Majority
Headnote
[1] Minors—Action for Services—Status of Parties—Conflict of Evidence—Findings—Appeal.—Where in an action brought on behalf of a minor to recover the reasonable value of services rendered the testimony was susceptible of conflicting inferences as to whether the defendant was, as contended, in loco parentis and therefore entitled to the sendees without compensation, the findings of the trial court are conclusive.This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment against him in favor of plaintiff, who is a minor and sues by his guardian ad litem. The plaintiff is the nephew of the defendant and this action was brought to recover $572, money had and received by the defendant, together with $4,250, the alleged reasonable value of services as a masseur, rendered by the plaintiff over a period of three and a half years at a turkish bath establishment conducted by defendant, which services were rendered at the special instance and request of the defendant.
Defendant answered, denying the indebtedness for money had and received, and denying that the reasonable value of the services rendered was the sum alleged by plaintiff, and alleging that plaintiff had been fully paid for all services rendered for defendant. The answer was later amended so as to include an allegation that at all the times mentioned in the complaint the plaintiff was a member of the defendant’s family, and the defendant bore to him the relation of a parent.
The trial court found “that it is not true that at all times mentioned in plaintiff’s complaint, or at any time at all, plaintiff was a member of defendant’s family, and it is not true that defendant maintained plaintiff at all or any times according to his circumstances or in any other manner, and that it is not true that defendant was in the place of a parent toward plaintiff, but the court finds that the defendant never at any time exercised any control whatsoever over the plaintiff or stood in any relation whatsoever to this plaintiff except as master and servant, and that it is not true that defendant did not make an agreement to pay plaintiff for his services, but the court finds it to be true that defendant did agree to pay plaintiff for his services.”
It was customary at the baths for the employees to sign their own names to the checks of the customers they serve as a basis for computation of the amounts due them, upon
It was stipulated, among other things, that during plaintiff’s employment at the baths he delivered to defendant two checks given by the Athletic Club to plaintiff as Christmas presents, which amounted to approximately $200. It was also stipulated that the average earnings, exclusive of tips, of the men employed by the defendant on a fifty per cent basis during the period of plaintiff’s employment was about ninety dollars a month. There was introduced by the plaintiff the testimony of several employees of the establishment to the effect that the plaintiff did as much work as the other employees of the baths; that he was skillful and successful with his work and worked long hours; that many of the customers called for him personally. It also appears in the record that while the defendant was in Washington for a period of about eight or nine months, plaintiff managed his business for him. Under these facts the court found that the reasonable value of plaintiff’s services during the period from January 1, 1915, to July 17, 1918, was $3,870. Obviously this computation was made in accordance with the stipulation regarding the average earnings of other employees at the establishment.
The court also found that there was due the plaintiff $520, the amount of the salary checks and Christmas checks belonging to plaintiff which he had turned over to the defendant. The court then deducted the sum of $1,142 as money paid on account, which included all sums spent by defendant for the plaintiff of which there is any evidence at all, including traveling expenses from Asia Minor to Los Angeles, spending money advanced to him, room rent paid, etc., leaving a balance of $3,248, for which judgment was given.
[2] There remains, then, only the question- whether, under the proof, which appellant contends shows an express contract, recovery can be had for the reasonable value of the services, which is the theory of the complaint. Conceding that the proof showed that the inception of the business relations of the parties was in an express contract, this would not defeat a recovery by the plaintiff upon a quantum meruit basis. It is the privilege of an infant to repudiate an express contract for his services and recover for the same upon quantum meruit. (See note to Tennessee Mfg. Co. v. James, 15 L. R. A. 211 .) [3] The filing of the action for a recovery upon quantum mermt would be a sufficient notice to the defendant of a disaffirmance of the contract under the holding in the ease of Spencer v. Collins, 156 Cal. 298 , 303, 304, [20 Ann. Cas. 49, 104 Pac. 320 ], where the supreme court refers to the fact that it has been held that a deed of a minor may be disaffirmed by his subsequent conveyance to a third person.
We find no errors in the record which are prejudicial to the appellant.
The judgment is affirmed.
Langdon, P. J., and Brittain, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Spencer v. Collins 156 Cal. 298 at 303, 304 p. 119