The Union Ice Co. v. Doyle

This is a suit in equity, the object of which is to correct an alleged misdescription of the land involved in two certain deeds, to quiet title thereto, and to compel conveyances of said land in accordance with the true description thereof.

The court invoked the aid of a jury, to which certain special issues were submitted, some of which, as found by said jury, were adopted by the court, and thereafter a judgment and decree entered reforming and revising said deeds, adjudging plaintiff the owner and entitled to the possession of the land, as described under such reformation, and peremptorily enjoining the defendants from “asserting or in any way setting up any right, title or interest in or to said last described land or any part thereof.” From the judgment Doyle and the Lewisons take this appeal.

The facts, as gleaned from the record, are these: The defendant J. L. Lewison, prior to the execution of the deed, the reformation of which is one of the purposes of this suit, was the owner of the whole of the southeast quarter of section 26, township 17 north, range 15 east, Mount Diablo base and meridian, in the county of Placer. Situated on the east half of the quarter section just' described, at the time of the

The complaint is verified. Demurrers to the complaint, general and special, were interposed on behalf of both Doyle and the Lewisons. The grounds of the special demurrers by the Lewisons and Doyle are the same, and are that “it appears from the complaint that the alleged cause of action is barred by the provisions of section 338, subdivision 4 thereof, of the Code of Civil Procedure,” and “that plaintiff and its grantor have been guilty of gross laches in delaying to bring suit, from the 7th day of December, 1898, the date of the deed from the Lewisons to Union Ice Company, to the 12th day of June, 1905, and the said complaint states no facts sufficient to excuse said gross laches.” The demurrers were overruled, and thereafter the defendants filed their answers, specifically denying all the material averments of the complaint, setting forth a history of Lewison’s connection with the Cold Stream Ice Plant, and setting up the bar of the statute under the provisions of section 338, subdivision 4 thereof, and of section 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The special issues upon which the jury were instructed to pass were involved in the following questions, submitted in writing by the court: 1. Was there a mutual mistake in the deed from Lewison to Union Ice Company? 2. Did the defendant Doyle at or before the time of his purchase have notice of the claims of the Union Ice Company, defendant, or The Union Ice Company, plaintiff? 3. Did the plaintiff or its predecessor discover the mistake prior to June 12, 1902? The jury answered in the affirmative all the questions thus submitted to them. The court approved and adopted the findings of the jury as to questions one and two, rejected the

Appellants contend most strenuously that the demurrers should have been sustained, for the reason that the complaint, by its averments, fails to disclose a case for equitable interference. It is claimed that the “mistake” upon which respondent relies for a reformation of the deeds is not shown by the allegations of the complaint to have been the “mutual mistake” of the parties essential to the granting of the relief demanded; that there is no allegation “that anything was paid for the land, ’ ’ hence a valuable consideration is not shown, and that the complaint shows “that the plaintiff and its predecessor in interest were guilty of laches.”

An impartial examination of the complaint justifies the conclusion, we think, that the objections urged by counsel for appellants in their briefs against plaintiff’s pleading are rather hypercritical. Most of the objections pointed out in argument against it appear to go more to the sufficiency of the statement of the facts than to the facts themselves, and in that view involve criticisms based upon the ground of uncertainty or ambiguity. The special demurrers interposed are restricted in their attack upon the complaint to the grounds of a bar under the statute of limitations and “gross laches in delaying to bring suit.” No demurrer was interposed upon the ground of uncertainty or ambiguity, hence we are of the opinion that, even if it may be conceded that the complaint is not as clear and specific and direct as it should be as to the fact of “mutual mistake,” it is nevertheless sufficient to overthrow the force of a general demurrer. The same may be said as to the objection that the complaint does not show by proper averments that a valuable consideration passed for the deed from the Lewisons to the defendant corporation. We think that it will not be disputed that it is a well-settled rule of pleading that where a complaint states all the facts essential to a recovery, but states them imperfectly, a demurrer, to be effectual, must be special and directed against the very defect apparent. (Tehama County v. Bryan, 68 Cal. 59 , [ 8 Pac. 673 ]; citing Himmelmann v. Spanagel, 39 Cal. 401 ; Ward v. Clay, 82 Cal. 505 , [ 23 Pac. 50 , 227]; Amestoy v. Electric R. T. Co., 95 Cal. 314 ,

