Majority
Headnote
[1] Accounts—Reciprocal Demands—Statute of Limitations.—An account showing on one side the different items furnished and amounts paid by one person for the joint benefit of himself and another, and on the other side the different items furnished and amounts paid by the latter for like purposes, a balance being shown in favor of the former, constitutes a mutual account; and an action thereon commenced within four years from the date of the last item thereof is not barred by the statute of limitations.This is an appeal by defendants from a judgment rendered in plaintiff’s favor for the sum of $892.01, in an action instituted by plaintiff against the representatives of the estate of James W. Minturn, deceased, for the purpose of establishing the validity of a rejected claim presented against said estate by plaintiff for a balance claimed to be due upon a mutual, open, and current account.
The question of the application of the statute of limitations depends upon the character of the account sued upon. If, as plaintiff avers, a “mutual, open, and current account” has been shown, the action is not barred by the statute, for the reason that suit was commenced within four years from the date of the last item of the account. (Subd. 2, sees. 337 and 344, Code Civ. Proc.) Appellants claim that no mutual, open, and -current account has been shown. In this respect it is -contended that the account sued upon lacks mutuality and reciprocal demands and is merely a statement showing payments advanced by plaintiff to third persons for and on behalf of plaintiff and said Minturn, for which suit should have been brought within two years from the date of the last item stated therein. (Subd. 1, sec. 339, Code Civ. Proc.)
[1] From the evidence it is made to appear that plaintiff and the deceased, Minturn, purchased jointly and paid for in installments certain residence property in Fresno, which they remodeled and afterward used as their home. Both plaintiff and deceased advanced money to pay for labor and materials in the renovation of the dwelling, and each kept a book of account in which entries of such payments were made. The account sued upon, which is set forth in the rejected claim, was taken by plaintiff from plaintiff’s books. Upon its face it shows the various entries of debit and credit in separate columns. The debit column represents the payments made by plaintiff to persons who - performed work and furnished materials in the improvement and repair of said residence, and covers a period from September 30, 1912, to January 4, 1914, and also represents the payments made by plaintiff on the land, and the interest on deferred payments, from October 7, 1914, to and including November 13, 1916. The credit column shows the payments made by Minturn to persons performing work and furnishing materials for said residence, and also the payments by him on the land, and the interest on deferred payments. Upon its face the account appears to have been balanced, and shows that plaintiff expended $10,866.51 more than Minturn, and that one-half thereof, to wit, $5,433.25,
[2] Appellants’ second point is that the court erred in admitting evidence in violation of the provisions of subdivision 3 of section 1880 .of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, .the persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator upon a claim or demand against an estate of a deceased person, cannot testify as to any matter or fact occurring before the death of such deceased person. The instance first complained of is where plaintiff, having been called as a witness in his own behalf, was handed the rejected claim, which had been admitted in evidence without objection, and testified that with the exception of one item thereof, amounting to $41.25, the rejected claim was a correct statement of the account as shown by his boobs. It is claimed by appellants that this testimony was admitted contrary to the rule stated in Colburn v. Parrett, 27 Cal. App.
[3] Appellants next claim that said section 18-80 was violated in allowing plaintiff to testify that the account had not been paid. There was no error committed. By seeking to establish nonpayment plaintiff was endeavoring to prove something that the law did not require him to prove. In Melons v.Ruffino, 129 Cal. 514 , [ 79 Am. St. Rep. 127 , 62 Pac. 93 ], it is held that the allegation of nonpayment of a debt sued upon, though necessary to make the complaint perfect, need not be proved; but the burden of proof of payment is upon the defendant. Such is the established rule in this state. (Barrett-Hicks Co. v. Glas, 14 Cal. App. 289 , 300, [ 111 Pac. 760 ]; Miller & Lux v. Dunlap, 28 Cal. App. 313 , [ 152 Pac. 309 ]; Stuart v. Lord, supra.) [4] Neither was it error for plaintiff to call as witness Ward Minturn, one of the executors defendant, to prove by him that the claim sued upon corresponded with the books kept by deceased. Such evidence did not involve or relate to a “matter of fact oeeuring before the death of the deceased,” and the point becomes entirely lacking in force in view of the fact that defendants afterward, as a part of their own case, called the same witness and proved by him that the account sued upon and the books of the deceased were “substantially the same.” Thereupon defendants offered the books of the deceased in evidence.
There is no merit in the point that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings. There were but three disputed issues: The character of the account sued upon, the payment of the balance due, and the statute of limitations. The first and third issues have been discussed and disposed of. [5] That there was a balance due plaintiff was proved by the introduction in evidence by defendant of the books of
[6] Appellants’ final point is that the judgment is erroneous because it is a personal judgment against the defendants, .without directing, as required by section 1504 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the payment thereof be made by defendants in the due course of administration. Respondent concedes this point. The error may be corrected by a modification of the judgment. (Drake v. Foster, 52 Cal. 225 ; Vance v. Smith, 124 Cal. 219 , [ 56 Pac. 1031 ]; Brinkley-Douglas Fruit Co. v. Silman, 33 Cal. App. 643 , [ 166 Pac. 371 ].)
The judgment is therefore modified by adding thereto the words, “And it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that said executrix and executor of said last will and testament pay in due course of administration the amount of this judgment,” and as thus modified the judgment will stand affirmed. Respondent will recover his costs.
Waste, P. J., and Richards, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Fraylor v. Sonora Mining Co. 17 Cal. 594 p. 4
- Norton v. Larco 30 Cal. 126 p. 4
- Flynn v. Seale 2 Cal. App. 665 p. 4
- Roche v. Ware 71 Cal. 375 p. 5
- Stuart v. Lord 138 Cal. 672 p. 5
- Melone v. Ruffino 129 Cal. 514 p. 6
- Barrett-Hicks Co. v. Glas 14 Cal. App. 289 at 300 p. 6
- Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Dunlap 28 Cal. App. 313 p. 6
- Cowdery v. McChesney 124 Cal. 363 p. 7
- Drake v. Foster 52 Cal. 225 p. 7
- Vance v. Smith 124 Cal. 219 p. 7
- Ashton v. Heydenfeldt 56 Pac. 1031 p. 7
- Brinkley-Douglas Fruit Co. v. Silman 33 Cal. App. 643 p. 7