Majority
The appellant, Andrew H. Hector, was charged by information with having committed the crime of an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to murder, and two prior convictions for burglary. Besides admitting the prior convictions he entered two pleas, not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial upon the first issue resulted in a verdict of guilty of an assault with a deadly weapon, and upon the trial on the issue of his sanity, the jury found him “sane at the time the offense charged in the information was committed.” The appeal is taken from the judgment of conviction, and no point is made in appellant’s briefs with regard to the trial on the issue of sanity.
The crime of which appellant was convicted is alleged to have been committed on H. 0. Fisher, who was a police officer. Appellant admits having fired a shot from the loaded revolver he was carrying on his person, but claims, first, that he shot at a dog which was about to attack him; and, secondly, that even though he shot at the officer, the circumstances under which the shooting took place justified him in shooting in self-defense.
The essential facts appearing from the evidence in support of the verdict are as follows: Fisher and a fellow officer named Tice, who were in civilian clothes, were patrolling the streets in an automobile, and while driving slowly along Twentieth Street near Franklin Street in Oakland on May 29, 1928, at about 10:15 o’clock at night, saw two men, who afterward proved to be appellant and a companion named Shepherd, on the south side of Twentieth Street between Franklin and Broadway, feeling the handles of the automobiles parked along there and looking inside of them. Tice got out at Franklin Street and watched them, walking toward them. In the meantime Fisher turned around and came back up the street to Twentieth and Franklin, and as he did so the two men crossed Twentieth Street to the
Appellant became a witness in his own behalf, and according to his testimony the shooting occurred as follows: He stated that he was riding with Shepherd in the latter’s automobile, and that when they reached a point opposite the parking station they stopped and went in there looking for a lavatory,- that as they reached the rear of the lot a car drove in from the street and the driver threw the headlights on them; that someone jumped out of the-car and said, “Throw up your hands or I will shoot you,” or something to that effect, but on account of the lights appellant could not see whether or not the men were in uniform. Immediately, he said, he ran for the rear fence, and as he jumped the fence two shots were fired in his direction; that as he landed on the other side of the fence a large dog raised up in a vicious manner as if to bite Mm, and that he put his pistol down close to the dog’s head and fired one shot, and then ran on. He further stated that he ran away because he believed he was about to be “held up,” and that later when he was overtaken down the street he tried to get out of the way because he thought the same people were after him who had shot at him in the parking station.
On cross-examination and by way of impeachment evidence it was shown that in 1920 appellant was convicted of burglary in San Francisco and served three years in San Quentin; that in June, 1923, he was convicted of burglary in Santa Barbara County and served five years in the same prison; and that during the week preceding his present trial he was convicted in Alameda County of robbery.
It is apparent that three distinct theories were presented by the foregoing evidence: First, that appellant did not shoot at the officer at all; secondly, that, not being a wrongdoer Mmself, he believed he was about to suffer serious bodily injury as the victim of a robbery and therefore shot
As said in People v. Martinez, 20 Cal. App. 343 [ 128 Pac. 952 ], afterward quoted approvingly in People v. Mitsunaga, 91 Cal. App. 298 [ 266 Pac. 1020 ], “Where the circumstances are such as to reasonably justify the inference of guilt, as found by the jury, the fact that an inference of innocence might likewise be reasonably drawn therefrom does not present a question of law for review by an appellate court any more than does a verdict based upon direct conflicting evidence, . . . and it is only when the evidence obviously does not warrant the inference of guilt that the court will interfere. ’ ’
Here, the members of the jury, being the sole judges of the facts and of the credibility of the witnesses, doubtless rejected the story told by appellant and found in accordance with the testimony relied upon by the prosecution, and in our opinion the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain their conclusion, for, briefly stated, it shows that appellant, at 10 o’clock at night, having been twice convicted of burglary and carrying a loaded pistol, which in itself constituted a felony (Stats. 1923, p. 695), was discovered by police officers in the pursuit of their duty tampering with a number of automobiles parked along a public street, from which it may be fairly inferred that appellant was about to commit a theft; that after being informed of the identity of the officers and called upon to halt, he shot at one of them in order to escape. Clearly, under such circumstances, it cannot be successfully maintained that he shot in self-defense.
The judgment is affirmed.
Tyler, P. J., and Cashin, J., concurred.
A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on January 28, 1929.
All the Justices concurred.
Cases cited
- People v. Martinez 20 Cal. App. 343 p. 106
- People v. Mitsunaga 91 Cal. App. 298 p. 106