Majority
Headnote
[1] Appeal—Absence of Bill of Exceptions—Evidence—Presumptions.—Where an appeal is taken on the judgment-roll alone, the appellate court must assume that the evidence presented in support of the findings of the trial court was competent to establish the facts alleged, that it was received without objection, and that it was sufficient to sustain each of the fact's found.Plaintiff claims that the defendants have greatly injured his orange orchard by wrongfully diverting thereon large quantities of storm water. He seeks an injunction, and prays for damages. Defendants had judgment and plaintiff appeals on the judgment-roll alone.
Plaintiff is the owner of an orange orchard on the southerly slope of the Sierra Madre Mountains. Just north of the land of plaintiff, and- separated therefrom by Ledora Avenue, are the lands of defendants. Located in these mountains is a deep ravine, known as Shorey-Canyon, which, with its many branches, constitutes the natural drainage-way of waters falling in said locality. In the year 1914 defendants constructed in this ravine, on their land, a concrete flume about five and one-half feet in width and about three and one-half feet in depth, with a fall of about ninety feet in a distance of 1,320 feet. Plaintiff "seeks to have this flume • declared a nuisance, and removed, and the ditch in which it is constructed filled to its natural level and grade.
The lower court found that plaintiff’s orchard suffered the injury alleged. It further found that for many years prior to the commencement of the action, and before the cultivation of plaintiff’s land, and at a time, and during a period, when all of the land thereabout was in a state of nature, there had been, and was, a natural course, or channel, leading out of Shorey Canyon and continuing across the lands of the defendants, over Ledora Avenue and across the land of the plaintiff, which channel carried the natural flow of storm water, flowing from said canyon over defendants’ land, across Ledora Avenue, and thence over the land of plaintiff; that plaintiff had at all times accepted said water, and made provision for the disposal thereof, by the
[1] In the absence of any bill of exceptions it must be assumed that the evidence presented in support of the foregoing findings was competent to establish the facts alleged, and was received without objection, and was sufficient to sustain each of the facts found. (Cutting Packing Co. v. Canty, 141 Cal. 692 , 695, [ 75 Pac. 564 ]; Damon v. Quinn, 143 Cal. 75 , 77, [ 76 Pac. 818 ].)
[2] Where two parcels of land belonging to different owners are adjacent to each other, and one is lower than the other, and the surface water from the higher tract has been accustomed by a natural flow to pass off over the lower tract, the owner of such upper tract of land has an easement to have the water flow over the land below, and the lower tract is charged with a corresponding servitude. (Ogburn v. Connor, 46 Cal. 346 , 352, [ 13 Am. Rep. 213 ]; Los Angeles Cemetery Assn. v. Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461 , 467, [ 37 Pac. 375 ].) [3] Every land owner must bear the burden of re
[6] The trial court also found that the respondents had acquired a right by prescription to discharge the water upon the land of plaintiff. Appellant contends that, if such right existed, it was a right only to maintain the first ditch, and was abandoned by the- construction and maintenance of the larger concrete flume. We are not impressed with the contention. The right which the respondents had arose from the easement to discharge the storm waters naturally flowing through their land on to the highway adjacent to and lower than their land, and thence over plaintiff’s land if necessary, a right which plaintiff could neither interrupt or prevent. (Los Angeles Cemetery Assn. v. Los Angeles, supra.) It had nothing to do with the particular method employed by respondents in discharging this water, so long as it in no way imposed ah additional burden on plaintiff.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Richards, J., and Kerrigan, J., concurred.
All the Justices concurred, except Wilbur, J., who was absent.
Cases cited
- Cutting Fruit Packing Co. v. Canty 141 Cal. 692 at 695 p. 305
- Damon v. Quinn 143 Cal. 75 at 77 p. 305
- Ogburn v. Connor 46 Cal. 346 at 352 p. 305
- Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles 103 Cal. 461 at 467 p. 305
- Heier v. Krull 160 Cal. 441 at 444 p. 306
- Wood v. Moulton 146 Cal. 317 at 319 p. 306