People v. Choate

The appellant was charged in two counts of an information with violations of section 476 of the Penal Code, and in a third count with violating section 476a of that code. In Count 1 he was charged with uttering and passing a fictitious check on April 8, 1957, purporting to

The evidence is amply sufficient to sustain the conviction on all three counts. The appellant cashed all of the checks involved therein at stores or places of business, and in most instances received both merchandise and a balance in cash. He claimed to have sold to this man Scott a membership in two different country clubs and that he received the checks involved in the first two counts in payment therefor. There was evidence that he was not working for these clubs at the time in question, that he never turned over any such memberships to the clubs, and that no such Scott had ever lived in that area. His explanation of these transactions was far from satisfactory, and there was evidence fully justifying the inference that he knew that these checks were fictitious. With respect to Count 3 it appears that the appellant sold two articles to Montigo; that Montigo told him that he had no checking account in any bank • that Montigo signed the checks on appellant’s statement and agreement that he would hold the cheeks for two or three months while he went on a trip to Texas, and that on his return he would return the checks to Montigo for the amounts named on their face; and that the appellant cashed one of these checks the same day he received it and the other on February 26, 1957.

The appellant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict, and the sole point raised on this appeal is that the court erred in admitting evidence concerning certain other checks cashed by the appellant, it being contended that since these acts or offenses had no relation to the acts with which the appellant was here charged such evidence was inadmissible. The evidence thus objected to related to a check for $800 given by the appellant to a Robert Goodwin on December 23, 1955; to four checks given to the appellant by one Heide in March, 1956; to three checks

The Goodwin check was given in part payment for goods previously sold to the appellant by Goodwin. When Goodwin told the appellant that the bank had refused to honor the check the appellant told him to redeposit it. The check was redeposited but the bank again refused to honor it, and Goodwin never received any payment on the check. The appellant testified that when he gave the check he had sufficient money in the bank to pay it; that there was sufficient money there for several days after he delivered the cheek “and probably until December 23”; and that his business was attached on January 12 and he was forced into bankruptcy. It is argued that this check transaction is in no way similar to the transactions with which the appellant was charged because he had money in the bank up to the time he withdrew it; because he and not a fictitious person signed the cheek; because he issued the cheek for a past debt and not to obtain ready money; and because this check was drawn on a different bank than the ones involved in the charges here made. It is further argued that it was not shown that he had a criminal intent in the Goodwin transaction. No such dissimilarity appears as would make the evidence as to this check inadmissible and the evidence, including the fact that Goodwin was told to redeposit the cheek after the appellant knew that it was not good, would justify an inference adverse to the appellant with respect to his intent.

With respect to the Heide and Hancock checks it is argued that these acts were not similar to the acts involved in the charges here made and therefore had no logical tendency to prove any element of the acts charged. With respect to all of these checks the appellant received the checks from other persons, cashed them, and they were subsequently dishonored. A sufficient similarity appears. It is further argued in connection with these cheeks that there was no evidence showing that the appellant knew or should have known that Heide or Hancock did not have sufficient funds in the banks to cover

With respect to the University Motors check it appears that the appellant bought a truck from University Motors, turning over an old car worth $25 and giving the company a check for the balance of the down payment which he signed “Richard Choate,” this being the name of his 8-year-old son. There was no such account in the bank and the check was not paid. The appellant had represented himself as being Richard Choate during this transaction, and when he was informed that the check had been dishonored the appellant said that the truck had been stolen from him and he could not return it. It is argued that this transaction was not similar to the crimes with which he was charged; that he had given the salesman information that if followed up would have led to disclosing his identity; that both parties believed that the check was intended merely as a note; and that this evidence would not tend to prove that appellant knew that the Walter H. Scott checks were not good, or that Eugene Montigo did not have sufficient funds in the bank. While

In view of the strong evidence of appellant’s guilt in connection with the offenses charged we find no reversible error in the record, and we are far from convinced that any miscarriage of justice has occurred.

The judgment is affirmed.

Griffin, J., and Mussell, J., concurred.