Prom the foregoing synopsis of the allegations of the complaint it is obvious that a cause of action is stated. In fact, we do not see how a much stronger statement of a cause of action could well have been set out without averring evidentiary facts, contrary to the rules of good pleading. In any event, the averments are, as we have declared, sufficient to resist the effect of a general demurrer. But counsel declare that “the complaint constantly alleges that the mistake was mutual,” and that such allegation “is a mere conclusion.” They say that “no facts are alleged from which the chancellor may draw the conclusion that both parties participated in the mistake beyond the allegation that both parties to the deed ‘supposed and believed. ’ ” Counsel evidently attaches no significance to the allegation to which we havé adverted that the plaintiff’s grantor took possession of the east half of the quarter section, with the knowledge and consent of the Lewisons, immediately upon the execution of the deed. Obviously they see no importance in the averment that the defendant Union Ice Company and the plaintiff, ever since the execution of the deed to the former, have been, under the authority of said deed, in the actual possession of the land with the full knowledge and consent of not only the said Lewisons but with the knowledge of the defendant Doyle. Manifestly there is no force, in the minds of counsel, in the declaration in the complaint that when Lewisons executed the deed to Doyle they did not intend thereby to convey to him the land upon which was situated the ice plant and in the possession of the plaintiff, and that the deed so conveying said land to Doyle was due to a mistake on the part of said Lewisons. We can perceive no difficulty in determining from the averments of the complaint that the wrong description of the land bought by plaintiff’s grantor from the Lewisons was the result purely of a mistaken notion

As to the consideration, appellants’ claim is, in effect, that the complaint does not contain a direct and specific statement that any money was in fact paid for the land, and that if inferentially it may be said that some money was paid for it, it does not appear how much was paid therefor; that there might have been but one dollar or less or nothing paid for the land and the balance or all paid for the ice plant and its essential concomitants, so far as the allegations of the complaint show. This is, we say, in effect the contention of. counsel upon this point, and as before declared is in effect an objection to the complaint which can be taken advantage of only through the instrumentality of a special demurrer addressed directly to the question of the alleged uncertainty involved in the allegation. But we think that, under the circumstances of the transaction, as disclosed by the pleaded facts, the allegation as to consideration is sufficiently clear, direct and specific. It is not disputed that in suits for the reformation of deeds upon the ground of mistake in the description of the land sought thereby to be conveyed the question of consideration is often an important factor in the determination of the ultimate question. Where the grantor conveys only a portion of a certain tract of land and misdescription through mistake is alleged, the inadequacy of the consideration may be the fact determinative of the controversy against the party seeking relief. But, according to the averments of the complaint here, the land which plaintiff contends it was its intention and that of its predecessor to buy from the Lewisons, and the latter’s intention to sell, was essentially as much a part of the ice plant as the other necessary equipments, and valuable to plaintiff and its grantor only because it was a necessary part of said ice plant. The averments of the complaint show that the Lewisons were the owners of the ice plant and the land on which it was located at the time of the sale. It is true, as we have seen, that the fact is developed by the evidence that the Lewisons were the owners of the land, but not of the ice plant equipments situated thereon; that the ice plant had been turned over to them only to secure the payment of a debt due them from the owners of said ice plant. But the ability of the complaint to successfully meet the challenge of the general and special de

The order overruling the special demurrers was proper. One of the grounds of said demurrers is that the action was barred by the provisions of section 338, subdivision 4 thereof, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Said subdivision of that section prescribes a limitation of three years within which an action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake may be brought, and provides that “the cause of action in such case is not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” But it seems to have been held by our supreme court in some comparatively recent cases, and that it is now the settled law in this state, that an action of the nature of the one at bar, where the relief sought is the revision of a deed because of misdescription of the land through a mutual mistake of the parties and to compel a conveyance of the land according to the corrected description and to quiet title thereto, is one “for the recovery of real property, and that the correction of the mistake in the deeds is merely incidental to that action” and “is not barred except by the five year limitation contained in section 318” of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Goodnow v. Parker, 112 Cal. 442 , [ 44 Pac. 738 ] ; Murphy v. Crowley, 140 Cal. 141 , [ 73 Pac. 820 ].) Nor do the allegations of the complaint betray laches on the part of plaintiff or its predecessor in interest in the assertion of its right. The complaint, as we have seen, shows very clearly that the grantor of plaintiff intended to purchase and did in fact purchase the east half of the quarter section; that both it and its grantors believed, at the time of the execution of the deed, that the land' sought to be conveyed comprised the west half of said quarter section; that the defendant Union Ice Company took possession of the east half under the deed thus executed, and that it and its grantee have at all times

