Rice v. McCarthy

This is an action to quiet title to a lot in the city of Los Angeles. Judgment passed for plaintiffs and defendant appeals.

Plaintiffs are husband and wife. The interest which they obtained in the property, or, more accurately speaking, the interest which the husband obtained therein, is such as was acquired under a written contract executed on September 1, 1919, by the owner, the California Security Loan Corporation, as the vendor, and the plaintiff John K. Rice, as the vendee, whereby the former agreed to sell and the latter agreed to buy the lot for a valuable consideration. This contract was never recorded. The interest thus ac

Defendant, invoking the doctrine of estoppel to' defeat plaintiffs’ claim that the husband’s contract with him is void, alleged in his answer that when he entered into his contract with Rice he did not know or have any information that his vendor and Sallie G. Rice were husband and wife; that he did not have any information of their matrimonial relation until January 3, 1920; that he has duly performed all the conditions of his contract; that when he purchased the property Sallie G. Rice knew that the lot was sold to defendant and that it was the subject of the contract between him and her husband; that subsequently to the execution of the husband’s contract to convey the property to defendant, the wife received payments made by defendant on the contract, well knowing that the same were made by defendant under his contract with her husband; that the wife used the moneys thus received by her and enjoyed the benefit thereof; that at no time prior to the commencement of the action did the wife object to her husband’s sale of the property to defendant, and that by accepting such payments she is now estopped from asserting that defendant’s claim to the property is without right. By a supplemental answer defendant further alleged that subsequently to the commencement of the action, and within the time provided by his contract, he paid the monthly installment due under the terms of his contract for each of

Respondents do not claim that the facts so alleged in defendant’s answer are not sufficient to work an estoppel against plaintiffs if the doctrine of estoppel in pais is invoeable to support a transfer of community real property in which the wife did not' join. What they do claim is that no matter what the wife’s conduct may have been, if she did not join with the husband in executing the transfer the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot be invoked to defeat an action brought to avoid the transfer.

There was evidence, either introduced by defendant or offered by him, which tended to establish the allegations of fact upon which he relies to make good his claim of estoppel. To the introduction of some of this evidence the court sustained objections upon the grounds of irrelevancy and immateriality. These rulings are assigned as error. These assignments present a question which, like the one next to be mentioned, depends for its answer upon whether or not the doctrine of estoppel is invoeable in cases of this character.

Instead of making findings upon the facts specifically pleaded by defendant to support Ms claim of estoppel, the trial court simply found that “it is not true that John K. Rice or Sallie G. Rice were at any time estopped from claiming that plaintiffs are entitled to the possession of said property.” This is but the mere statement of' a conclusion of law, which leaves us in utter ignorance as to what facts, if any, the trial court considered as constituting an estoppel. [1] “The rule is that the facts constituting the estoppel must be pleaded. . . . By the same rule the facts constituting the estoppel must be found.” (Fritz v. Mills, 12 Cal. App. 118 [ 106 Pac. 727 ].) It follows, therefore, that defendant was entitled to findings upon the facts pleaded by him and which he claimed raised an estoppel, unless, as contended by respondents, the doctrine of estoppel never can be invoked by the husband’s transferee in an action of this character.

Prior to the adoption of this section it was the established doctrine in this state that during the marriage the husband is the sole and exclusive owner of all community property, and that the wife has no claim thereto nor any interest or estate therein other than a mere expectancy as heir, if she survive him. (Spreckels v. Spreckels, 172 Cal. 775 [ 158 Pac. 537 ], and cases there cited.) Whether this doctrine has suffered any modification by reason of the adoption of section 172a is a question which was purposely left open in Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 191 Cal. 601 [ 218 Pac. 22 ], the court there saying That because the property in that case was acquired before the section was adopted “it is unnecessary to consider the question . . . whether, with reference to after-acquired property, the section creates an estate in the wife which she had not theretofore possessed.” Nor do we find it necessary here to consider that question, for both parties to this appeal have expressly conceded that it is the power of alienation, and not .the nature of the estate, which is affected by the statute. Therefore, for the purposes of this appeal, we shall adopt counsel’s concession as embodying a correct statement of the law.

[2] If, as counsel concede, the section affects only the power of alienation and not the nature of the estate, then the legislative intent may best be carried out by regarding the transfer as being good as against the husband but voidable at the option of the wife. In Spreckels v.

i, The question, then, is this: May the wife by her conduct estop herself from asserting the right which is given her by section 172a, i. e., the right to avoid her husband’s conveyance of community real property in which she did not joint [3] As a general rule, estoppel cannot vitalize a transfer which is void because prohibited by law or because it is against public policy. In the eye of the law such a transfer has no existence whatever, and neither action nor inaction can validate it or estop a party against asserting its utter invalidity. The rule is announced in Ruling Case Law as follows: “It is generally considered that, as between the parties to a contract, validity cannot be given to it by estoppel if it is prohibited by law or is against public policy.” (10 R. C. L., p. 801.)

