Majority
This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of conviction of manslaughter under an information charging him with the crime of murder.
The defendant has filed herein a document designated as, and purporting to be, a brief. All that said document contains, so far as it relates in any way to the merits of the appeal, is the following: “Appellant has not funds sufficient to enable him to employ attorneys to make an extensive analysis of the transcript on appeal, and all that the attorneys for appellant are doing on this appeal is done voluntarily and without compensation. In order to adequately present a brief in this case it would be necessary for appellant’s attorneys to analyze the testimony and write a very extensive brief, as the entire transcript is the main basis of the appeal.”
The remainder of the “brief” is devoted entirely to a reply to the motion of the attorney-general to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the defendant, on taking the appeal, failed to comply with the requirements of section 1247 of the Penal Code in his application for a transcription of such testimony received and any other proceedings had at the trial as might be deemed necessary “to fairly present the points relied upon” for a reversal. Nor did the defendant, through his counsel, or otherwise, appear in court and offer or make an oral argument in support of the appeal, although the cause was placed upon the calendar of the October term of this court for hearing and decision, and counsel given due notice thereof by the clerk of this court.
Regardless of whether the motion of the attorney-general to dismiss is or is not tenable, it is clear that the judgment must be affirmed for failure on the part of the accused to file, or cause to be filed, a brief or to present an oral argument, pointing out the errors upon which he intended to base his demand for a reversal. Rule 5 of this court explicitly authorizes this course in cases in which the appellant or his counsel is guilty of such delinquency, and our courts of review have in many eases emphatically sanctioned the enforcement of the rule. This is so because,
The judgment and the order are affirmed.
Plummer, J., and Weyand, J., pro tem., concurred.