Majority
Appeal from order denying motion for change of venue from Santa Barbara County to Los Angeles County upon the ground of convenience of witnesses. The action seeks recovery of damages for personal injuries received while plaintiff was a paying guest at defendants’ motel in Santa Barbara County. The complaint alleges negligent failure to keep the swimming pool and walks in good, safe and proper condition, and that same were in slippery, hazardous, defective, dangerous and unsafe condition, as the proximate result of which plaintiff, while walking upon the walks alongside the pool, slipped and tripped, fell and injured himself. Issue was duly joined upon these allegations by answer filed.
The action was filed in Los Angeles County but the parties stipulated that the case be transferred to Santa Barbara County because the accident occurred there and defendants reside therein, it being understood that such transfer should be without prejudice to a motion by plaintiff under section 397, Code of Civil Procedure, to transfer the cause to Los Angeles County. The transfer to Santa Barbara having been effected, plaintiff moved for a retransfer to Los Angeles upon the ground that convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by such change of place of trial.
Attached to the notice of motion is the affidavit of plaintiff’s attorney who avers that plaintiff, his wife, father and mother, are residents of Los Angeles County and will be necessary witnesses on behalf of plaintiff; that each of said three supporting witnesses would testify that he or she “was personally present and witnessed the happening of the accident which is the subject of said action, the description of the premises, the resultant injuries and damages.” Also alleged to be necessary witnesses are two physicians and one dentist who reside and practice in Los Angeles County, each of whom will testify “to his observations made upon examination of the plaintiff
In opposition there was submitted the affidavit of defendants’ attorney and one made by the two defendants. The attorney averred that each defendant “will testify concerning the condition of the premises where the accident mentioned in plaintiff’s complaint is alleged to have occurred.” Also, that “there are also other witnesses residing in Santa Barbara, California, who were employed by the said defendants at the time of said alleged accident and who will be necessary witnesses to testify concerning the condition of said premises around the swimming pool at the time said accident is alleged to have occurred; said witnesses include Charles Black and Douglas Holloway, both of Santa Barbara, California.” The defendants’ affidavit states that the motel is conducted solely by them, that “it would be extremely inconvenient for your affiants to attend a trial of this action in Los Angeles because it would necessitate either that affiants close the Silver Saddle Hotel for a sufficient time to enable them to attend said trial in Los Angeles or it would be necessary for affiants to employ some person or persons to manage and run said motel during said period, and in this connection affiants state that it is difficult and at times impossible to obtain persons with suffi
The burden rests upon one who seeks a change of venue under Code of Civil Procedure, section 397, subdivision 3, to prove that both the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted thereby. (Prewitt v. Prewitt, 128 Cal.App.2d 344 , 346 [ 275 P.2d 63 ]; City of Stockton v. Ellingwood, 78 Cal.App. 117 , 121 [ 248 P. 272 ].) This he must do through affidavits which contain something more than generalities and conclusions. (Baird v. Smith, 21 Cal.App.2d 221 , 224 [ 68 P.2d 979 ].) It is primarily a question for the trial judge whether that burden has been successfully sustained. (See 1 Witkin, California Procedure, p. 788, § 267.)
The supporting affidavits must set forth the names of the witnesses, the nature of the testimony expected from each and the reasons why attendance upon the trial would be inconvenient. (Juneau v. Juneau, 45 Cal.App.2d 14 , 16 [ 113 P.2d 463 ]; Art Frost of Glendale v. Hooper, 130 Cal.App.2d Supp. 903 , 905 [ 280 P.2d 229 ]; San Jose Hospital v. Etherton, 84 Cal.App. 516 , 518 [ 258 P. 611 ].) In the present instance the moving affidavits state the subjects upon which the witnesses are expected to testify but fail to reveal the substance of what any of them would say, and it is impossible to tell whether their testimony would be favorable or unfavorable to plaintiff. However, as the object of the stated requirement of the affidavit is to enable the court “to determine the materiality of the evidence or the necessity of testimony from such witnesses” (Juneau v. Juneau, supra, 45 Cal.App.2d 14 , 16), the vagueness of the affidavits at bar cannot be said to vitiate although it does present a situation which properly may be considered by the trial judge in exercising his discretion.
The opposing affidavits are not much more informative. They do show that a Los Angeles trial would impose a real inconvenience upon defendants themselves because their absence from the motel would require them to close it or to find and employ some qualified person to conduct it in their absence, a difficult and at times impossible thing to arrange.
Convenience of a party to the action may be considered
The accident having occurred in Santa Barbara, where both defendants reside, that county is the proper place for trial (Code Civ. Proc., § 395) unless convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by a retransfer to Los Angeles County. Change of venue on the ground of convenience lies essentially within the judicial discretion of the judge and his ruling will not be disturbed unless it clearly appears as a matter of law that there has been an abuse of that discretion. (Rios v. Lacey Trucking Co., supra, 123 Cal.App.2d 865 , 868; First-Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Meredith, 16 Cal.App.2d 504 , 508 [ 60 P.2d 1023 , 62 P.2d 369 ].) In this instance the showing presented by each side was so inconclusive as to afford little information upon which to base an exercise of discretion. In the circumstances we cannot say there has been a clear abuse of same.
Order affirmed.
Fox, Acting P. J., and Richards, J. pro tem.,[1] concurred.
* Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
Cases cited
- Prewitt v. Prewitt 128 Cal.App.2d 344 at 346 p. 75
- City of Stockton v. Ellingwood 78 Cal.App. 117 at 121 p. 75
- Baird v. Smith 21 Cal.App.2d 221 at 224 p. 75
- Juneau v. Juneau 45 Cal.App.2d 14 at 16 p. 75
- Art Frost of Glendale v. Hooper 130 Cal.App.2d Supp. 903 at 905 p. 75
- San Jose Hospital v. Etherton 84 Cal.App. 516 at 518 p. 75
- Rios v. Lacey Trucking Co. 123 Cal.App.2d 865 at 868 p. 76
- Figley v. California Arrow Airlines 111 Cal.App.2d 285 at 286 p. 76
- Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. Zachary 60 Cal.App.2d 560 at 562 p. 76
- Wood v. Silvers 35 Cal.App.2d 604 at 611 p. 76
- First-Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Meredith 16 Cal.App.2d 504 at 508 p. 76