Majority
Defendant was convicted of robbery by the trial court; he was found not to be personally armed at the
While defendant admitted that a robbery took place and that he was present, he denied he was a willing participant. There is much dispute concerning certain material facts; and presented on the record before us is the all too common situation of the trial judge, after hearing and observing the witnesses and weighing their testimony, accepting the People’s version of what occurred and rejecting defendant’s testimony. (People v. Murrie, 168 Cal.App.2d 770 [ 336 P.2d 559 ].) It is the sole province of the trial judge to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and resolve all factual conflicts. (People v. Robles, 183 Cal.App.2d 212 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 748 ]; People v. Gardner, 177 Cal.App.2d 43 [ 1 Cal. Rptr. 830 ].) Thus, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent (People v. Caritativo, 46 Cal.2d 68 [ 292 P.2d 513 ]), we are satisfied that defendant was an accomplice of the man who robbed the gas station attendant with the use of a shotgun and, therefore, a principal in the commission of the robbery. (Pen. Code, § 31.)
At approximately 12:35 a. m. defendant, wearing a white sweater, walked into a service station and asked Brenner, the attendant, for a can of gasoline. Brenner told him the can was out; defendant replied that he would get one from his car. As he started to leave defendant saw McLain approach, and said to Brenner, “Well, here comes my friend now.” McLain walked up to Brenner with a raised shotgun, pointed it at him and said, “I want all your money.” Brenner took $35 out of his right-hand pocket; when asked if he had any more he took some change out of another pocket. Defendant took the change from Brenner; Brenner was then told to walk to the rear of the station, and defendant and McLain told him, “Lay down because we don’t want to hurt you.” Brenner did so; defendant and McLain ran from the station after seeing a cruising patrol car, got into defendant’s automobile and defendant drove away. Officer Handley, driving a black and white patrol car, having been informed of the robbery and a description of two male negroes, one wearing a white sweater, observed a two-door Chevrolet, southbound on Yer
On his defense defendant told a story about agreeing to take friends, Herbert McLain and two others, to Pacoima for $2.00 and a half of a tank of gas; that on the way his gas ran low and he parked 125 feet from Brenner’s gas station on a side street and went in for a can of gas, but that Brenner had no can; that he then went into the station office and sat on a stool during which time McLain came and held up Brenner; that after taking his money McLain said to Brenner, “I know
Defendant’s version of what occurred, while omitting numerous material details which tend to incriminate him, admits to the robbery and his participation therein; however, the evidence is disputed concerning defendant’s activities in the station, his prior knowledge that a robbery would take place and his flight from the police. Pointing to his willing implication in the crime are his activities prior to, and conduct during, the robbery—that of parking his vehicle on a side street a distance from the gas station, going alone into the station first, obviously to look it over, standing by while McLain held up the attendant with a shotgun, and assisting in taking the change from Brenner, walking him to the back of the station and telling him to lie down; and his conduct after the robbery—running to avoid a cruising patrol ear, fleeing the premises in his own car, spending some of the stolen change for gas, refusing to stop knowing he was being pursued by police for that purpose, again fleeing the officers by stopping in front of the bar and then speeding away, his activities in the ear just before he stopped, his conduct when finally apprehended, and his false and contradictory statements to police after his arrest. These are all incriminatory circumstances which the trial court could consider in determining defendant’s guilt. Flight, for instance, is a factor tending to connect the accused with the commission of an offense and shows a consciousness of guilt (People v. Gautt, 190 Cal. App.2d 355 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 805 ] ; People v. Parmenter, 186 Cal.App.2d 509 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 135 ]), as does an admittedly false explanation given by an accused. (People v. Smith, 184 Cal.App.2d 606 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 607 ] ; People v. Stanley, 162 Cal. App.2d 416 [ 327 P.2d 973 ]; People v. Peete, 54 Cal.App. 333 [202P. 51].)
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed.
Wood, P. J., and Fourt, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- People v. Murrie 168 Cal.App.2d 770 p. 471
- People v. Robles 183 Cal.App.2d 212 p. 471
- People v. Gardner 177 Cal.App.2d 43 p. 471
- People v. Caritativo 46 Cal.2d 68 p. 471
- People v. Gautt 190 Cal. App.2d 355 p. 473
- People v. Parmenter 186 Cal.App.2d 509 p. 473
- People v. Smith 184 Cal.App.2d 606 p. 473
- People v. Stanley 162 Cal. App.2d 416 p. 473
- People v. Peete 54 Cal.App. 333 p. 473