People v. Eldridge

The defendant John Eldridge was charged jointly with Clifford Miles and Charles Davis with the crime of robbery. Davis demanded and was granted a separate trial, but the charges against him were subsequently dismissed • without trial.' Miles and Eldridge were tried together and Miles was convicted, but the jury disagreed as to Eldridge. Upon a second trial Eldridge was convicted, and he prosecutes this appeal from the judgment.

It appears from the record that on the night of April 2, 1924, about 11:30 o’clock, one Henry Waxman was held up by three men, on Willow Avenue, between Laguna and Octavia Streets, San Francisco, and robbed at the point of a revolver. Immediately following the robbery he telephoned to the police department from his home near by, and upon arrival of an officer gave descriptions of his assailants. About four hours later complaint of a different nature was made to the police department, by a woman, concerning the conduct of Eldridge, in response to which the officer, accompanied by said woman, proceeded to a house on Sutter Street where Eldridge roomed, and there found Davis in bed, but Eldridge apparently was not there. The officer, observing fresh footprints on the window-sill, left the room temporarily to search the rear of the premises. Upon returning he knocked at the door of the room and the door was opened by Eldridge, who was undressed, as if about to retire. The officer asked Eldridge who had been with him the night before, and Eldridge first stated that no one had been with him, but afterwards said that he and Miles had been together. Eldridge was then taken to a house on another street where Miles was found in bed. Eldridge and Miles were taken to Waxman’s home, arriving there about

The following is the confession made by Eldridge:

“San Francisco, April 3, 1924. A statement made by John L. Eldridge, residence 1892 Sutter street, room 20. I want to make a truthful statement about the robbery and burglary charges against me. The man I saw with you in Judge Golden’s Court this morning is the man that Clifford Miles, George Davis and myself robbed last night of one dollar and sixty cents. I did not use.the gun. There was a gun used. I don’t know if it was Miles or Davis that used it. We three colored men also robbed Baymond Foz, I believe, after reading the police report No. 95,354. Thinking it over we may not have robbed Foz. If he is a Filipino, the second man we robbed last night looked like a Filipino. It may be him. Mary Davis, living on Sutter street, about three doors from me, was out with Miles and me. . . . This statement I make free and voluntarily and without any force or violence being used against me or any promises being offered me. I have read this statement and it is a true one. Signed John L. Eldridge. George J. Me

Laughlin, Sergeant 437. Bichard 0. Hughes, Detective Sergeant 689. Clifford Miles.”

In connection with Eldridge’s confession it was shown that Sergeant McLaughlin, who prepared Eldridge’s statement, had in fact appeared in court with Waxman, the victim of the robbery, on the morning of the day this statement was written and signed. Later and during the trial appellant repudiated his written confession, claiming that it had.been signed by him under an apprehension of fear that physical violence would be inflicted upon him by the police officers if he did not sign the same. In denying participation in the robbery he claimed that he was elsewhere at the time the crime was committed. The alibi offered by him, however, was not supported by any other witness, nor by any corroborating circumstance.

[1] The principal ground urged for a reversal of the judgment is that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain a conviction, counsel for appellant contending “that the two matters upon which the conviction are predicated are these— first: There was a crime committed; second: Eldridge confessed to the crime, and,” counsel for appellant say, “we submit that these two facts alone are not sufficient to support a verdict of guilty.”

With this contention we are unable to agree. The corpus delicti was clearly and positively established by the testimony of the victim of the robbery, and appellant’s connection with and participation in the crime was shown by his own confession and by the one made by Miles, which he also signed after stating, as before mentioned, that it was a true statement. [2] Preliminary to the introduction in evidence of said written confessions proof was made to the effect that said confessions were freely and voluntarily made, and that the defendants were informed that said confessions, if made, could be used against them at the time of trial. The question, therefore, of whether said confessions were free and voluntary or were the result of inducement, coercion, intimidation, or duress exerted by the officers was one peculiarly within the province of the trial judge to decide upon the facts, and inasmuch as the conclusion reached by him has substantial support in the evidence, it will not be interfered with on appeal (People v. Grufft, 61 Cal. App. 7 [ 214 Pac.

[3] It matters little whether Miles’ confession with Eldridge’s signature attached to it be considered as a part of the latter’s confession, as appellant contends, or whether it be considered as the separate statement of Miles containing declarations not made in Eldridge’s presence, for the reason that Miles’ confession sets forth in detail the circumstances of the participation of Eldridge in the commission of the robbery and of his movements and operations on the night in question, to the truth of which Eldridge agreed before he signed the Miles confession. It would therefore appear that in either event he was bound by it, and, if believed by the jury, was legally sufficient without corroboration to justify a verdict of guilty.

The judgment is affirmed.

Tyler, P. J., and Cashin, J., concurred.