Majority
Headnote
[1] Evidence—Findings Based on Conflicting Evidence—Appeal.— In an action to recover for personal services, where the evidence is conflicting as to whether the plaintiff was employed by the . defendant corporation or by another company having a similar name and the trial court finds that plaintiff was not employed by defendant corporation, such finding is conclusive and binding on the appellate court.In this action plaintiff sought to recover eight hundred dollars, alleged to be due him as the balance of salary upon a contract made with defendant whereby he was employed by the latter as a director of the production of motion pictures for a compensation of two hundred dol
[1] By answer defendant denied the alleged making of the contract, or that it ever at any time employed plaintiff in any capacity or agreed to pay him any compensation for services rendered to it, or that it agreed to pay plaintiff a .royalty on the pictures produced under his direction, and further denied that plaintiff, as alleged, worked for it from July 17, 1916, to January 14, 1917, or worked for it at all; in accordance with all of which denials the court found in favor of defendant.
Plaintiff’s first contention is that the findings are without sufficient support. It appears from plaintiff’s testimony that about July 16, 1916, in the city of Los Angeles, he was by oral agreement employed by A. Carlos, acting for and on behalf of defendant, at a salary of two hundred dollars per week, in addition to which he was to receive a royalty of two hundred dollars upon the first picture produced and three hundred dollars on each picture thereafter produced; that he produced four pictures upon which no royalty was paid; that his employment continued from July 17, 1916, to January 14, 1917, during which time, except for the last four weeks, he had received from defendant his salary of two hundred dollars per week, but was paid nothing on account of the royalty. As against this evidence, it appears from the testimony of William Fox, president of defendant corporation, that prior to May, 1916, Mr. Carlos was general representative of the company in its sales department, which position he resigned on said date and came from New York city to Los Angeles, where he entered the employ of another corporation, known as the William Fox Vaudeville Company, as general manager of its studios in Los Angeles, and from the time of his resignation occupied no position whatever with defendant, had no authority to act for it, and performed no duties in connection therewith. A. Carlos testified that, while he employed plaintiff at a salary of two hundred dollars per week, his act in so doing was for and on behalf of, and as the manager of, the William Fox Vaudeville Company, for which plaintiff performed services as director of moving pictures, but that he never at any time agreed to pay him any royalty on pictures so produced as director. In addition to this testimony it also
[2] Another alleged error is predicated upon the rulings of the- court in rejecting certain documentary evidence offered by plaintiff for the purpose of showing that Carlos, with whom he made the contract, was the representative of and acting for defendant. One of these documents consisted of an application made March" 17, 1917, by Mrs. O’Connor to the Industrial Accident Commission for an award of compensation for injuries alleged to have been sustained by her as an employee of defendant on September 26, 1916. The answer thereto was signed, “Fox Film Corporation, By A. Carlos, Its General Representative. ’ ’ Another document was the verification of an answer filed in the superior court of Los Angeles County on August 1, 1917, in the case of Standing against the defendant, which likewise was made by A. Carlos as the general representative of defendant. The third documént was an affidavit made by him on March 10, 1917, for the removal of an action pending in the superior court to the federal court, and wherein he stated that he was the general representative of defendant. The court sustained objections to the introduction in evidence of all these documents. At most, the proffered evidence was a mere repetition of the testimony given by Carlos, and hence not admissible for the purpose of impeachment. Appellant, however, insists that the documents were admissible as substantive evidence showing admissions against interest and
The judgment is affirmed.
Conrey, P. J., and James, J., concurred.