Majority
Presented together in this court, as below, are three proceedings directed to the custody of an infant whose birth certificate names her as Maria de la Luz Diaz. One is a proceeding in habeas corpus brought by the child’s mother, Virginia Y. Salazar, on October 14, 1960; another is a petition filed on January 3, 1961, by Mrs. Josefina M. Diaz, under section 701, subdivision (a), Welfare and Institutions[1] to have said child declared free from the custody and control of her mother because of abandonment, etc.; the third is a proceeding brought by Mrs. Josefina M. Diaz for adoption of the child without the consent of the mother upon the ground that the child had been abandoned for a period of one year or
1 This section was transferred to § 232, Civil Code, by the 1961 legislature.
The appeal from the order denying petition for adoption (No. 25908) has not been perfected in such manner as to permit of its determination upon the merits. The clerk’s transcript consists of (1) notice of appeal; (2) notice of motion for stay of execution of the court’s order declaring restoration of the custody of the little girl to her mother, Virginia Y. Salazar, forthwith; and (3) request for clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts. The request for clerk’s transcript in this adoption matter calls for “the petition for writ of habeas corpus, the answer thereto and the traverse and findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, and all papers, records and documents which constitute the judgment roll.” The document ends with the following note to the reporter: “As this matter was joined for trial with Cases A 5042 and TIC 73452, it will not be necessary to duplicate the transcripts on appeal but one transcript will be sufficient, as all of the foregoing matters were joined together for trial.” So the clerk gave counsel a transcript which contains no petition for adoption, no notice of hearing thereon and no findings or order denying adoption.[2]
Such a record does not afford any basis for review. It is fundamental to appellate review that the order or judgment which is challenged must be included in the record before the reviewing court. (San Diego Inv. Co. v. Crane, 40 Cal.App. 393 , 394 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Savings & Loan Soc. v. Meeks, 66 Cal. 371 , 374 [ 5 P. 624 ] ; Conley v. Apablasa, 42 Cal.App.2d 565 , 567 [ 109 P.2d 367 ]; Supple v. Luckenbach, 45 Cal.App.2d 734 , 735 [ 114 P.2d 734 ]; Curran v. Giometti, 20 Cal.App.2d 405 , 406 [ 66 P.2d 1260 ]; Kimple v. Conway, 69 Cal. 71 , 72 [ 10 P. 189 ]; Valley Lumber Co. v. Struck, 146 Cal. 266 , 271-272 [ 80 P. 405 ]; O’Connell v. O’Connell, 201 Cal. 48 , 52-53 [ 255 P. 514 ]; Lewis v. Fowler, 80 Cal.App. 717 , 721 [ 252 P. 786 ] ; 3 Cal.Jur.2d § 258, p. 778.)
2 At the oral argument in tliis court it was stipulated that the quotations from Supplemental Report of Los Angeles County Bureau of Adoptions which appear at pages 22-24 of appellant’s opening brief are correct quotations from said report.
In the habeas corpus proceeding (No. 25907) the court upon the basis of appropriate fact findings concluded: “1. That petitioner is a fit person to have the custody of the minor; 2. That the interests and welfare of the minor will be best served in the care, custody and control of petitioner, the minor’s natural mother; 3. That petitioner at no time abandoned said minor child; 4. That pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, Section 200 thereof,[3] petitioner is entitled to the custody of said minor.” The court ordered “that respondents Ruben O. Dias and Josefina M Dias aka Ruben 0. Diaz, and Josefina M Diaz restore the custody of the minor Maria de La Luz Dias aka Maria de La Luz Diaz to the petitioner Virginia Y. Salazar forthwith.”
In the proceeding under section 701, subdivision (a), Welfare and Institutions Code (No. 25909) the court found that said child was of “the age of 3 years on June 17, 1960; that said person is not a person defined in subdivision (a) of said section, in that the minor Maria de Luz Mendez Diaz has been illegally detained by petitioners since the birth of said minor, against the will and wishes of her mother, Virginia Y. Salazar ; that petitioners have resisted all efforts of said mother to regain custody of said minor continuously since the child’s birth; . . . and there is not a scintella of proof that said person has at any time since the birth of said minor had any intention to abandon her said minor child.” It adjudged the child “not to be a person within the provision of section 701, subdivision (a) of the Welfare and Institutions Code and that the petition is denied.”
