Majority
Headnote
[1] Landlord and Tenant — Waste — Action for Damages — Title Essential.—An action for damages to leased property committed by the defendant during the tenancy cannot be maintained by one who did not have title to the property at the time of the commission of the alleged waste, in the absence of an assignment to him of the cause of action therefor.This is an appeal from the judgment in favor of the defendants for costs in the second trial of an action brought originally for the cancellation of a lease upon the ground of nonpayment of rent and for the recovery of
To this complaint as thus amended the defendants demurred generally and specially, and the demurrers were by the court sustained to the first and third counts, trial being thereafter had upon the question of damages claimed in the second count.
[1] On this issue the court found that the defendants, in making certain permissible changes in said building, had committed no substantial waste, and that if said building was damaged by the making of said changes the damage had been done before the plaintiff became the owner of the premises and that it existed at that time. The evidence also disclosed that the plaintiff, through its president and others, examined the property before purchasing the same; that it knew the nature of the repairs that had been made to the building and regarded the consequent damage thereto as of a trifling nature. Under these circumstances it is clear that the plaintiff cannot maintain an action for waste in the absence of an assignment to him of the cause of action therefor. Title to the property at the time of the commission of the waste is necessary to sustain the right to an accounting for such waste. (40 Cyc. 527; 30 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 282; Shelby v. Hearne, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 512 ; Hughlett v. Harris, 1 Del. Ch. 349 [ 12 Am. Dec. 104 ]; Dickinson v. Mayor, 48 Md. 583 [ 30 Am. Rep. 492 ].)
[2] Coming to the third count, it was therein alleged that the defendant had wrongfully and unlawfully changed the renewal term of the lease from nine years to ninety-nine years.
Section 1700 of the Civil Code provides: “The intentional destruction, cancellation or material alteration of a written contract, by a party entitled to any benefit under it, or with his consent, extinguishes all the executory obligations of the contract in his favor, against parties who do not consent to the act.” This count of the complaint alleges a plain violation of this section of the code; the order, therefore, sustaining the demurrer to this count was erroneous. (Pelton v. S. J. Lumber Co., 113 Cal. 21 [ 45 Pac. 12 ].) The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings upon the issue tendered by the third count in plaintiff’s amended complaint only, with instructions to the trial court to overrule the demurrer to the third count of the complaint and to permit the defendant to answer thereto.
Richards, J., and Tyler, P. J., concurred.
Cases cited
- J. B. Hill Co. v. Pinque 179 Cal. 759 p. 246
- Hughlett v. Harris 1 Del. Ch. 349 p. 246
- Pelton v. San Jacinto Lumber Co. 113 Cal. 21 p. 247