Majority
Defendant Chodak appeals from a judgment convicting him and his codefendant, Ben R. Reinschreiber (also known as Reiner),[1] of two counts of grand theft from J. Jay Sakiad (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. 1) and one count of conspiracy to cheat and defraud by criminal means (Pen. Code, § 182, subds. 1 and 4). Count I of the information charged both defendants with grand theft of $15,000 from Sakiad on March 3, 1954; it was dismissed as to defendant Chodak and defendant Reiner was acquitted on that count. The charges upon which defendants were convicted were conspiracy, theft of $6,000 on April 29, 1954, and theft of $3,000 on April 30, 1954. Jury trial was waived by both defendants.
Appellant makes two points on appeal, (1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction, and (2) that the crime, if any, was obtaining money by false pretenses, which must be corroborated in the manner required by section 1110, Penal Code, and that there is no such corroboration.
As to the sufficiency of the evidence, it is established that a reviewing court “must assume in favor of the verdict the existence of every fact which the jury could have reasonably deduced from the evidence, and then determine whether such facts are sufficient to support the verdict.” (People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678 , 681 [ 104 P.2d 778 ].) So viewing the evidence, it proves to be abundantly sufficient.
Mr. Sakiad, engaged in business as a builder, was the uncle of Reiner’s wife. Prior to the occurrences involved herein, Reiner had been convicted of grand larceny in the State of Washington in 1944; of issuing a cheek without sufficient funds in Los Angeles in 1950; later, in 1955, was also found guilty of four counts of grand theft.[2]
On Monday, March 1, 1954, defendant Reiner told Sakiad he had bought a piece of property in Las Vegas from a Mrs. Preidlander for $42,500; that it had 356 feet of frontage on Highway 91 across the street from the Sands Hotel; that he had made a $2,500 deposit and needed $10,000 or $15,000
1 For convenience we nse the shorter name of that defendant.
2 See People v. Reinschreiber, 141 Cal.App.2d 688 [ 297 P.2d 658 ].
Several weeks after the foregoing events, Reiner enlisted the aid of defendant Chodak for the specific purpose of “stalling” Saklad, and Chodak did carry out the plans and suggestions of Reiner in that regard. Reiner told Saklad that he had met in Reno one Weinstock, a retired Detroit liquor man, who represented a syndicate that would build a large hotel on the Las Vegas property; that he had had Weinstock checked and found he was part owner of Harold’s Gambling Casino in Reno, was worth $5,000,000, had partners worth not less than $1,000,000 to $1,500,000 each. Reiner arranged a meeting at the Armstrong-Schroder Restaurant in Beverly Hills and there
In his testimony Reiner said: “Q. Did you in fact tell him some falsehoods to stall him [Saklad] 1 A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you arrange for some falsehoods to be told to him ? A. I did, sir. Q. Now, was this for the purpose of getting the money
When Chodak was arrested he said he had no land transaction with Saklad, could not place him, never met him, never registered at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel under the name of Weinstock or at all. Later, when in jail, he said he wanted to cooperate with the officers, that he had not previously told them the truth. Officer Hull testified: ‘ ‘ He says ‘I don’t owe Mr. Reinschreiber any allegiance and I never got anything out of this deal. I did just as Ben told me. He said that he had this option on this land up in Las Vegas. . . . Ben set up the whole deal. I was to stall this Saklad, which I did. It was a dirty deal. Ben will try to put it off on me. I met Saklad using the name Weinstock and told him I was a big show from back East. Sure, I sent him the phony lease. It was in my handwriting. . . . Q. Did you inquire of Mr. Chodak what the ‘stall’ was to be in reference to Mr. Chodak’s statements? A. He stated that he was to act the part of a big shot, a multi-millionaire from back East, and he was to ‘stall’ and keep the heat off as Mr. Saklad was causing Ben some trouble, and that was what he was doing. . . . Q. Isn’t it true that he told you that this was a ‘stall’ to give him time for the repayment of a loan ? A. No, he did not say that it was a ‘stall’ for the repayment of a loan. . . . Q. What did he say regarding that? A. He stated that it was a dirty deal and that he was ashamed that he had any part in it. . . . At the end of the conversation Mr. Smith said something ‘Well, you knew what this deal was all about, didn’t you, Harry?’ And Mr. Chodak said ‘Yes. I knew it was a scheme to defraud Saklad. ’ ”
