Majority
Headnote
[1] Negligence—Burning of Hospital Patient—Issues—Agency— Burden of Proof—Evidence—Instructions.—In this action to recover damages for burns inflicted on plaintiff’s leg while a patient in the hospital operated by defendant corporation, there having been no legal evidence before the court that either the nurse who put the hot-water bottles in the bed, or the nurse who put plaintiff in bed in contact with the hot-water bottles, or the special nurse who thereafter took charge of the case or any of them, was not the agent of defendant, and the law having imposed on defendant the burden of introducing evidence to show that said individuals, and especially the latter two nurses, were not its agents and that defendant was not guilty of negligence, and defendant having wholly failed to sustain that burden, the court properly instructed the jury that the only question before them was “the question of damages this boy is entitled to recover”; and there was no evidence before the court calling for the application of defendant’s requested instructions relating to the nonliability of defendant for the carelessness of a special nurse employed by plaintiff or his parents or for the negligence of a person in an independent employment, over whom defendant exercised no control or supervision.The plaintiff, a minor, commenced an action to recover damages for burns inflicted on his leg while a patient in the hospital operated by the defendant
Mrs. McBride, the mother of the plaintiff, testified: “That at the date of the trial the plaintiff was nine years of age; that in February, 1920, Mr. McBride and I were living at 1147 Benton Way, Los Angeles; we had but one child, Johnnie, and at that time there was nothing the matter with his health except for his tonsils and his nose bothering him; I consulted Dr. Ruddy, who advised that there was a growth in the nose and that it should be removed and that his tonsils should be removed; the doctor advised me to go to the Clara Barton Hospital. Later I called the hospital on the telephone and engaged a private room. On Friday morning, February 6, 1920, we took the child to the hospital about 7 A. M. When we arrived there we registered and I stated that we wanted a special nurse detailed on the case. We were taken to a ward-room containing several beds and when I stated that I had engaged a special room I was told that the hospital had none and that the bed in the ward was the only vacant bed. The child was put to bed undressed. At that time he was perfectly conscious. About 8 o’clock attendants took him in a wheel-chair and the child was operated upon. While the child was absent from the room the witness remained in the ward-room and in the hall adjacent. A nurse in a blue drab uniform with a white apron and cap (hospital uniform) came forward and made the bed and put a hot water bottle in the bed. I asked why that was done and the nurse replied ‘that it was necessary, when a patient is coming out of an anaesthetic, to have the bed warm. ’ There were very likely three hot water bottles put in. The nurse was a young girl. After she put the hot water bottles in the bed she left and I did not see her again. After the child was brought from the operating room and placed in bed I went into the room and remained there until about noon. During that time the child was unconscious. When I entered the room
Marie Hodgdon, a witness called on behalf of the defendant, testified: “In the month of February, 1920, I was em
Dr. Barton, called as a witness for the defendant, testified: “I am president and general manager of the Clara Barton Hospital in Los Angeles. In our hospital we do not have any special nurses. When a patient comes to our hospital and wants a special nurse it is the custom of the hospital to telephone outside—look in the nurses’ directory. I don’t think Miss Woodward was employed by our hospital in February, 1920, because those things are turned over to the superintendent of nurses and I don’t have personal knowledge. If she was a special nurse she was not employed by our hospital. We have no control of the special nurses at all. They report to the doctor in charge of the patient. He is not one of our doctors. Dr. Buddy never was connected with the hospital in any way. I know what the custom is in regard to preparing the bed where a patient is undergoing an operation. The custom is that the bed is prepared with blankets and the hot water bottle put in there, and when the anaesthetized patient is returned to the bed the fixed rule of the hospital is to remove the hot water bottle. It is the duty of the nurse in charge of the patient at the time the patient is returned to take out the hot water bottle. When Miss Woodward went out to the house from time to time to change the dressing after the patient went home, that was not done under my direction nor the direction of the hospital. We did not pay her for any services rendered in that connection. Dr. Sprague, who went out there several times and dressed the wound, was not employed by us. He did not go out there under my direction. I never received any word from Mrs. McBride or from Miss Woodward that we should send a nurse or a doctor out there. I never heard of this matter after the patient left the hospital until suit was filed against us. It is the custom in our hospital when a special nurse is employed in a case that we collect a fee for them. The hospital gets no part of it. The hospital did not get any part of Miss Woodward’s fee. We got money for the board of the nurse and for the room, but no money for her compensation. We collect for the nurse just for accommodation—that is the custom. We never
Iva B. Lounsbury, called as a witness by the defendant, testified: “I know the custom in the hospital in regard to employing and paying a special nurse. The hospital makes no charge nor takes any part of the pay of the special nurse. In this ease the hospital received nothing except what is shown on the bill. In this case the hospital charged Mrs. McBride $23.70 which does not include $10 collected for Dr. Biddle for giving the anaesthetic, nor a fee for Miss Woodward. That is the hospital charge. I did not enter in our cash book the $15 for Miss Woodward, or the $10 for Dr. Biddle.”
