People v. Tolson

Appellant Tolson was charged with and convicted by a jury of a violation of section 261 of the Penal Code, in that, with force and violence, and against her will, he accomplished an act of sexual intercourse with a Mrs.

As grounds for reversal appellant asserts that prejudicial error was committed by the trial court in allowing testimony of the conduct of defendant toward three other women in a bar in the afternoon just prior to the offense against Mrs. S.; that there was reversible error in the introduction by the district attorney and the allowance by the court of statements made by defendant shortly after his arrest; and that the district attorney, in his argument to the jury, made a statement that was prejudicial to defendant.

The evidence shows that the offense of which appellant stands convicted occurred about 5:30 p. m.; that around 3 o’clock of that day appellant entered the Forest Club in Forbestown where he seated himself beside a Mrs. G., a total stranger, began a conversation with her, and asked if he could not take her home, and when she refused asked her to take a ride with him, which she also refused. He then approached two other strange women, asking each one of them if she would not go with him. To avoid him the three women finally moved to a corner table, together, but he followed them and continued his attentions, during which time he pinched one of them on the buttocks. The bartender ordered him to leave, which he did about 4:30 or 5 p. m., after some expostulation.

Defendant’s counsel objected to evidence of the aforesaid circumstances, but the objection was overruled, at which time the court instructed the jury that such testimony was admitted solely and only for the purpose of showing, if it did show, the frame of mind or a design or a common purpose on the part of defendant in connection with the offense with which he was charged. On a motion by defendant to strike the foregoing testimony the court again said:

“. . . If your argument is sound, the Jury will agree with you. You admit that he had an act of sexual intercourse with the complaining witness, and as you say, the sole issue is whether it was accomplished by mutual agreement between them or whether it was accomplished by the use of force. That is the issue as I take it; however, I see no harm in this testimony, and I think it is material to show possibly a design or common purpose or something of that sort.”

As to the evidence regarding statements of defendant, it shows that after his arrést the evening of the day of the offense, defendant denied that he visited the S. house at all; and after his arrival at Marysville, where he was taken to the sheriff’s office, he made a statement, which was written and signed, that he had visited the Forest Club, and after leaving same his car got stuck; that he was drunk and did not know whether he raped a woman or not; that he could not remember because he was drunk; that he did not admit the rape or deny it. But at the trial his memory seemed to clear. He testified that he went to the Forest Club and there saw Mrs. G. and some other women, all of whom were strangers; that after leaving the club his car became stuck in the mud, and that he went to the S. house where Mrs. S. was standing in the yard near two dogs; that he asked her if there was anyone there that could help get his car out, and she said there was not; that they then discussed sexual intercourse; that a child in the house started to cry and he followed Mrs. S. into the house; and that after that they had intercourse. He stated that he did not use force, did not tell her he would kill her, and did not strike her. He admitted that he told the sheriff the things contained in the statement he made to the sheriff.

Under these circumstances it cannot be said that it was error to admit testimony regarding the prior statements and denials made by defendant. They were admissible as tending to show consciousness of guilt, under the authority of People v. Walker, 99 Cal.App.2d 238 , 243 [ 221 P.2d 287 ] ; People v. Gibson, 64 Cal.App.2d 537 , 539 [ 149 P.2d 25 ], and People v. Turner, 86 Cal.App.2d 791 , 801 [ 195 P.2d 809 ].

As for appellant’s third assignment of error, the statement of the district attorney to which exception is now taken

No objection to the argument of the district attorney was made nor was it charged as misconduct, nor was any request made for an instruction to the jury to disregard it.

In People v. Sampsell, 34 Cal.2d 757 , 763 [ 214 P.2d 813 ], wherein the prosecutor went rather far afield, in affirming the conviction and death sentence the court said:

“The defendant, however, made no attempt to object to these remarks during the course of the trial, nor was the court requested to admonish the jury concerning them. It would appear that such an objection and request should have been made.”

And in People v. Godina, 30 Cal.2d 356 , 362 [ 181 P.2d 881 ], the court said:

“Moreover, defendant made no attempt to correct these alleged improprieties at the trial; and it is the general rule that any objectionable remarks or argument of the prosecuting attorney must be opposed at the time they are made, and the court requested to admonish the jury concerning them, before they can be made a ground for appeal.”

Also see People v. Shears, 133 Cal. 154 [ 65 P. 295 ] ; People v. O’Brand, supra ; People v. Harmon, 89 Cal.App.2d 55 , 61 [ 200 P.2d 32 ] ; People v. Tucker, 88 Cal.App.2d 333 , 334 [ 198 P.2d 941 ] ; People v. Hunter, 49 Cal.App.2d 243 , 250 [ 121 P.2d 529 ]; People v. Dozier, 35 Cal.App.2d 49 [ 94 P.2d 598 ] ; People v. Davidson, 23 Cal.App.2d 116 [ 72 P.2d 233 ].

The testimony of Mrs. S. regarding defendant’s use of force and threats in accomplishing his act was clear and convincing, and amply supports the verdict. It was for

The judgment and the order denying a new trial are affirmed.

Peek, J., and Van Dyke, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied March 18, 1952, and appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 3, 1952. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.