Majority
This is an appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered after the defendant’s demurrer to the first amended complaint had been sustained without leave to amend.[1]
A résumé of the plaintiff’s first amended complaint is as follows: 1. From about 1938 until its dissolution in November 1959, Lakewood Water and Power Company was engaged in business in Los Angeles County as a public utility. On or about November 11, 1959, the corporation and its stockholders assigned to the plaintiff, as trustee, certain assets of the corporation, one of which was its claim against the defendant County of Los Angeles upon which the present action is based. 2. On or about January 30, 1959, the county made written application to the public utility for water service in a described area in the city of Lakewood. Thereafter the public utility proceeded to supply water to the county through its water main extension in that area. 3. As required by the Public Utilities Commission, the public utility adopted its rule No. 19, which was in compliance with the Water Main Extension Bules of the commission. Thereunder it was provided that where it was necessary to make certain main extensions so that an applicant could be served, such applicant should be required to advance to the utility before the commencement of construction the estimated reasonable cost of the installation of such mains. Any facilities so installed were the sole property of the utility. Provision was made for the adjustment of any difference between the estimated cost and the reasonable actual cost of the main extension after the actual cost of the installation had been ascertained by the utility. The money so advanced was subject to refund by the utility pursuant to certain formulae set forth in the rule. 4. “During 1957 and 1958 the defendant . . . County of Los Angeles and the incorporated City of Lakewood, constructed
1 The grounds of demurrer stated were that “the first amended complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action” and that “the first amended complaint is barred by the provisions of subdivision 1 of Section 339 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” The portion of section 339 to which reference was made is in part as follows: “Within two years: 1. An action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing. ...”
2 As shown in Exhibit A attached to the first amended complaint, such provisions as set forth by the commission áre: “The money so advanced will be subject to refund by the utility without interest to the party or parties ' entitled thereto. The total *358 amount so refunded shall not exceed the amount advanced. Refunds may be made under either of the following methods at the option of the utility: (a) ............ (b) Percentage of Revenue Method * The utility will refund 22% of the estimated annual revenue from each bona fide customer, exclusive of any customer formerly served at the same location, connected directly to the extension for which the cost was advanced. The refund will, at the election of the utility, he made in annual, semiannual or Quarterly payments and for a period of 20 years.
Although it was directed primarily to the question of the applicability of the statute of limitations under the facts, the following statement of the appellant in his opening brief sets forth his position: . under said Rule 19 all the utility had was a right or privilege to demand a deposit in advance of the estimated cost before beginning construction. The pleading and formal claim show that said right or privilege was not exercised and the utility extended the water main, completing it in December, 1957. The county had no liability at that point. The county then contracted with an independent contractor to construct the buildings and he contracted for his own water at his own expense on a temporary service construction contract as permitted by the rules of all water utilities. Obviously the county during construction and after construction and until January 30, 1959, when it formally applied for water service, could have at any time without any liability to the utility under Rule 19, (1) ceased construction and abandoned the project; (2) transferred the land, construction and facilities to the state, City of Lakewood or any other public agency or even a private party. . . . This liability of the defendant county to the utility did not arise or accrue until January 30,1959, when the county in writing contracted for water service through this extended main. ’ ’
3 In his opening brief the appellant states: ‘'Plaintiff’s formal claim to defendant county . . . sets forth in evidentiary style all of the facts, data and details of the conduct, correspondence and dealings of the parties in chronological order.”
The appellant has conceded that there was no liability on the part of the county before it entered into the contract of January 30, 1959. But as of that date the main extension had been completed and in existence for over a year. Consequently, the provisions of rule 19 as embodied in the contract of January 30, 1959, were not applicable to the factual situation existing on that date. The mere fact that the defendant county may have benefited by the lack of caution on the part of the utility in failing to have a contractual relationship with the county prior to the extension of its main is not alone sufficient to give rise to liability. (See Fursdon v. County of Los Angeles, 100 Cal.App.2d Supp. 845 , 847 [ 223 P.2d 520 ]; Hart Bros. Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 31 Cal.App.2d Supp. 766 , 768 [ 82 P.2d 221 ].) Consequently, the appellant can derive no aid from his argument that the county will be unjustly enriched if recovery is denied in this case.[5] Furthermore, payment to the appellant would not inure to the benefit of any of the other customers receiving service from the present owner of the water system and, accordingly, no injustice to such customers is involved.
As has been noted, if the county had to pay a share of the reasonable cost of the main extension, it would be entitled to a refund of at least a part thereof over a period of time under the provisions of rule 19. But, in view of the determination
4 In passing, it should be noted that the plaintiff makes no claim that the utility did not receive payment for the main extension herein involved as part of its system which it sold to the City of Lakewood.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shinn, P. J., and Files, J., concurred.
Footnotes
- * The utility may, at its option, in its filing insert a higher refund percentage, so as to refund a greater percentage of the estimated annual revenues over a shorter period than set forth herein; provided, however, that in so doing the percentage times years equals i.i.”
Cases cited
- Holly Sugar Corp. v. Johnson 18 Cal.2d 218 at 225-226 p. 358
- Hischemoeller v. National Ice & Cold Storage Co. 46 Cal.2d 318 at 325 p. 359
- Gardner v. Basich Bros. Construction Co. 44 Cal.2d 191 at 193-194, at 194 p. 359
- Cole v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. 112 Cal.App.2d 416 at 418 p. 359
- Church v. Public Utilities Commission 51 Cal.2d 399 p. 359
- Fursdon v. County of Los Angeles 223 P.2d 520 p. 359
- Hart Bros. v. County of Los Angeles 31 Cal.App.2d Supp. 766 at 768 p. 359