the court in People v. Wilbur, 33 Cal. App. 511 , [ 165 Pac. 729 ], while not fitting the facts here presented, supports our view of the law, where it is said: “And the fact that the check

[3] Under the second point made, the evidence is pointed' to which shows that at the time of making the delivery of the check in question, defendant did actually have a credit at the bank of a sum of monéy in excess of that called for by the check. However, prior to the making of ■ this check, the defendant had delivered to the bank a writing in the following words: “This is to authorize the American State Bank to ffionor all checks I write to garages for gasoline. However, payment is stopped on all other checks.” The president of the bank testified that by this order it was understood between appellant ánd the bank that no checks drawn by appellant should be honored except those having the word “gas” on them. On cross-examination, when it was shown that other checks had been cashed without having the word indicated upon them, he testified that the tank did pay other checks than those bearing the prescribed word where the appellant personally came into the bank with the holder of the check and requested the bank to pay. In other words, that the instructions to the bank were partially oral and partially in writing. Clearly, under this state of facts, the arrangement and understanding with the bank was that the appellant had no credit within the xheaning of section 476a of the Penal Code to meet a check drawn as the one in question here was drawn.

! As to other points argued: [4] We think the court properly admitted the testimony of the prosecutor who told how, after the check had been dishonored at "the bank, he accosted appellant and informed him of the situation, and that appellant laughed and responded. “Some time I pay him.” This testimony was entitled to be considered by the jury as indicating the guilty knowledge of appellant and as affecting the question of his good intent in passing the check.

We find no errors in this record, which would justify an order of reversal.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Conrey, P. J., and Shaw, J., concurred.