Majority
Headnote
[1] Criminal Daw—Murder op Policeman—Evidence—Accomplice— Corroboration.—In this prosecution for the murder of a police officer, it is held that the evidence strongly tended to connect defendant with the commission of the crime charged and was sufficient, within the provisions of section 1111 of the Penal Code, to corroborate the testimony of accomplices.The defendant was charged with the murder of Michael J. Brady, a police officer. The jury returned a verdict of murder in the first degree, life imprisonment being fixed as the punishment for the crime. A motion for a new trial was denied, from which order and from the judgment the defendant has appealed.
The deceased, at about the hour of 1 o’clock A. M. on October 1, 1924, near the intersection óf Mason and California Streets, in the City of San Francisco, received injuries from pistol shots fired by one of the occupants of a Ford touring car, from which he subsequently died, defendant and two others, namely, Haughey and Gleason, being charged by indictment with the crime. The latter and one Robinson were called as witnesses for the prosecution and testified that on the occasion mentioned they with the defendant occupied the automobile and were engaged in carrying out a previous plan to rob one Carrington; that at the time of the injuries of the deceased the latter approached the car, which was being driven by defendant Rhinehart, ordered the driver to stop, and attempted to step upon the running-board, whereupon defendant fired the shots which caused the officer’s death.
Defendant urges as grounds for reversal that the testimony of these witnesses was not corroborated by evidence tending to connect him with the commission of the offense, and that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of eer
In addition to the foregoing evidence was adduced which tended to show that defendant, in company with one or more of his associates mentioned, had previously participated in a robbery perpetrated by methods described by Eobinson and which were similar to those contemplated on the night of the murder.
[1] This testimony strongly tended to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime charged, and was sufficient within the provisions of section 1111 of the Penal Code to ' corroborate the witnesses Gleason and Eobinson (People v. McLean, 84 Cal. 480 [ 24 Pac. 32 ]; People v. Blunkall, 31 Cal. App. 778 [ 161 Pac. 997 ]; People v. Taylor, 70 Cal. App. 239 [ 232 Pac. 998 ]).
[2] Subsequent to the arrest of Gleason and Eobinson statements in writing were made by them containing in substance the matters. to which they testified at. the trial. Shortly after the arrest of the defendant the statements mentioned were read to him.' Defendant some days previously had demed his guilt, and on this occasion stated that he had nothing to say. Such testimony is received on the theory that a refusal to speak under circumstances which naturally call for denial is a fact which tends inferentially to show an admission of the truth of the accusation, its relevancy in view of the circumstances shown being in the
No error appearing from the record, and the evidence being sufficient to sustain the verdict, the order and judgment appealed from are affirmed.
Tyler, P. J., and Knight, J., concurred.
A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on December 13, 1926.
Curtis, J., dissented,
Cases cited
- People v. McLean 84 Cal. 480 p. 501
- People v. Blunkall 31 Cal. App. 778 p. 501
- People v. Taylor 70 Cal. App. 239 p. 501
- People v. Byrne 160 Cal. 217 p. 502
- People v. Shelest 62 Cal. App. 213 p. 502
- People v. Graney 48 Cal. App. 773 p. 502
- People v. Egan 77 Cal. App. 279 p. 502
- People v. Swaile 12 Cal. App. 192 at 198 p. 502