Majority
Plaintiff sought damages for breach of an oral contract. In a non jury trial, judgment was for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff is a citizen of the United States, residing in Los Angeles. Defendant is a citizen of Mexico, residing in Ensenada.
The complaint, as amended at the beginning of the trial, alleged that: On February 16, 1954, plaintiff entered into
The answer of defendant was to the effect that he admitted that he was the owner of the boats and the boats were registered., at the Port of Ensenada; and he denied generally and specifically the other allegations of the complaint. Seven separate defenses were:
(2) Legal incapacity of plaintiff because the law of Mexico provided that persons not citizens of Mexico were required to have a “Visitor For Business Permit” from the government of Mexico in order to invest funds in Mexico, and that plaintiff did not have such a permit.
(3) Purported contract is invalid and unlawful because it purports to allow plaintiff, an American citizen, to invest funds in Mexico without securing a business permit from Mexico.
(4) Contract is invalid because it is not acknowledged before a notary public and recorded in Mexico, as provided by Mexican law.
, (5) The only contract which defendant entered into with plaintiff, regarding the boats, was that on said February 27, in Ensenada, defendant orally agreed with plaintiff and Tomas Moreno, a Mexican citizen, that plaintiff would sell the three boats for “a.sum agreed upon by them” of which $7,500 was “to be paid down in cash” and the balance in installments then “agreed upon” with 6 per cent interest, and the purchaser to carry insurance on the boats in the name of defendant; Moreno entered into an agreement whereby plaintiff agreed to furnish funds to enable Moreno to enter into the contract; thereafter the contract was modified by the parties to include another boat for $5,000 to be paid in installments agreed upon by them; the contract was invalid and unenforceable in Mexico because it was not in writing and the doctrine of part performance is not the law of Mexico, and the oral contract was not acknowledged before a notary public or recorded by the notary.
. (6) Any funds received by defendant from plaintiff were paid on behalf of Moreno, who is a necessary party to the action.
(7) The down payment was not made, except $2,500 which
was paid to defendant as a deposit and to protect him against loss by failure of the purchasers to complete the contract; neither plaintiff nor Moreno secured insurance as provided in the agreement, and Moreno is in default under' the agreement.
(8) Any sums received by defendant in regard to the contract have been forfeited by reason of said default.
Defendant also alleged a counterclaim, based upon the alleged failure of plaintiff to perform the agreement alleged by plaintiff. (Defendant stated, in alleging fhe counterclaim, that he did not admit he entered into such a contract as alleged by plaintiff but “if such a contract be found to have been made between them” then defendant is entitled to damages on his counterclaim.)
Plaintiff testified as follows: He resided in Los Angeles and was in the window cleaning and sponge business. He first met defendant in the first part of February, 1954, at Ensenada and he told defendant that Moreno (an employee of defendant) had said that defendant was interested in selling the boat business. Defendant said the price was $16,500. Plaintiff said that as an American citizen he could buy only 49 per cent of a business in Mexico. Plaintiff also said that Moreno had told him that Moreno was dickering to buy the business but could not buy all of it. Plaintiff said he was there “more or less to buy the other part. ’ ’ Defendant said he would like to sell all of it to one person and be through with it, but it was difficult to do so and he realized it, and he was going to sell 49 per cent to plaintiff and the balance to Moreno. Defendant asked him if he was interested in buying it. Plaintiff said that he would buy 49 per cent in it but he (plaintiff) would have to see his brother in Los Angeles, and if defendant would come up in a week or two plaintiff would give him a definite answer. The boats involved in that conversation were the Beatriz, LaPaz and D-D. Moreno was a citizen of Mexico and an employee of defendant, who sold tickets for fishing trips on the boats. In the middle of February, 1954, defendant was in plaintiff’s office in Los Angeles, and on that occasion the other persons present were: plaintiff, plaintiff’s brother Eugene, plaintiff’s wife, his secretary Miss Matsuda, and his employee Blake. At that meeting defendant asked if they had come to a decision. Plaintiff said that he and his brother had talked it over and would accept $16,500 and take it. Defendant said it was $17,000—that he had to spend about $500 to repair the D-D. Plaintiff and his brother discussed
The $500 check (Exhibit 1) was drawn on the Bank of America in Los Angeles, California, was payable to and endorsed by defendant, and was paid by the bank. A notation on the front of the check was: “Deposit on Three Boats (D-D, LaPaz and Beatriz in Ensenada, B. C. Mexico.) ”
Defendant wrote and signed a receipt for the $500, which receipt was as follows: “March 1st 1954. Received from Mr. Victor Glasband the amount of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) on account of three sale of three boats (D. D. LaPaz and Beatriz. John Hussong.”
