Majority
Headnote
[1] Criminal Law—Time of Trial—Expiration of Sixty-day Period —When Insufficient Ground for Dismissal.—A defendant is not entitled to have pending criminal actions dismissed on the ground that they were not brought to trial within sixty days after the finding of the indictments, where the court was engaged practically all of such sixty-day period in the trial of other criminal cases, many of which had precedence over those against the defendant.This is an application for a writ of mandate to compel the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco to dismiss a number of criminal actions pending therein in which the petitioner in this proceeding is the defendant, on the ground that said actions were not brought to trial within sixty days after the finding of the indictments against the defendant.
The federal constitution and also that of this state provide that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, and the Penal Code of this state also contains a provision (sec. 1382, subd. 2) that “the court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the prosecution to be dismissed. . . .
“That from the said 17th day of January, 1921, to and including said 12th day of March, 1921, there was no open day upon the calendar of said court upon which said petitioner could have been tried upon any one of said indictments, for the reason that there had prior to said 17th day of January, 1921, been set for trial 46 criminal actions wherein said defendants had entered their pleas and said actions had been duly and regularly set for days certain for trial, which days extended from said 17th day of January, 1921, to and beyond said 12th day of March, 1921; that each and all of said 46 actions were of importance and it was necessary in the interests of justice that said actions be forthwith tried. That of said 46 actions 30 thereof had been pending in said court a period longer than that of any of the aforesaid indictments against said petitioner. That even though petitioner had been brought into court and allowed to plead to said indictments such action could not have expedited his trial upon any of said indictments, nor could he have been tried upon any of said indictments prior to said 12th day of March, 1921.”
In its return the court has accounted for the delay up to the twenty-fifth day of March, 1921, the date when the motion to dismiss was made, and the petitioner has made no later motion to dismiss. It follows that the petition should be denied, and it is so ordered.
Waste, P. J., and Richards, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the district court of appeal on June 24, 1921.
Cases cited
- People v. Vasalo 120 Cal. 168 p. 8
- People v. Peter 20 Cal. App. 151 p. 8