Majority
Headnote
[1] Broker’s Commissions—Negotiation oe Sale.'—The contract of the real estate broker is to negotiate a sale, that is, to produce a valid contract to purchase, which can be enforced by the vendor if his title is perfect, or, if he does not procure such contract, to bring the vendor and the proposed purchaser together, that the vendor may secure such a contract, unless he is willing to trust to an oral agreement.This cause was tried, the appeal was perfected, and the briefs on appeal were filed in the lifetime of Jacob Sholley, the original defendant. The suggestion of his death and the substitution of his executor in his stead were made in this court.
Plaintiff, a real estate broker, brought the action for the purpose of recovering a broker’s commission. The complaint alleges that Sholley employed her as his agent to sell a certain parcel of real property, that she found a purchaser and that Sholley “accepted the proposal of the purchaser so secured . . . and entered into a written agreement of purchase and sale relating to said real property with said purchaser.” Plaintiff had judgment and Sholley appealed.
That the above-mentioned allegations were all true was established at the trial by uncontradicted evidence, at least to the extent that it was shown that a purported agreement was entered into between Sholley and the purchaser, but appellant contends that the “agreement” was incomplete and unenforceable. Without passing upon this claim, it is enough to say that the point is immaterial. [1] “The contract of the broker is to negotiate a sale; that is, to produce a valid contract to purchase, which can be enforced by the vendor if his title is perfect; or if he does not procure such contract (italics ours), to bring the vendor and the proposed purchaser together, that the vendor may secure such a contract, unless he is willing to trust to an oral agreement” (Gunn v. Bank of California, 99 Cal. 349 [ 33 Pac. 1105 ]. See, also, Mott v. Minor, 11 Cal. App. 774 [ 106 Pac. 244 ]; Cone v. Keil, 18 Cal. App. 675 [ 124 Pac. 548 ]; Massie v. Chatom, 163 Cal. 772 [ 127 Pac. 56 ]; Twogood v. Monnette, 65 Cal. Dec. 431 [ 215 Pac. 542 ]). It is true that in the opinions in some of the cases cited there are dicta which indicate that, where an agreement of sale is executed between one
[5] Appellant’s only other point is that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding made by the trial court that the purchaser was ready and willing to buy the property which -was the subject of the seller’s contract with the broker. This finding was, however, upon an immaterial matter, as the pleadings make no issue as to the readiness or willingness of the purchaser to buy. The complaint presents no allegation on the subject, although the answer contains a denial that the purchaser was ready, able, or willing
Judgment affirmed.
Finlayson, P. J., and Craig, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Gunn v. Bank of California 99 Cal. 349 p. 769
- Wetzel v. Webb 33 Pac. 1105 p. 769
- Mott v. Minor 11 Cal. App. 774 p. 769
- Cone v. Keil 18 Cal. App. 675 p. 769
- Massie v. Chatom 163 Cal. 772 p. 769
- Wood & Tatum Co. v. Basler 37 Cal. App. 381 p. 770
- Sobaje v. Schubert 37 Cal. App. 709 p. 770
- Johnson v. Krier 59 Cal. App. 330 p. 770