Majority
Headnote
[1] Goods Sold and Delivered—Recovery op Price—Partnership— • Estoppel — Finding — Evidence.—In this action to recover for goods sold and delivered, the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that one of the defendants held himself out or permitted himself to be held out as a partner of his codefendant, and that plaintiff’s assignors relied upon such representation.This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff upon two assigned accounts for goods, wares, and merchandise alleged to have been furnished to the firm of J. Morris & Co., of which firm it is alleged that the appellant herein had held himself out to the assignors of the plaintiff herein as being a member. Upon the trial of the cause the court sustained by its findings plaintiff’s assign
The evidence in the case discloses that one J. Morris, prior to his death in 1919, had conducted a brush and broom business in the city and county of San Francisco, under the name and style of J. Morris & Co. He purchased brooms and brushes from William James and Walter Bueger, the latter doing business under the name and style of Sunset Broom & Brush Co. Shortly before his death J. Morris took his son Irving Morris with him and called on James and Bueger, informing them that he intended taking Irving in as a partner later on after he had learned the business. After the death of J. Morris, Irving Morris and Jacob C. Morris, an elder brother, called on James and Bueger with regard to the conduct of the business. It appears that J. Morris had left some bills unpaid to both James and Bueger and at these conferences they were assured by Jacob C, Morris that the bills would be paid. There is a sharp conflict in the evidence as to just what was stated at these conferences, appellant insisting that no representation that Jacob C. Morris would be identified with the business was made. On the other hand, James and Bueger testified that they were led to believe that the bills would be paid; that the business would be conducted as J. Morris & Co., Jacob C. Morris handling the financial end and Irving Morris attending to the selling. The business was continued with its office at the place of business of Jacob C. Morris under the name of J. Morris & Co., checks were signed by Jacob C. Morris as J. Morris & Co., the books of the firm were kept by him, and orders for brooms and brushes were given by both of them. The amounts due and owing by the firm at the time of the death of J. Morris were paid off after the business was again continued, and further credit was extended, as testified by James and Bueger, on account of the fact that they knew Jacob C. Morris to be a successful business man and financially responsible, and notwithstanding the fact that they knew Irving Morris lacked experience and was financially irresponsible. The account with James ran from July 19, 1920, to December 15, 1920, and the unpaid balance amounted at the latter date to $534.13; the account with Bueger, doing
[1] Appellant relies mainly on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that appellant held himself out or permitted himself to be held out as a partner of Irving Morris. This is summarized in two points: (I) There was no intention of appellant to represent himself as a partner in J. Morris & Co. or to mislead respondent’s assignors. (II) There was no representation by appellant which amounted to a representation that he was a partner in J. Morris & Co. In support of his contention appellant urges that to create a liability on his part the law requires intentional or deliberate deception or fraud, or gross negligence amounting to culpability as the basis of an equitable estoppel, and in explanation of his acts and conduct states that his action in identifying himself with the business was simply that of lending a helping hand to members of his family and that he in no way intended or expected to be a partner. Appellant seems to rely upon the proposition that it requires a course of conduct with the actual intent to deceive or defraud; or gross negligence amounting to culpability. Section 2444 of the Civil Code reads as follows: “Anyone permitting himself to be represented as a partner, general or special, is liable, as such, to third persons to whom such representation is communicated, and who, on the faith thereof, give credit to the partnership.”
That is precisely the ease at bar; the only thing remaining to be proven was whether appellant “permitted” himself to be represented as a partner and the reliance by third parties upon such representation. [2] Representations or
The judgment is affirmed.
Tyler, P. J., and St. Sure, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Seymour v. Oelrichs 156 Cal. 782 p. 456
- Carpy v. Dowdell 115 Cal. 677 p. 456
- Dickerson v. Colgrove 25 L. Ed. 618 p. 456