In rebuttal John W. McBride was called as a witness for the plaintiff. He testified: “I am the father of the plaintiff. I was present at the operation. There was a regular hospital attendant in the surgery-room when the operation was going on. Miss Woodward was not there. After I left the surgery-room I accompanied the boy to his room. Miss Woodward was not there. A nurse put the boy to bed. She was dressed in regular probation nurse, blue and white I guess. After the patient was in bed was the first time I saw Miss Woodward in the room. I saw her come in the room after the boy was placed in bed. The other nurse went on about her duties I presume. This nurse stated that she had charge of the case.”
All of the evidence given by Mr. McBride was objected to as not being in rebuttal, nevertheless it was admitted. No motion for a continuance was made, but when the time arrived the appellant cross-examined Mr. McBride. On cross-examination the witness testified: “Mrs. McBride arranged with the hospital to supply the room with a special nurse.
[1] After the foregoing evidence had been received the case was argued to the jury. Thereupon the court instructed the jury that, “There is only one question for you to consider in this case and that is the question of damages this boy is entitled to recover. ’ ’ Continuing, the court fully instructed the jury on the rules governing it in estimating damages. We do not understand that the appellant questions the correctness of any of the latter instructions. However, in connection with the first instruction which the trial court gave appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give numbers V and VI of the instructions requested by the appellant. Those two instructions were worded as follows: “V. You are instructed that if the injuries claimed to have been sustained by the plaintiff, were caused solely by the fault, carelessness, or negligence, of a special nurse employed by the parent, or parents, of the said plaintiff, and that the said special nurse was not at the said time in the employ, nor under the control or supervision of the defendant, then your verdict should be for the defendant. VI. You are instructed that a person, or corporation, is not liable for the negligence, or carelessness, of a person in an independent employment, over whom he, or it, exercises no control, or supervision.” In view of the evidence which we have recited above we think it is quite clear indeed that the trial court committed no error in giving the instruction taking from the jury all issues excepting the amount of the damage. There was no legal evidence before the trial court that the first nurse (name not disclosed by the record) mentioned by Mrs. McBride, nor the nurse mentioned by Mr. McBride as the nurse that put the plaintiff in bed in contact with the hot water bottles (name of nurse
All other requested instructions became immaterial in view of the first instructions given by the trial court.
[2] , There was evidence that the appellant had posted in different places in its premises certain notices limiting its liability. There is no evidence that the plaintiff or his parents saw or read the notices or entered into any contract limiting the liability of the appellant. The appellant does not call to our attention any statute which authorizes a hospital to limit its liability by posting notices. The trial court did not err in refusing to admit the contents of the notices in evidence. (Carter v. Service Co., 160 Iowa, 78 , 90 [ 141 N. W. 26 ].)
[3] During the trial the appellant sought to introduce in evidence what it claimed to be the custom obtaining in the city of Los Angeles in regard to hospitals employing special nurses called in from the outside, controlling and supervising such nurses, and collecting for and paying to such nurses their compensation. The trial court interrupted the proceeding and suggested to the respondent that such evidence was inadmissible. Thereupon an objection was made and the objection was sustained. The ruling was clearly correct. (6 Thompson on Negligence, sec. 7882.)
[4] A point is made that the trial court erred in receiving as in rebuttal the testimony of Mr. McBride because his testimony should have been offered by the plaintiff as a part of his case in chief. The trial court did not err. If the appellant was taken by surprise it could have asked for a continuance, or it could have asked for the privilege of introducing any appropriate evidence to meet the evidence of' Mr. McBride. Having failed to take either of those courses
We find no error in the record. The judgment is affirmed.
Langdon, P. J., and Nourse, J., concurred.
A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on January 7, 1926.
Cases cited
- Meyer v. McNutt Hosp. 173 Cal. 156 p. 170
- Nuckolls v. College of Physicians & Surgeons 7 Cal. App. 233 p. 171