The story is a drab one. Apparently Virginia Y. Salazar was never married to any man; this child was illegitimate, as were four other children previously borne by Miss Salazar and two more born after Maria, mostly begotten by different men and supported largely by public aid. Maria was born on June 17,1957. According to evidence favorable to respondent
[3] [3] 3Civ. Code, 5 200: “The mother of an illegitimate unmarried minor is entitled to its custody, services, and earnings.”
The briefs of counsel concern themselves principally with á discussion of the conflicting evidence and the correct inferences to be drawn therefrom. Having ascertained the existence of substantial conflict a court of review has exhausted its function. “ [T]he power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradieted which will support the finding of fact. [Citations.]
“ When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court. [Citations.] ” (Primm v. Primm, 46 Cal.2d 690 , 693-694 [ 299 P.2d 231 ].)
These rules prevail in custody, section 701, subdivision (a) and similar proceedings, as well as in other matters. (See Guardianship of Turk, 194 Cal.App.2d 736 , 738-739 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 256 ]; In re Gano, 160 Cal.App.2d 700 , 705 [ 325 P.2d 485 ]; In re Barton, 168 Cal.App.2d 584 , 588 [ 336 P.2d 210 ].) These cases emphasize the fact that the question of intention involved in an abandonment charge is one of fact subject to the rule which precludes the weighing of the evidence by
In the circumstances here existing it is not our province to review the soundness of the trial judge’s decision.
The appeal' in the adoption matter, No. 25908, is dismissed. The judgment in the habeas corpus proceeding, No. 25907, is affirmed. The judgment in the proceeding brought under section 701, subdivision (a), Welfare and Institutions Code, No'. 25909, is affirmed. The attempted appeals from “all orders . . . and rulings of the above entitled court in said matter” are dismissed in each of cases Nos. 25907 and 25909.
Fox, P. J., and Herndon, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- San Diego Investment Co. v. Crane 40 Cal.App. 393 at 394 p. 104
- Sav. & Loan Soc'y v. Meeks 66 Cal. 371 at 374 p. 104
- Conley v. Apablasa 42 Cal.App.2d 565 at 567 p. 104
- Supple v. Luckenbach 45 Cal.App.2d 734 at 735 p. 104
- Curran v. Giometti 20 Cal.App.2d 405 at 406 p. 104
- Kimple v. Conway 69 Cal. 71 at 72 p. 104
- Valley Lumber Co. v. Struck 146 Cal. 266 at 271-272 p. 104
- O'Connell v. O'Connell 201 Cal. 48 at 52-53 p. 104
- Lewis v. Fowler 80 Cal.App. 717 at 721 p. 104
- Altman v. Poole 151 Cal.App.2d 589 at 593 p. 105
- Primm v. Primm 46 Cal.2d 690 at 693-694 p. 106
- Turk v. McArthur 194 Cal.App.2d 736 at 738-739 p. 106
- Anderson v. Gano 160 Cal.App.2d 700 at 705 p. 106
- Barrett v. Barton 168 Cal.App.2d 584 at 588 p. 106
- Schafer v. Rutherford 188 Cal.App.2d 202 at 208 p. 107
- Romine v. Pingree 91 Cal.App.2d 389 at 393, at 394 p. 107
- Banks v. Culver 141 Cal.App.2d 703 at 705, 708 p. 107
- In re Schwartz 171 Cal. 633 at 635, at 636 p. 107
- In re Forrester 162 Cal. 493 at 496 p. 107
- In re Akers 184 Cal. 514 at 521 p. 107
- Banks v. Footman 192 Cal. 714 at 719 p. 107
- In re Estate of Snowball 156 Cal. 240 at 243 p. 107