Respondents contend that a conveyance of community real property in which the wife does not join is void, both because it is prohibited by law and because it contravenes public policy. Is such a conveyance so far prohibited by section 172a as to be an absolute nullity, wholly ineffective for any purpose whatever ? [4] That section, as we have seen, contains a proviso which declares that “the sole lease,

[6] The word “presumed,” as used in the declaration of the proviso that every lease, contract, mortgage or deed which is under its protecting aegis “shall be presumed to be valid,” is doubtless used in the sense that it is conclusively presumed that every such lease, contract, mortgage or deed is valid. We have then in this part of the section what is tantamount to an express statutory recognition of the passing of the title to the lessee, grantee, vendee or mortgagee whenever those conditions exist which are defined in the. proviso.

The proviso is sandwiched between the first and concluding portions of the section. The concluding clause declares that “no action to avoid such instrument shall be commenced after the expiration of one year from the filing for record of such instrument in the recorder’s office in the county in which the land is situate.” [7] Obviously, the words “such instrument” where they last occur, i. e., in the provision to the effect that suit shall not be commenced after one year from the filing of “such instrument” for record, do not refer to the instrument by which the husband acquired the record title. It evidently was the intention of the legislature that the year within which the action could be brought should not commence to run until the wife could be charged with at least constructive notice that her husband had alienated or encumbered the title. But the recording of the instrument whereby the husband acquired the record title would not afford notice to the wife that he had alienated or encumbered the title so acquired by him. [8] Equally obvious is it that the words “such instru

These considerations lead irresistibly to the conclusion that, so far as the meaning of the words “such instrument” is concerned, the first and last parts of the section should be read as though the proviso which separates them had been omitted. So read, the section would provide that “. . . the wife must join with him [the husband] in executing any instrument by which such community real property or any interest therein is leased for a longer period than one year, or is sold, conveyed or encumbered; but no action to avoid such instrument shall be commenced after the expiration of one year from the filing for record of such instrument in the recorder’s office in the county in which the land is situate.”

From the foregoing analysis of the section it will be seen that it fixes a limitation of one year from the recording of an instrument executed by the husband alone, and which is not within the saving grace of the proviso, within which to bring an action to avoid the husband’s instrument. [10] But a statutory provision which prescribes a time limitation within which a wife may bring an action to avoid her husband’s instrument of conveyance enwombs the necessary implication ■ that the title passes by the instrument even

[11] Nor is there any reason why it should be held that “public policy,” a term of vague and uncertain meaning, forbids the wife from waiving her right to avoid a transfer of community real property executed solely by her husband. A wife’s right to avoid an instrument transferring community real property, or an interest therein, executed by her husband alone, is a privilege in which the state has no interest apart from that of the wife herself. There is no duty, perfect or imperfect, on the part of a wife to contest the validity of her husband’s transfer of community real property. It is true that the claim of a surviving wife to her share of the community property upon the death of her husband is one which, from the nature of the marriage relation, appeals to the courts and to society; but it has repeatedly been held that the wife may by contract relinquish her expectancy as heir in such property. (Estate of Sloan, 179 Cal. 393 [ 177 Pac. 150 ]; Estate of Brix, 181 Cal. 667 [ 186 Pac. 135 ].) In Spreckels v. Spreckels, supra (decided prior to 1917), the court, speaking of the provision in section 172 to the effect that the husband cannot make a gift of community property or convey the same without a valuable consideration unless the wife, in writing, consents thereto, said: “The provision was manifestly intended solely .for the benefit of the wife.” ( 172 Cal. 784 [ 158 Pac. 540 ].) We think it equally manifest that the provision in section' 172a which

In the state of Washington, which has a statutory provision similar to that contained in section 172a of our Civil Code, it frequently has been held that the doctrine of estoppel may be invoked against the wife. Thus in Magee v. Risley, 82 Wash. 178 [ 143 Pac. 1088 ], the court, having under consideration a case involving the application of the statute, said: “Assuming, without deciding, that Wright’s wife would have been actually entitled to a community interest in the property as against a purchaser with notice of the marriage, still the facts found in this case would, under the doctrine announced in Sadley v. Niesz, 5 Wash. 182 [ 31 Pac. 630 , 1030], forever estop her from claiming any interest as against the respondent here, who was a purchaser in good faith without notice.”

Our conclusion from the foregoing is that there is no “public policy” which forbids the transferee in cases such as this from setting up the wife’s conduct as an estoppel against her right to avoid her husband’s transfer of community real property.

The cases relied upon by respondent, of which Hart v. Church, 126 Cal. 471 [ 77 Am. St. Rep. 195 , 59 Pac. 296 ], and Friermuth v. Steigleman, 130 Cal. 392 [ 80 Am. St. Rep. 138 , 62 Pac. 615 ], are the most conspicuous examples, are not in point. They are cases where one of the spouses alone executed a deed to or a mortgage upon the home

[12] Holding, as we do, that estoppel is a defense which may be pleaded by the husband’s vendee or grantee in an action such as this, it follows that the trial court erred in sustaining objections to evidence offered by appellant in support of the facts pleaded by him by way of estoppel, and that it also erred in failing to make specific findings upon the facts so pleaded.

The judgment is reversed.

Works, J., and Craig, J., concurred.