Majority
Each appellant herein was convicted on two counts of violating section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code. They appeal from the judgments and from the orders denying their separate motions for new trial.
The first count of the indictment against appellants charged them with unlawfully possessing, transporting, selling, furnishing or giving away marijuana, committed on July 22, 1955. The second count charged a like offense committed on July 25, 1955. As to Count One, the evidence may be summarized as follows: One Nick Alvarez was employed by the sheriff’s office of Stanislaus County during the month of July, 1955, in the capacity of an undercover operator in the narcotics detail. While acting in this capacity on July 22, 1955, he observed the appellant Robert Conlon in an alley near 7th Street in Modesto. Conlon called out to Alvarez as
The evidence as to the second count may be summarized as follows: On July 25, 1955, Alvarez again contacted Conlon at the State Club in Modesto. He asked Conlon if he knew where marijuana could be obtained, and Conlon told him, to drive to the state hospital, where there was a man who had it. They drove to the hospital; Conlon left the ear and went into the hospital but returned about 15 minutes later, saying that the man he intended to see was not working that day. He then told Alvarez to drive to appellant Staats’ home. As they
With respect to appellant Staats, additional evidence was received that between July 26 and August 1, 1955, Staats, with two other men, made a trip to Mexico and brought a quantity of marijuana to Modesto. This evidence was introduced over the objections of both appellants.
The first contention advanced is that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction of Conlon for the alleged violation of July 25, 1955. The argument is that not once did Conlon have the marijuana in his possession; that he did not receive any money paid by Alvarez to Staats; that he did not in any way participate in the transaction but was a mere observer. The contention cannot be sustained. The evidence we have heretofore narrated sufficiently shows that he was directly concerned in the commission of the crime and aided and abetted its commission. (Pen. Code, § 31.) He directed Alvarez to the home of Staats, directed him to park in such a way as not to excite suspicion. He went into the Staats house and, inferably, told Staats that Alvarez wanted to buy marijuana. He was present when the sale was made to Alvarez. The jury could conclude that he was so intimately concerned with the whole transaction as to be fairly held to have aided and abetted Staats in the commission of the crime.
Appellant Conlon contends that he was the victim of entrapment. The evidence we have narrated, while it does contain proof of suggestions by Alvarez that marijuana be obtained and other acts of Alvarez which might be described as acts in collaboration with Conlon in obtaining marijuana, nevertheless, the most that can be said is that the evidence was sufficient to make the defense of entrapment an issue of
The evidence of the trip made by appellant Staats to Mexico a few days after the occurrences on July 25th which formed the basis of the second count, was introduced against Staats alone, and the trial court admonished the jury on several occasions they were not to consider it in connection with the guilt or innocence of Conlon. If admissible against Staats, therefore, Conlon cannot complain. We cannot assume that the jury did not obey the admonitions of the court. The evidence was admissible as to Staats. It tended, logically, naturally and by reasonable inference, to establish facts material to the prosecution. It showed motive, scheme, plan and system on the part of Staats in transactions involving the possession and sale of marijuana. It showed that he was familiar with marijuana and tended to prove the essential of the crimes with which he was charged, that is, knowledge that the substance he had and sold was marijuana. (People v. Winston, 46 Cal.2d 151 [ 293 P.2d 40 ].) It may be added that the court had properly instructed the jury that: “The corpus delicti of the crime of possession of marijuana is: . . . (3) The defendant must have knowledge that such objects in his possession is a narcotic.” It was, therefore, properly admitted.
The judgments and the orders appealed from are affirmed.
Peek, J., and Schottky, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- People v. Schwartz 109 Cal.App.2d 450 at 455 p. 529
- People v. Lindsey 91 Cal.App.2d 914 at 916 p. 529
- People v. Braddock 41 Cal.2d 794 at 803 p. 529
- People v. Winston 46 Cal.2d 151 p. 529