The receipt for $2,000 (Exhibit 2) was as follows: “March 12th 1955 Received on a/e $2,000.00 for D D, LaPaz & Beatriz from Victor Glasband. John Hussong. ’ ’
Plaintiff’s testimony as to the conversation with defendant in plaintiff’s office in Los Angeles in the middle of February (to the effect the contract for the three boats was made there) was corroborated by his brother, his wife, his secretary, and his employee Blake. Also, plaintiff’s testimony as to the conversation with defendant in plaintiff’s office in Los Angeles in the first week of April (to the effect the contract for the four boats was made there) was corroborated by his brother, his wife, and his secretary.
Defendant, called as a witness by plaintiff under section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure, testified as follows: On February 12,1954, Gonzales and Moreno introduced plaintiff to defendant in Ensenada, and nothing was said on that occasion about buying boats. On February 21 plaintiff and Moreno went to defendant’s house and plaintiff told defendant that he heard that defendant wanted to sell the boats; and plaintiff said he had enough money to pay $17,000 for them, which amount Moreno said was the price. He (defendant) had told Moreno that he would pay him $500 commission on the sale of the boats. Plaintiff said he could pay only $7,500 down and $500 a month for the boats. Plaintiff made an offer of $7,500 down and $500 a month with 6 per cent interest on the boats. Bonifaz, the lawyer, came over and told plaintiff that he could not buy boats in Mexico. Plaintiff said he knew that, and he was going to furnish the money and that he and Moreno were going “to partnerships.” Plaintiff said he was going to lend the money to Moreno. Plaintiff said he was going to put in all the money. Moreno was going to divide the profits with plaintiff and have a salary of $150 a
The manner in which the presentation of plaintiff’s case was brought to a close should be noted. While plaintiff’s counsel was cross-examining defendant under said section 2055 (in an effort to prove the contract was accepted in Los Angeles), the judge said it was not material whether the acceptance of the contract took place in Los Angeles because the last act that made it an enforceable contract was the payment of $500 which took place in Mexico. Thereafter the judge and counsel for plaintiff engaged in a discussion, with reference to the law of contracts, which covered 13 pages of the transcript. At the end of the discussion the judge said that at the next session of court he would have the case sharpened down to essential points, and that his final decision would follow the nonsuit theory unless he was shown eases to the contrary. At the next session of court the judge said, among other things: whether we look at the statute of frauds as creating an invalid contract or a voidable contract it is not material; if we consider the acceptance as a complete acceptance we will have the situation where there was no writing and therefore no enforceable contract; the part payment was made in Mexico, and the only thing that could give vitality to it would be the law of Mexico; the $500 check, the receipts, and the telegram did not amount to a sufficient memorandum because those documents did not, in the language of section “214 of the Restatement,” go far enough to state the terms of the contract; it followed from what he said that he could not hold that plaintiff had a contract and therefore the plaintiff could not recover on the theory that he had an enforceable contract; where that leaves the plaintiff could not then be determined because the court did not have the testimony of defendant as to what the terms of the contract were as he
Counsel for plaintiff offered to prove that plaintiff paid directly to defendant $2,500 at the special instance and request of defendant, and that plaintiff expended for the benefit of defendant $2,799 to repair boats owned by defendant; that the money was paid pursuant to an oral contract made in Los Angeles, California. (A further part of the offer pertained to the provisions of the contract and the breach thereof as alleged in the complaint.) Also, a part of the offer of proof was that, by defendant’s breach of the contract, defendant had been unjustly enriched in the amount of $5,299, the money actually paid to and for the benefit of defendant. Without an objection being made to the offer, the judge said the objection would be sustained.
Plaintiff further offered to prove, by reference to bank cheeks, that he paid $2,799 for repairing defendant’s boats. The judge said that the objection would be sustained upon the theory that if there is no contract, under the law, there cannot be a recovery for a breach of it. The judge also said plaintiff had alleged an express contract, a breach of the express contract, and ¿resulting damages; and, under the position of the pleadings, the evidence as to payments to defendant was not admissible.
