Majority
Plaintiff, a real estate broker, appeals from a judgment for the defendants in an action to recover a commission for the sale of real property in Orange County.
On July 28, 1950, defendant Katherine Raines signed a general listing agreement, authorizing plaintiff to sell the property described as “102 Del Mar, San Clemente, for cash or terms, $28,500.” On August 7, 1950, plaintiff obtained a purchaser (Opal F. Cole) who offered to buy the property for $27,500, with terms of $7,500 cash. Escrow instructions
Appellant argues that under the circumstances shown by the record he was entitled to recover a commission since he had a valid listing agreement and within the life of that agreement, had obtained a purchaser ready, willing and able to purchase on terms acceptable to the sellers, and a valid and binding agreement to purchase and sell had been executed. However, the contract to purchase and sell was expressly made contingent upon the closing of the escrow by August 30, 1950, and the seller’s ability to perfect title by that date.
As was said in Denbo v. Weston Inn. Co., 112 Cal.App.2d 153 , 157 [ 245 P.2d 650 ] :
“The right of a broker to recover his commission must be measured primarily by the terms of his employment (Peterson v. Montgomery Holding Co., 89 Cal.App.2d 890 , 893, 894
[ 202 P.2d 365 ].) The broker may, by special agreement, make his compensation depend upon a contingency or the happening of a condition precedent, and unless such contingency occurs, he has no right of recovery. (Peterson v. Montgomery Holding Co., supra; Leventritt v. Cowell, 21 Cal.App. 597 [ 132 P. 627 ]; McGill v. Fleming, 32 Cal.App.2d 601 [ 90 P.2d 341 ] ; Hirschberg v. Rose, 136 Cal.App. 653 [ 29 P.2d 785 ] ; Edgecomb v. Callahan, 132 Cal.App. 248 [ 22 P.2d 521 ] ; Hollingsworth (W. I.) & Co. v. Haas, 6 Cal.App. 2d 519 [ 45 P.2d 360 ].)”
The record shows that plaintiff, who had a general listing for the property involved, procured a purchaser who made an offer at a price less than that quoted in the listing. Defendant Raines was not required to accept this counteroffer. She did, however, by escrow instructions, set forth the terms upon which the counteroffer would be accepted and a commission paid. This transaction was made dependent upon the happening of a condition. The instructions became a special contract between the parties, which contract was approved by plaintiff. Under the circumstances shown, plaintiff’s claim for commission must be based upon the escrow instructions and where, as here, his commission is dependent upon an unfulfilled condition, he cannot recover. (Wilson v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 427 , 433 [ 190 P.2d 975 ].)
In the fourth count of the complaint plaintiff alleges that by reason of misrepresentations made by defendant Raines that she was the owner of the property involved, plaintiff was damaged in the sum of $1,375. However, the record does not contain evidence of any such representations as to the ownership of the property, or otherwise, and plaintiff failed to prove fraud.
Judgment affirmed.
Barnard, P. J., and Griffin, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Denbo v. Weston Investment Co. 112 Cal.App.2d 153 at 157 p. 310
- Peterson v. Montgomery Holding Co. 89 Cal.App.2d 890 at 893, 894 p. 310
- Leventritt v. Cowell 21 Cal.App. 597 p. 311
- McGill v. Fleming 32 Cal.App.2d 601 p. 311
- Hirschberg v. Rose 136 Cal.App. 653 p. 311
- Edgecomb v. Callahan 132 Cal.App. 248 p. 311
- W. I. Hollingsworth & Co. v. Haas 6 Cal.App. 2d 519 p. 311
- Wilson v. Security-First National Bank 84 Cal.App.2d 427 at 433 p. 311