Majority
Headnote
[1] Estates op Deceased Persons—Sale op Assets—Power op Legatee or Administratrix.—A person has no authority, either as legatee under a will or as administratrix of the estate 'with the will annexed, to sell the assets of the estate, and, therefore, cannot delegate such authority to another.This is an action based upon a bond and interest coupons of the Southern Pacific Railway Company. Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant for the return of the bond and coupons, or their value in case delivery thereof could not be had. Defendant appeals from the judgment under the alternative method.
The bond in suit is one issued by the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, having semi-annual coupons attached, known as a first refunding mortgage gold $1,000 bond. It is made payable to bearer and secured by a mortgage on certain real and personal property of the Southern Pacific Company, as set forth upon the face of the bonds. As the
The bond came into the possession of defendant in the following manner: It was part of the assets of the estate of Patrick Maguire, of which estate Elizabeth Maguire, plaintiff’s testatrix, was the administratrix with the will annexed. She was the widow of Patrick Maguire and the sole legatee under his will. She delivered the bond in suit (together with other bonds of like character) to one Shay, her attorney in the administration of the estate, as the court found, for safekeeping and convenience in preparing the inventory and appraisement. He also collected the amount due on the coupons. Shay included this bond in the inventory which he filed in the estate. But before distribution was had, and on June 29,1914, without any order or authority of court" therefor, and without the knowledge of Elizabeth Maguire, he delivered possession of the bond to stock brokers, who sold the same, under his instructions, for his account and as his .personal property, he retaining the proceeds thereof, amounting to $941. After several successive transfers, and on July 30, 1914, defendant purchased this bond' in the open market without knowledge of any equities or claims of the Patrick Maguire estate, or anyone .else, in respect thereto. She paid $890 therefor, the full market price at that time. Thereafter, and on October 5, 1914, all the estate of Patrick Maguire, including the bond in controversy, was distributed to Elizabeth Maguire in her individual capacity. Elizabeth Maguire first became aware that Shay had parted with possession of the bond about January, 1916, more than a year after distribution of the estate. At that time Shay offered by way of adjustment to have conveyed to Mrs. Maguire, subject to encumbrances thereon, three pieces of property located in Alameda and Santa Cruz Counties. In March, 1916, Shay and his wife, in accordance with this offer, executed two deeds covering that property. These deeds were recorded May 20, 1916. Shay and his wife thereafter signed a statement, also dated May 20, 1916, reciting that
Appellant relies upon four defenses on appeal:
(1) That there was no conversion. The answer sets up the defense, among others, that at the time of. the sale of the bond Shay was attorney in fact for Elizabeth Maguire individually, as well as attorney for her as administratrix of the Patrick Maguire estate, and that she had given him, as such attorney in fact, full power to sell or dispose of the bond. Appellant contends that there was no conversion because Shay sold under this power of attorney. With respect to this matter Shay testified that Elizabeth Maguire gave him a general power of attorney to act for her individually shortly after she was appointed administratrix of the Patrick Maguire estate; that it had never been revoked; that it was not recorded and he could not locate it to produce upon the trial. Appellant thereupon attempted to prove by oral evidence Shay’s authority from Elizabeth Maguire under the power of attorney to sell personal property. The court sustained respondent’s objection on the ground that evidence of the contents of the instrument was inadmissible because a power of attorney from Elizabeth Maguire to sell property of the estate would be void. Appellant urges, however, that respondent bases his right to maintain this action upon the ownership of the bond by Elizabeth Maguire as a legatee under the will of Patrick Maguire and not upon her right as administratrix to possession of the bond during the period of administration of the estate of Patrick Maguire; that Elizabeth Maguire as sole legatee under the will of Patrick Maguire was the owner and could convey title subject to administration; that if Elizabeth Maguire as such legatee did in fact authorize the sale of this bond by the power of attorney given to Shay, her after-acquired right to possession inured to the benefit of appellant and there was' no conversion; that evidence to show such authorization was competent and its exclusion constituted prejudicial error.
The difficulty with appellant’s argument is that Shay did not sell under, any power of attorney. Neither did he
[3] (2) That respondent is estopped by the conduct of Elizabeth Maguire from asserting title to the bond as against appellant. The estoppel relied upon by appellant is based upon the alleged laches of respondent and his testatrix, during which time appellant contends a cause of action existing in her favor against her immediate vendors upon their warranty of title implied in their sale of the bond to her was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court found that “neither said Elizabeth Maguire nor the plaintiff herein was guilty of laches in failing to inquire into or investigate as to the whereabouts or possession of said bond.” About two years elapsed between the purchase of the bond by appellant and the institution of this action. But respondent’s testatrix did not discover the loss of the bond until about eight months prior to commencing suit, and nothing occurred before that time, so far as the record shows, to put her upon inquiry. Shay testified that possibly he continued paying the interest on the bond to Mrs. Maguire for some time after distribution of the Patrick Maguire estate. About four months after discovery of the
[4] (3) That if there was a conversion the settlement with Shay ratified and confirmed his sale. With respect to this defense the court found: “That on or about the fifth day of March, 1916, Frank Shay executed a conveyance- of his interest in certain real property to said Elizabeth. Maguire, which consisted of equities in various parcels of land, each of which was subject to prior obligations, but there was no accord or satisfaction executed between said Elizabeth Maguire and said Frank Shay with respect to said controversy arising over the sale and disposition of said bond; and said conveyance was not accepted by said Elizabeth Maguire in satisfaction or settlement of any claim of said Elizabeth Maguire against said Frank. Shay arising out of his sale and disposition of said bond, but said conveyance was made by said Frank Shay to said Elizabeth Maguire as security for the redelivery of said bond to said Elizabeth Maguire.” Shay’s offer was made by letter to Mrs. Maguire’s attorney and contained the following statement: “All of the properties above referred to belong to Mrs. Shay, her separate property, and she is willing to convey them to Mrs. Maguire
[5] (4) That if the deeds were not taken as settlement they were taken as mortgages to secure the return of the bond and the action is barred by the provisions of section 726 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that but one action can be maintained for the enforcement of an obligation secured by mortgage—that is, an action to foreclose the mortgage. This action is not one coming within the provisions of that section, the defendant herein not being a party to the mortgage. Moreover, the court found that the equities of Elizabeth Maguire in the properties involved in the deeds “were and are of no value and have been lost to said estate of Elizabeth Maguire” and that they were not lost by reason of any negligence of Elizabeth Maguire or plaintiff herein. This finding was based upon admissions of counsel for appellant on the trial of the action.
The judgment is affirmed.
Brittain, J., and Langdon, P. J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Kohn v. Sacramento Electric 168 Cal. 1 p. 407
- Crocker Nat'l Bank of San Francisco v. Byrne & McDonnell 178 Cal. 329 p. 407
- Wickersham v. Johnston 104 Cal. 407 at 412 p. 409
- Bovard v. Dickenson 131 Cal. 162 at 164 p. 409