Upon the conclusion of the introduction of testimony on behalf of the plaintiff, the defendants presented a motion for a nonsuit upon the specific grounds: 1. That the evidence failed to show that notice, actual or constructive, was ever brought to the defendant Doyle that Lewison had sold to the defendant Union Ice Company the land in dispute; 2. That the evidence adduced through plaintiff’s witnesses shows that the discovery of the alleged mistake in the description of the land in the deed of conveyance from the Lewisons to Union Ice Company was in December, 1898, “shortly after the purchase of the land, and that therefore more than the statutory time has elapsed within which suit can be brought to correct such a mistake.” The court denied the motion, and the ruling was, under the evidence, unquestionably proper. All that is necessary to justify the refusal of a nonsuit asked for on the close of plaintiff’s testimony is that a prima facie case in support of the material allegations of the complaint has been made out. (Janin v. London etc. Bank, 92 Cal. 14 , [ 27 Am. St. Rep. 82 , 27 Pac. 1100 ]; Felton v. Millard, 81 Cal. 540 , [ 21 Pac. 533 ]; Pacific Mut. L. I. Co. v. Fisher, 109 Cal. 567 , [ 42 Pac. 154 ] ; Archibald Estate v. Matteson, 5 Cal. App. 441 , [ 90 Pac. 723 ].) More than a 'prima facie showing upon the points forming the basis of the motion was made by plaintiff here in its original case.

But the principal point urged by appellants, aside from those arising under the order overruling the demurrers, is that the evidence does not sustain the findings of the court. Counsel for appellants in their briefs expressly recognize the rule, established by the constitution, that this court is re

The claim that there is no evidence to show that the Lewisons received any consideration for the land is not supported by the record. Mr. Toby, one of the vice-presidents of plaintiff’s predecessor at the time of the transaction, testified that when the agreement was reached for the sale of the Cold " Stream Ice Company property there was some conversation between him and defendant J. L. Lewison that the latter was to receive ten dollars per acre for the eighty acres of land, which included the portion upon which were situated the ice plant and other improvements. Lewison, it is true, denied this, but the court’s finding upon the point is sufficiently supported by Toby’s testimony. Besides, we think there are certain circumstances, independent of Toby’s testimony, which strongly tend to show that the Lewisons received a sufficient consideration for the land. The land; it will be kept in view, is, according to the testimony of surveyor Uren, who surveyed it, of only nominal, if any, value for any other purpose than for cutting or harvesting ice thereon. The ground consists of low flat land, partly marshy. Lewison himself virtually admitted it to be of little value, in detailing a conversation he had prior to the sale with Mr. Hopkins, president of the corporation defendant, and even if we disregard the positive testimony of Toby, and it be true, as has been suggested, and as may well be inferred from the evidence, that his anxiety to secure the payment of the $1,800 due him from the McLellans solely influenced said Lewison in transferring the land to the corporation, without any other specific monetary consideration therefor, we think that fact of itself,

But there is no room for eveh the remotest doubt that the land in dispute is the particular tract of land which the

The rule, attempted to be invoked here, that where there appear in a case of this nature equal equities between the parties, a court of equity will remain silent and passive, and refuse to award relief, finds no room for play under the facts as displayed by the record before us. Doyle testified that he knew, before the date of the delivery and execution of the deed by Lewison to him, that a fractional portion of the large body of land purchased by him had been transferred by Lewison to the corporation. Doyle had lived in the neighborhood for many years, during most of which time he was employed as a bookkeeper by Lewison. He was in a position in which he could have learned, and the evidence shows that he did learn and know of the transaction between Lewison and the corporation. “A court of equity,” says the court in Enos v. Stewart, 138 Cal. 112 , [ 70 Pac. 1005 ], “interferes to correct a mistake in a written instrument only in furtherance of justice, and to prevent fraud or some injustice.” The relief granted in the case at bar, under the evidence disclosed by the record, is the result only of the application of the principle as it is stated in that case and of other equitable principles established and practiced in courts of equity “in the furtherance of justice and to prevent injustice.”

The findings of the court upon all the other essential issues involved in the ease are fully sustained by the evidence. There are certain rulings of the court in admitting and rejecting testimony of which complaint is made, and presented

We find no error in the record invading the rights of appellants. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

Burnett, J., and Chipman, P. J., concurred.