Majority
Defendant was convicted in a nonjury trial of violating section 337a, subdivision 2, of the Penal Code in that she unlawfully kept and occupied a room with papers and paraphernalia for the purpose of recording bets on a horse race. (She was also charged with violating subdivision 1 [bookmaking] and subdivision 4 [recording a bet], but she was acquitted of those charges.) She appeals from the judgment of conviction, and the order denying her motion for a new trial. Her contention is that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment or the order.
The tape, referred to by the officer, was received in evidence as Exhibit A. It was stipulated that it was a betting marker.
Officer Bradley testified further that, after receiving the tape, he arrested the defendant and began searching below the counter; at that time defendant was standing next to the officer (witness), and Officer Harris was standing next,to defendant, and Mrs. Rogers and .Officer Scott were sitting in chairs; then a Mr. Griffith entered the shop, walked ■ toward defendant and said, “Where is my money I got coming on
Miss Thomas, called as a witness by defendant, testified that at the time involved here she was employed in an adjustment bureau at 4421 Avalon Boulevard; on the afternoon in question she took some cancelled checks from that place and
Defendant testified that she has a record shop at 4419 Avalon Boulevard; the adding machine was there for sale— it was from a grocery store; Miss Thomas was in her shop that afternoon; one of the officers asked her (Miss Thomas) what she had in her hand, and she showed him some cancelled cheeks; Mrs. Rogers (also known as Mrs. Loriek) was in her shop that afternoon when the officers came in; Officer Bradley told her to take things out of her pocket; she took a piece of paper, Exhibit A, from her pocket; that paper does not look like anything that she (defendant) has written; while the officers were there, a man' by the name of Griffith came into the shop; she knew Griffith—he had an office a few doors from her shop; when he came in he said, “Miss Baker, give me my money”; she did not answer him at first because she did not know what he was talking about; he was under the influence of liquor; he also said, “Miss Baker, give me my money. I bet a horse and I won and I want my money”; she replied that she did not owe him any money and “You haven’t bet no horse with me”; when the officers were taking her out of the shop, after the arrest, she said to Griffith that he knew that he had told lies about giving her a bet; he then said that he was only kidding; she did not accept any wager from Griffith on that day or any other day.
Officer Bradley testified, in rebuttal, that when the officers and defendant were going out the door of the shop the defendant said, “Mr. Griffith, I don’t know why you would do that to me. You know I haven’t taken any bet from you”; Griffith replied, “I’m sorry”; she said, “Don’t tell me you are sorry. What I should do to you is pop you right in the mouth. ’ ’
The defendant was in the record shop which was owned and operated by her. She operated the adding machine, tore some tape therefrom, and handed it to Mrs. Rogers. That tape was a betting marker. Another tape found in the shop was an owe sheet. A newspaper was on the counter next to the adding machine, and the last page of that paper, which contained racing entries, was visible to a person standing by the machine. The evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant kept and occupied a room with papers and paraphernalia for the purpose of recording bets on a horse
Appellant asserts that the court erred prejudicially in receiving the testimony of the officer as to statements made to defendant by Griffith (who came into the shop) to the effect that he wanted the money that was coming to him on a bet he had made on a horse. She argues that the evidence was hearsay. The statements were accusatory. When he first made the statement, defendant did not say anything in reply thereto. After a few minutes, when he made the statement a second time, she said she did not owe him any money. She did not deny that she took a bet from him until she was leaving the shop with the officers and then she said that Griffith had lied about giving her a bet. The evidence was admissible. As stated in People v. Cacioppo, 34 Cal. App.2d 108 , at page 111 [ 93 P.2d 194 ]: “It is the rule that declarations or statements made in the presence of a party are received in evidence, not as evidence in themselves, but to understand what reply the party to be affected by the statement should make to the same. If he is silent when he ought to have spoken, the presumption of acquiescence arises. In this sense admissions may be implied from conduct.” The statements of Griffith to defendant were not admissible for the purpose of proving that defendant did owe Griffith money or that Griffith had placed a bet on a horse with defendant, but the statements coming in the midst of an investigation and search of the room by the officers, and being made in the presence of defendant, constituted a circumstance to be considered. Such a statement, if made by telephone during an investigation similar to the investigation here, would have been admissible for the purpose of proving the purpose for which the room was used. (People v. Reifenstuhl, 37 Cal.App.2d 402 , 405 [ 99 P.2d 564 ].) Under the circumstances in the present case, where the defendant was present and heard the statements of Griffith, the statements were material on the issue as to the purpose for which defendant used the room.
The judgment and the order are affirmed.
Shinn, P. J., concurred.
Vallée, J., concurred in the judgment.
Cases cited
- People v. Cacioppo 34 Cal. App.2d 108 p. 431
- People v. Reifenstuhl 37 Cal.App.2d 402 at 405 p. 431