Majority
Headnote
[1] Estates of Deceased Persons —■ Preferred Creditors ■— Marshaling of Assets.—When a petition by alleged preferred creditors of the estate of a deceased person to have distributed to them a specified sum of money, as preferred creditors, is before the trial court and it appears to the court that the claims which have been proved and allowed and are unpaid and an outstanding and unpaid judgment against the estate greatly exceed the moneys on hand, but there are other assets of a speculative and uncertain value that have not been liquidated, the court should make no order with reference to the payment of the claims, preferred or otherwise, or any part thereof, but it should await the time when all the assets have been marshaled.On August 26, 1920, Harland B. Lemon was employed by Jack Stuhldreher in his vulcanizing shop at Santa Maria, California. A gasoline explosion occurred which set fire to the shop and burned the employee and his employer. The employee died of his injuries on the same day. The employer died the next day. Such proceedings were had that Esther M. Stuhldreher, the wife of the employer, was duly appointed administratrix of his estate. Blanche E. Lemon, the surviving wife of the employee, took such proceedings that the Industrial Accident Commission thereafter made its findings and award in favor of the surviving wife and Harland B. Lemon, her minor child, in the sum of $4,495.50. A certified copy of said award was filed with the county clerk of Santa Barbara County and a judgment was entered thereon. On proceedings duly had and taken the Industrial Accident Commission converted said award into a lump sum, $4,058.34, payable forthwith. A certified copy of its order was filed with the county clerk and a judgment in accordance therewith was duly entered. Such proceedings were had -that on the fifteenth day of October, 1923, Esther M. Stuhldreher, as administratrix of the estate of Jack Stuhldreher, filed in the matter of the said
On July 7, 1924, the attorneys for the administratrix and the attorney for Blanche E'. Lemon et al., filed a stipulation “That the court may determine the priority, if any, of the said Blanche E. Lemon and Harland B. Lemon, Jr., whether or not the said Blanche E. Lemon and Harland B. Lemon, Jr., have a preferred claim based on the award of the Industrial Accident Commission of the state of California, and direct that the payment not to exceed the sum of $1000 be ordered paid as prayed for in said petition, said payment to be made to the various creditors in accordance with law following the court’s determination on the question of priority, it being the intention of this "stipulation that the court need not determine the pro rata to which each creditor is entitled at this time.”
The record contains a reporter’s transcript. That trans-script purports to set forth the proceedings that occurred on Monday, November 25, 1923. A reading thereof discloses that the subject matter before the court was the settling of the second account and the consideration of a petition for the allowance of attorney fees. Nothing is contained therein with reference to the “Petition for Partial .Payment to Creditors. ’ ’
On the seventh day of July, 1924, the trial court made an order as follows: “The petition of Blanche E. Lemon and Harland B. Lemon, Jr., alleged preferred creditors of the above-entitled estate to have distributed to them the sum of $1000, as preferred creditors, having heretofore been submitted to the court for consideration and decision, and the court having duly considered the same and being fully advised in the premises, now renders its decision thereon from the bench and orders that said petition be and the same is hereby denied. Let an order be prepared accordingly.”
On the twenty-first day of July, 1924, Blanche E. Lemon and Harland B. Lemon, Jr., contestants and appellants, served a notice of appeal on the attorneys for the administratrix and filed the same. In that notice of appeal they recited that they appealed from an order allowing attorney fees and also from the order quoted above.
We must assume until the contrary appears that the judicial record before us correctly determines and sets forth the rights of the parties. [1] When the petition was before the trial court it appeared to the trial court that there was on hand the sum of $3,670; that there were some other assets of a speculative and uncertain value that had not been liquidated; that the claims proved and allowed and unpaid amounted to $8,025.29 and that there was in addition thereto outstanding and unpaid a judgment in the sum of $4,058.34. Under these circumstances, if no other facts appeared, the record presents a case where it was peculiarly proper that the court should make no order with reference to the payment of the claims preferred or otherwise, or any part thereof, but on the other hand that it should await the time when all of the assets had been marshaled. (Estate of Smith, 122 Cal. 462 [ 55 Pac. 249 ].) The utmost that the record shows is that the trial court exercised its discretion by refusing to determine whether the judgment was a preferred claim or was not a preferred claim. Certainly nothing appears in the record showing that it abused its discretion.
[2] In their briefs counsel refer to the stipulation. The filing of the paper was an idle act. The power of the court flowed from the statute and could neither be increased nor diminished by the stipulation of counsel.
We find no error in the record. The order is affirmed.
Nourse, J., and Langdon, P. J., concurred.
Cases cited
- In re Estate of Smith 122 Cal. 462 p. 230