Counsel for plaintiff asked if the judge would consider an amendment to the complaint setting forth a cause of action for unjust enrichment in connection with the payments to and on behalf of defendant. The judge said: “You can’t do that now, we have run for several days trying this case on your theory and on the defendant’s theory and it will have to go the one way or the other.” The judge said he would preclude plaintiff from making any offer to amend the pleadings to conform to proof. Then counsel for plaintiff said there was no further cross-examination of defendant and that plaintiff was compelled to rest.
Thereupon, defendant was called as a witness on his own behalf. He testified that he never offered to sell 49 per cent interest in any of his boats to plaintiff.
The findings were: Plaintiff did not enter into an agreement with defendant for the purchase of an interest in the boats.
The alleged defense to the effect that the contract was illegal, under the Mexican law, because plaintiff did not have a “Visitor For Business Permit” is not sustained. There was no evidence regarding the Mexican law. The court could not take judicial notice of the foreign law. (See Estate of Kennedy, 106 Cal.App.2d 621 , 626 [ 235 P.2d 837 ].)
Likewise, the alleged defense to the effect that under a Mexican statute of frauds the contract was invalid is not sustained. In the absence of proof of the law of Mexico as to a statute of frauds, it will be presumed that the law of Mexico on that subject is the same as the law of California. (See Estate of Pusey, 177 Cal. 367 , 372-374 [ 170 P. 846 ] ; Hickman v. Alpaugh, 21 Cal. 225 , 226.) Section 1624a of the Civil Code of California (statute of frauds) provides that a contract to sell goods of the value of $500 or upward shall not be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall give something in part payment or unless some note or memorandum in writing of the contract be signed by the party to be charged. Defendant states in his brief that no reliance is made upon the statute of frauds to sustain the judgment.
The alleged defense to the effect that the amounts paid were forfeited because plaintiff failed to secure insurance is
The findings (1) that the only agreement made by defendant with respect to the boats was to sell the same to Moreno, and (2) that any sums received by defendant from plaintiff were paid on behalf of Moreno, are not supported by the evidence. Defendant did testify that he never offered to sell 49 per cent interest in any of his boats to plaintiff. It is admitted by defendant that plaintiff paid $2,500 to him. The receipt for the $500, which is in defendant’s handwriting and is signed by him, states that the money was received from plaintiff on account of “sale of three boats (D.D. LaPaz and Beatriz.” The receipt for $2,000, which is in the handwriting of defendant and is signed by him, states that the money was received from plaintiff on “a/c” for D D, LaPaz and Beatriz. The $500 check which was drawn by plaintiff and endorsed by defendant, contained a notation thereon that it was a deposit on the three boats. Moreno did not testify. No one testified that those amounts were paid on behalf of Moreno. Defendant did testify that plaintiff said that he and Moreno were going “to partnerships.” He also testified that he had no details of a contract between them—he knew they were partners. The evidence was not sufficient to prove the partnership. Defendant did not testify that he made a contract with Moreno. As above stated, he testified that he did not offer to sell 49 per cent to plaintiff.
It was an abuse of discretion not to permit plaintiff to amend his complaint to allege unjust enrichment of defendant by reason of the payment of $2,500, and the payment of $2,799 for repairing defendant’s boats. In Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715 [ 299 P.2d 257 ], it was said at page 751: “Great liberality is indulged in matters of amendment to the end that lawsuits may be determined upon their merits. ’ ’ It was also said therein (pp. 751-752) : “ [T]he test is not whether under technical rules of pleading a new cause of action is introduced, but rather, the test is whether an attempt is made to state facts which give rise to a wholly distinct and different legal obligation against the defendant.” In the present case the amendment would not give rise to a wholly distinct and different legal obligation of defendant. The complaint herein alleged that the $2,500 had been paid to defendant, and that the $2,799 had been expended for repairing the boats. The prayer of the complaint asked for damages which included those specific amounts. It is clear that de
The judgment is reversed.
Shinn, P. J., and Vallée, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 27, 1956, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied January 30, 1957.
Cases cited
- Estate v. American Trust Co. 106 Cal.App.2d 621 at 626 p. 686
- In re Estate of Pusey 177 Cal. 367 at 372-374 p. 686
- Hickman v. Alpaugh 21 Cal. 225 at 226 p. 686
- Desny v. Wilder 46 Cal.2d 715 p. 687