Majority
The complaint in this action was on a common count and alleged: “That within two (2) years last past, immediately prior to the commencement of this action, the defendants became indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred Seventy Dollars ($2570.00) for goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendants, at the special instance and request of the defendants. ’ ’ The answer generally and specifically denied this allegation.
The first witness called at the trial of the action was the general manager of the plaintiff, which is the respondent herein. He testified that the defendants, the appellants herein, came to his establishment to buy a carpet and that, among other carpets, he showed them a white carpet and they told him that they wanted to purchase it. An agreement was then entered into between them that it would he sold to defendants
The question before us is epitomized by respondent in his brief in these words: “Appellants contend that such a defense is not ‘new matter ’ necessitating an affirmative defense. The trial court and the respondent are of the view that such a defense is new matter.” With this latter contention we do not agree. We are of the opinion that the ruling of the court constituted prejudicial error. The witness had testified that the defendants had been sold a white carpet and was equally positive that the carpet selected had been delivered. Having testified that a white carpet had been delivered it was certainly proper cross-examination to question the witness as to whether or not the carpet sold was, in fact, delivered. Respondent having pleaded that it was and having testified that it was, the proof of this matter was therefore clearly within the issue, was so placed by the allegations of the complaint, the denial of these allegations in the answer, and was not new matter. In an action upon a common count under a general denial the defendants may urge any defense tending to show that the plaintiff has no right to recover or to recover to the extent that he claims. (De Santis v. Miller Petroletim Co., 29 Cal.App.2d 679 , 683 [ 85 P.2d 489 ]; Heaton-Hobson etc. Offices v. Arper, 145 Cal. 282 , 284 [ 78 P. 721 ]; Evans v. Zeigler, 91 Cal.App.2d 226 , 230 [ 204 P.2d 902 ]; Bridges v. Paige, 13 Cal. 640 .)
In support of respondent’s contention that the testimony
As this case must be remanded for a new trial no useful purpose ivould be served by a consideration of the question raised by appellants as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a holding as to the status of the agency of one of the defendants or as to whether or not the evidence is sufficient to support the judgment. At any new trial of this action the parties should be allowed to amend their pleadings if they be so advised.
The judgment is reversed.
Shinn, P. J., and Vallée, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- DeSantis v. Miller Petroleum Co. 29 Cal.App.2d 679 at 683 p. 860
- Heaton-Hobson Associated Law Offices v. Arper 145 Cal. 282 at 284 p. 860
- Evans v. Zeigler 91 Cal.App.2d 226 at 230 p. 860
- Bridges v. Paige 13 Cal. 640 p. 860
- American Steel Pipe & Tank Co. v. Hubbard 42 Cal.App. 520 p. 861