Majority
This is an appeal by plaintiff from an order granting defendant’s second motion to dissolve an attachment, after the first such motion had been denied.
Plaintiff sued on an accepted sight draft given in Mexico City and, in a second cause of action, on a judgment given in Mexico City upon the draft. Contemporaneously he secured an attachment which was levied on certain shares of stock owned by defendant. Pursuant to a trial judgment was entered for defendant on November 26, 1951. No formal written notice of entry of judgment was given to plaintiff. On December 4, 1951, plaintiff served and filed notice of intention to move for a new trial. On January 3, 1952, defendant served and filed notice of motion to dissolve the attachment. On January 28, 1952, plaintiff’s motion for a new trial was granted. On February 6, 1952, defendant’s motion to dissolve the attachment was denied. Thereafter defendant timely appealed from the granting of plaintiff’s motion for a new trial and from the denial of her motion to dissolve the attachment. The order granting the new trial was affirmed by the other division of this court on June 30, 1953, in Henderson v. Drake, 118 Cal.App.2d 777 [ 258 P.2d 879 ], which judgment has become final. The order denying defendant’s motion to dissolve the attachment was affirmed by the Supreme Court on December 31, 1953. (Henderson v. Drake, 42 Cal.2d 1 [ 264 P.2d 921 ].) On January 12, 1954, defendant noticed her second motion to dissolve the attachment, which was granted by minute order on February 4, 1954, after the remittitur of the Supreme Court decision had come down. On February 11, 1954, the superior court entered a written order in which it found that plaintiff had failed to appeal from the judgment for defendant and that the time for such appeal had expired, wherefore the attachment was ordered dissolved and the sheriff directed to release any attachment levied and to notify all garnishees of the release. The appeal before us is from the two orders of February 4 and February 11, 1954.
It is undisputed that when defendant did appeal from the order granting a new trial plaintiff did not avail himself of his right of cross-appeal of the judgment under rule 3a, and that when the second motion to dissolve the attachment was decided, plaintiff had lost all opportunity to perfect an appeal from the judgment for defendant. That is what distinguishes the situation at the time of the second motion to dissolve from the one at the time of the earlier motion and what justifies the opposite result.
Appellant contends that the Supreme Court cannot have intended to hold that plaintiff, to keep his attachment alive, should have taken an appeal from the judgment after it had been set aside on his motion for a new trial. The majority opinion did not expressly state what effect if any the motion for and the granting of a new trial had on the life of the
Appellant urges that even if the order dissolving the attachment was correct its effect was stayed by his appeal and that therefore the sheriff should not have been ordered to release the attachment levied. His contention was rejected by the trial court when it denied a motion to vacate the order of February 11. Appellant contends that the question whether the appeal of the order dissolving an attachment stays its effect is governed by the general stay provision of section 949 Code of Civil Procedure not by the quoted provision of section 946 with respect to the effect of an appeal on an attachment. We do not agree. Sections 553 and 946, supra, clearly show the intent that no attachment will remain in effect after judgment for defendant during the often prolonged period of an appeal unless the undertaking of section 946 has been executed and filed. There is as much reason for such security when the appeal is taken from the order dissolving the attachment as when the appeal is taken from the judgment for defendant. In Hallam Cooley Agency, Inc. v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.App.2d 20 [ 85 P.2d 457 ] and Albertsworth v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 84 Cal.App.2d 816 , 821 et seq. [ 192 P.2d 66 ], the court assumes that section 946
Orders affirmed.
Dooling, J., and Kaufman, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Henderson v. Drake 118 Cal.App.2d 777 p. 146
- Henderson v. Drake 42 Cal.2d 1 p. 146, p. 147, p. 148
- Hallam Cooley Agency, Inc. v. Superior Court 30 Cal.App.2d 20 p. 148
- Albertsworth v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. 84 Cal.App.2d 816 at 821 p. 148
- Flagg v. Puterbaugh 101 Cal. 583 at 584 p. 149
- Doud v. Jackson 102 CaLApp. 213 p. 149