People v. Knight

Defendant was charged with having committed lewd and lascivious acts upon the body of a female child under the age of fourteen years with the intent of arousing and gratifying the lust and passions and sexual desires of himself and such child, as denounced by section 288 of the Penal Code. He was tried and found guilty.

He had been previously convicted of the same offense but a new trial was granted by the lower court upon the ground that it had permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of similar offenses committed against other little girls for the purpose of showing the disposition of the defendant to commit crimes of the character with which he is charged. The points here relied upon for a reversal of the judgment of conviction present practically the same question, though the evidence was received in this trial upon a different theory.

When confronted by the prosecutrix with her charges and those of several other little girls, who had accused him of having placed his hands between their limbs while he was swinging them, and also at times when he was reading funny papers to them, defendant did not deny the charges in tóto, but declared, according to the testimony of the police officers, that they were true in part only. At the trial and in explanation of his statement defendant testified that he did on certain occasions place his hands upon the children’s legs when taking them from the swing and slide, but that his act in so doing was only accidental and done with no evil intent. To refute and negative this innocent motive and intent the state then offered and there was received in evidence the testimony of other little girls to show that the defendant had placed his hands under their clothing between their legs on different occasions. The reception of this evidence, it is claimed, justifies a reversal of the case.

It is the general rule that evidence of a distinct crime unconnected with that charged in the indictment cannot be

Certain exceptions exist, however, to the rule just stated which have been permitted from necessity to aid in the detection and punishment of crime. [2] Among these is the rule that evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime charged when it tends to establish intent, the absence of mistake, or accident, or a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other. (Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, 10th ed., p. 73; Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 357 et seq.; People v. Sindici, 54 Cal. App. 193 [ 201 Pac. 975 ].)

[3] We do not deem a discussion of these questions necessary, for here no attempt was made to admit the testimony objected to under any one of the exceptions. It was not until defendant claimed an innocent motive in his relations with the prosecutrix that any direct attempt was made to prove that his testimony in this respect was untrue, by showing the commission of similar acts on his part with other children. The real ground upon which the evidence was admitted was upon the theory that after the defendant denied 1hat the admitted acts were done with lustful intent it was proper to rebut this declared innocent motive and

It is claimed by respondent that defendant was not prejudiced or his substantial rights affected by the testimony for the reason that there was sufficient evidence in the record to indicate that he had committed similar offenses, which went in without objection. The conclusion we have reached makes further discussion of the case unnecessary.

The judgment is affirmed.

St. Sure, J., and Richards, J., concurred.