Majority
Appellant and Thela Smith were charged by information with seven counts of abortion (Pen. Code, § 274). Following a jury trial defendants were adjudged guilty of all seven counts. Defendant Davis appeals from the judgment and from the order denying a new trial.
It is contended on appeal that,
I. “The trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting evidence of the declarations or acts of the alleged co-conspirators against appellant in the absence of independent proof of the existence of a conspiracy.”
II. That, “The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that appellant was on trial for the crime charged in the information, to wit violation of Penal Code section 274 and for no other crime, and that the sole purpose in per
III. That, “The evidence is insufficient to support the conviction of appellant in that there is no evidence corroborating the testimony of the abortee-witnesses which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime pursuant to Section 1108 of the Penal Code.”
Briefly, it may be noted, that the seven so-called abortees testified as to the operation and the arrangements leading up to the incident. These arrangements were made with codefendant Thela Smith. When the “abortees” arrived at the house pursuant to appointment they were prepared for the operation by Thela Smith. The description of what occurred, as testified to by the seven “abortees,” was substantially the same. All were blindfolded before the doctor entered the room.
As set forth in respondent’s brief and confirmed by the record, “Appellant testified, among other things, that he was an osteopathic physician, licensed in California as a drugless practitioner since 1927, and that he retired from active practice in 1947; that he saw Carol Berry (Count One) at his house one afternoon in early February, 1954; that she wanted information as to an abortion, that he was not able to help her out and that he had not seen her prior to that time; that early in February, Violet Thompson (Count Six) and her husband came to his house, that they told appellant she was pregnant and wanted an abortion, and asked if appellant could do something about it, that appellant suggested she go to term and have the baby and that he said he could not do anything about assisting them in obtaining an abortion; that George Krainbrink (Count Seven) came to appellant’s house one afternoon in late January or early February stating that he had gotten a girl into trouble and wanted someone to help them out, that appellant said he was sorry but he could not do anything about it and suggested that Mr. Krainbrink and the girl get married, that he never saw Mrs. Rose Marie Nipp before the preliminary hearing; that to the best of his recollection he never saw Martha Lemmonson (Count Four) before the commencement of this action; that he saw Mrs. McGinnis (Hamby), (Count Two), early in February when he went to her home in El Monte
Appellant’s points one, two, and four above noted relate to conspiracy. In that connection it should be noted that People v. Buffum, 40 Cal.2d 709 [ 256 P.2d 317 ], refers to the subject of conspiracy in such cases as the ease here considered and refutes appellant’s contentions. It appears to be well settled that a woman who submits to an abortion is not an accomplice of the individual procuring or conspiring to procure the miscarriage. (See also People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal.2d 57 [ 257 P.2d 29 ]; People v. Davis, 43 Cal.2d 661 [ 276 P.2d 801 ].) (As to corroborative evidence, see People v. Berger, 128 Cal.App.2d 509 [ 275 P.2d 799 ] ; People v. Allen, 104 Cal.App.2d 402 [ 231 P.2d 896 ] ; People v. Califro, 120 Cal.App.2d 504 [ 261 P.2d 332 ].)
The record reveals that the jury was clearly instructed that defendants were charged with abortion in each count of the information. Also with regard to the subject and application of the law of conspiracy, the jury was fully informed.
There appears to be an error in the judgment. The judgment recites that appellant admitted the second prior conviction and that the first prior conviction was stricken. However, the record shows that the first prior conviction was the one admitted and the second one was stricken. Pursuant to the rules on appeal (Rule 12(b)) the judgment should be corrected to correspond to the record as above noted.
It appears that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; that the instructions adequately cover the subject of conspiracy and that no prejudicial errors were committed.
It is ordered that the judgment be corrected by striking therefrom the following language in paragraph one thereof:
“and admitted the second prior conviction as alleged to-wit: Abortion, a felony, Superior Court of the State of California, Los Angeles County, August 19, 1953; first prior conviction having been stricken,” and in lieu thereof substitute the following:
“and admitted the first prior conviction as alleged to-wit: Income Tax Evasion, a felony, District Court of the United States, in and for the Southern District of California, September 17, 1947; second prior conviction having been stricken. ’ ’
As so modified and corrected, the judgment and order are and each is affirmed.
White, P. J., and Drapeau, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- People v. Buffum 40 Cal.2d 709 p. 560
- People v. Gallardo 41 Cal.2d 57 p. 560
- People v. Davis 43 Cal.2d 661 p. 560
- People v. Berger 128 Cal.App.2d 509 p. 560
- People v. Allen 104 Cal.App.2d 402 p. 560
- People v. Calipro 120 Cal.App.2d 504 p. 560