The tenor of the defense was that Saklad did not buy into a Las Vegas property venture but made loans to Reiner for no specified purposes, and that Chodak’s participation was directed merely to the stalling of Saklad with respect to repayment of these loans. There are some aspects of Saklad’s testimony which point in the direction of a loan of the original $15,000 (the count upon which Reiner was acquitted
Appellant’s arguments stress the fact that the trial judge found the $15,000 transaction, which occurred before Chodak came on the scene, to be a loan not induced by fraud; and his counsel insists that the obtaining of the $6,000 and the $3,000 must fall in the same category. Of course this is a non sequitur. If it be assumed that Saklad had loaned $15,000 to Reiner, that would not justify him in making false representations and promises to induce Saklad to put up more money to protect the loan. All of the joint activities of Chodak and Reiner were directed toward convincing Saklad that he would
With respect to the conspiracy, this case is one of those rare instances in which it is proved by defendant’s testimony of an express agreement. True, he sought to attach an innocent objective to it, but the circumstances conclusively refuted this phase of his testimony.
Appellant’s argument, made in reliance upon section 1110, Penal Code,[3] cannot prevail. Counsel says that the crime, if any was proved, was that of obtaining money by false pretenses and section 1110 requires corroboration of the fact of the pretense; that the inclusion of obtaining money by false pretenses in the definition of grand theft (by the 1927 amendment to Pen. Code, § 484) has not affected this rule; and that there is no corroboration at bar. The substantive proposition of law is sound (see People v. Carter, 131 Cal.App. 177 , 183 [ 21 P.2d 129 ]; People v. Ashley, 42 Cal.2d 246 , 258 [ 267 P.2d 271 ]).[4] But it is only the pretense which must be corroborated (People v. McCabe, 60 Cal.App.2d 492 , 497 [ 141 P.2d 54 ]), and section 1110 says that this may be done by testimony “of one witness and corroborating circumstances.” Here the one witness is Saklad and the corroborating circumstances are shown by admissions of appellant and the testimony and conduct of both defendants. In People v. Frankfort, 114 Cal.App.2d 680 , 701 [ 251 P.2d 401 ], this
3 § 1110. “Upon a trial for having, with an intent to cheat or defraud another designedly, by any false pretense, obtained the signature of any person to a written instrument, or having obtained from any person any labor, money, or property, whether real or personal, or valuable thing, the defendant cannot be convicted if the false pretense was expressed in language unaccompanied by a false token or writing, unless the pretense, or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing, subscribed by or in the handwriting of the defendant, or unless the pretense is proven by the testimony of two witnesses, or that of one witness and corroborating circumstances; but this section does not apply to a prosecution for falsely representing or personating another, and, in such assumed character, marrying, or receiving any money or property.”
4 The evidence probably would also sustain a conviction on the theory of" obtaining money by trick and device (People v. Bartges, 126 Cal.App.2d 763 , 770 [ 273 P.2d 49 ]; People v. Gilliam, supra, 141 Cal.App.2d 749 , 758; People v. Ashley, 42 Cal.2d 246 , 258 [ 267 P.2d 271 ]).
The judgment is affirmed.
Moore, P. J., and Pox, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- People v. Newland 15 Cal.2d 678 at 681 p. 751
- People v. Skidmore 123 Cal. 267 at 268 p. 756
- People v. Cummings 123 Cal. 269 at 272 p. 756
- People v. Gilliam 141 Cal.App.2d 749 at 751 p. 756
- People v. Carter 131 Cal.App. 177 at 183 p. 757
- People v. Ashley 42 Cal.2d 246 at 258 p. 757
- People v. McCabe 60 Cal.App.2d 492 at 497 p. 757
- People v. Frankfort 114 Cal.App.2d 680 at 701 p. 757
- People v. Harrington 92 Cal.App. 245 p. 758
- People v. Reed 113 Cal.App.2d 339 p. 758