Majority
Headnote
Action to Quiet Title—Intervention—Title Claimed by Interveners—Effect of Order.—An action to quiet title is one for the recovery of real property; and an order of the superior court granting leave to interveners, who claim title against the plaintiff to intervene, determined that the interveners had an interest in the matter in litigation.Appeal from a judgment quieting title and from an order denying motion to vacate such judgment.
Plaintiff filed his complaint under section 738, Code of Civil Procedure, for the purpose of determining adverse claims to certain described real estate. To this complaint ap
Interveners, within due time, moved the court to vacate and set aside its judgment, because no notice of the trial of the action was given interveners or their attorneys, which motion was denied and said judgment duly entered in the judgment-book; from which judgment, and from the order refusing to vacate the same, appellants duly appeal upon a bill of exceptions.
The action to quiet title is one for the recovery of real property. (South Tule etc. Ditch Co. v. King, 144 Cal. 455 , [ 77 Pac. 1032 ].) The real property so sought to be recovered is, therefore, the subject matter of such action. The order of the superior court granting leave to intervene determined that interveners had an interest in the matter in litigation, and under section 387, Code of Civil Procedure, were entitled as parties to avail themselves of all of the procedure and remedies to which the defendants were entitled
It appears from the bill of exceptions that interveners served and filed their complaints, setting forth the grounds upon which their intervention rested, due service of which is certified in the bill, which must be accepted as service upon all parties to the action, as required by section 387, Code of Civil Procedure, and the claim to the subject matter is an interest adverse to both plaintiff and defendants. ■ The only relief sought, however, by these complaints in intervention was that plaintiff take nothing and that interveners recover costs. Under the law, their position was thereafter that of “plaintiff in intervention, uniting with the defendant in the cause in resisting the demands of plaintiff in the cause.” (St. Charles R. R. Co. v. Fidelity etc. Co., 109 La. 491 , [ 33 South. 574 ].) The inaction of the defendants in permitting their default does not preclude intervener from his relief. (People v. Ferris Irr. Dist., 132 Cal. 290 , [ 64 Pac. 399 , 773].) That plaintiff in such action may dismiss the same, where the relief sought by interveners is only “that plaintiff take nothing,” is determined in Henry v. Vineland Irr. Dist., 140 Cal. 377 , [ 73 Pac. 1061 ]; the reason assigned is that “by a complete dismissal of the action plaintiff has consented to take nothing and thereby the ends of the intervention are accomplished.” But in this case plaintiff does not so elect, but seeks to maintain his action against certain defendants and proceeds to judgment against them, and by such judgment takes the relief sought. After the court has determined by its order that a party has an interest in the subject matter of a suit and should be permitted to litigate such interest therein, it is not within the power of the plaintiff, either under the provisions of section 581, Code of Civil Procedure, or otherwise, to annul such order of the court by dismissing the action as to such parties, and unless the court vacates the order permitting intervention, the plaintiff, so long as he seeks relief under the action, must meet such issues raised by the complaints in intervention. There is nothing in the record to justify the conclusion that the court vacated its original order permitting intervention. The dismissal was directed by the plaintiff, and the judg
The court erred in refusing to vacate said judgment so rendered, and in entering a judgment granting the relief to plaintiff before the issues of fact were heard and determined.
It is ordered that the order refusing to vacate the judgment and the judgment so entered be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Shaw, J., and Taggart, J., concurred.