Majority
Headnote
[1] Waters and Water Rights—Incorporated Towns—Judicial Notice.—Courts take judicial notice^ of the incorporation of cities and of the boundaries thereof, without proof and without averment; and this rule is applicable to proceedings before boards and special tribunals.This is an appeal from the judgment herein requiring the defendants to “proceed to hear and act upon” the plaintiff’s “application for a permit to appropriate” ten second-feet of the water in Lindsay Slough, a tributary of the Sacramento River, for municipal purposes.
The complaint sets out the application in full, including a map which accompanied and was made a part of the application. The parts of the application material to the questions raised by the appeal are as follows: “The use
Appellants fairly summarize the material facts as follows: “Respondent filed an application . . . for a permit to appropriate unappropriated waters . . . for municipal purposes ; ... it was for the purpose of supplying the cities of Vallejo, Benicia, Suisun and Fairfield and adjacent territory in the county of Solano. . . . The map filed with said application showed the pipe-line to Cordelia, but did not show
Section la of the Water Commission Act provides: “The state water commission shall have authority to grant, or to refuse to grant a permit and to reject any application, after hearing; provided, however, that no hearing shall be necessary in order to issue a permit upon an unprotested application or in order to reject a defective application after notice as provided in section seventeen of this act, unless the state water commission elects to hold a hearing. ’ ’ Section Id provides that “the application must be accompanied by such maps, drawings, and other data as may be required by the state water commission.” Section 7 provides: “For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this act the state water commission is authorized to pass such necessary rules and regulations as it may from time to time deem advisable.” Section 16 provides, among other requirements: “Every application for a permit to appropriate water shall set forth . . . the location and description of the proposed headworks, ditch, canal and other works; . . . and the place where it is intended to use the water.” The rules and regulations adopted by the commission contain the following: “Regulation 3. . . . (e) The place of use must be established with reasonable certainty. . . . Regulation 4. ... If municipal use is intended then the name of the municipality to be served should be given providing it is incorporated, and if it is not incorporated then the area to be served may be described in some other suitable manner. . . . Regulation 5. Maps in duplicate must be filed in connection with each
[1] Vallejo, Benicia, Suisun, and Fairfield are all incorporated cities. Courts take judicial notice of the incorporation of cities and of the boundaries thereof. (10 Cal. Jur. 710; Municipal Corporation Bill, see. 3, Stats. 1923, p. 103.) Courts take judicial notice of the incorporation of a city “without proof, and even without averment.” (City of Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238 , 256 [ 27 Pac. 604 ].) The doctrine of judicial notice is applicable to proceedings before boards and special tribunals. (Anderson v. Board of Dental Examiners, 27 Cal. App. 336 , 339 [ 149 Pac. 1006 ]; Benton v. Industrial Acc. Com., 74 Cal. App. 411 [ 240 Pac. 1021 , 1023].) [2] The plaintiff’s application, therefore, gave the defendants as full information relative to the place of intended use of the water within the boundaries of the incorporated cities named as if such boundaries had been particularly described, and the only uncertainty in the application relates to the use of the water in the “adjacent territory.” Since the water is to be used for municipal purposes, it may be inferred that the term “adjacent territory” refers to built-up territory outside of but immediately adjacent to the respective incorporated cities named in the application. [3] Under the liberal provisions of section la of the Water Commission Act a hearing may be held and a permit granted even though the application therefor be defective. [4] Also the application may be granted in part and denied in part. Section 17 of the act provides: “The approval of any application shall give the right to take and use water only to the extent and for the purpose allowed in said approval.” There is no defect in the description of the place of intended use in so far as the incorporated cities themselves are concerned, and the use of water therein is doubtless the principal use for which the appropriation is sought. No more reason appears for denying plaintiff a hearing, on the mere ground that his application is insufficient as to a part of the places of intended use, than there would be for sustaining a general demurrer because one of several causes of action alleged in a complaint is defectively stated.
[6] Appellants urge that plaintiff was not entitled to a writ of mandate because he had a plain, speedy, and_ adequate remedy under the provisions of section lb of the act (Stats. 1923, p. 162). That section provides that any interested party “may within thirty days after issuance of a permit or an order refusing to issue a permit and rejecting an application bring an action in the superior court. . . . Said action shall be for a review of the order of the state water commission. Said court shall review all correspondence, maps, data and other records on file with the state water commission which pertain to said application and all evidence taken before said commission and take such additional evidence as it may require or as may be submitted by the parties in interest or the state water commission and shall then render judgment affirming, reversing, or modifying the action of the state water commission.” Respondent contends that such provisions of section lb are unconstitutional on various grounds, but the contention need not be considered, because the section, if valid, clearly contemplates such an action only after a hearing before the commission and not in a ease where a hearing has been denied. The remedy provided by section lb would not be adequate in a case such as this. (Careaga v. Fernald, 66 Cal. 351 ,
The judgment is affirmed.
Hart, J., and Plummer, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the district court of appeal on June 28, 1926, and a petition by appellants to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court, of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on July 26, 1926.
Cases cited
- City of Pasadena v. Stimson 91 Cal. 238 at 256 p. 213
- Anderson v. Board of Dental Examiners 27 Cal. App. 336 at 339 p. 213
- Benton v. Industrial Accident Commission 74 Cal. App. 411 p. 213
- Careaga v. Fernald 66 Cal. 351 p. 214