Jacobson v. Jacobson

The appellant Martin I. Jacobson filed a motion to modify an order for the support of respondent, Roberta G-. Jacobson. The order was based upon a property settlement agreement previously executed by the parties. At the hearing on the motion the respondent objected to the introduction of evidence on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction because the order sought to be modified was based upon an integrated property settlement agreement and therefore was not subject to modification. The appellant contended the agreement was modifiable by its own terms, or if not, it was ambiguous and hence extrinsic evidence was admissible to show that the parties intended by the language they used that the portion of the agreement relating to the support of respondent was subject to further order of the court. The trial court determined from its examination of the agreement that it was an integrated agreement; that it was not ambiguous, and that it was not subject to modification. The court sustained respondent’s objection to the introduction of evidence and denied appellant’s motion.

The relevant provisions of the agreement of the parties are these: “Whereas, certain differences have arisen between the parties hereto and their matrimonial relations have not been entirely pleasant or agreeable, and said parties are now separated, and said parties desire to adjust and settle fully and finally for all time between them all property rights of every kind and all claims and demands which either might make against the other of every kind and character, and particularly but not exclusively, as to all claims with respect to community property and any claims of the wife for alimony, sup

Since the trial court received no extrinsic evidence relating to the written agreement, its construction presents purely a question of law. Under such circumstances an appellate court is not bound by the interpretation placed upon the instrument by the trial court but it is the duty of the appellate court to make its own determination in accordance with applicable principles of law. (Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343 , 352 [ 131 P.2d 825 ] ; Meyer v. State Board of Equalization, 42 Cal.2d 376 , 381 [ 267 P.2d 257 ] ; Lane v. Lane, 117 Cal.App.2d 247 , 251 [ 255 P.2d 110 ].)

We have examined the agreement and cannot agree that it is free of ambiguity. Paragraph 4 of the agreement begins with this introductory sentence: “The parties agree, subject to the provisions hereof and the appropriate further order of the Superior Court of the State of California, that:” (Emphasis added.) Two subparagraphs follow. The first sub-paragraph relates to custody of the child of the parties and to visitation privileges of the appellant. The second sub-paragraph provides for support payments for respondent and for support payments for the child. The appellant earnestly contends that the introductory sentence to paragraph 4 clearly shows that specific authority is reserved to the Superior Court to alter support payments to be made by appellant to

Where, as here, the written agreement before the court is ambiguous and its meaning uncertain, extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain what the parties meant by the language they have used. (Beneficial etc. Ins. Co. v. Kurt Hitke & Co., 46 Cal.2d 517 , 524 [ 297 P.2d 428 ].) The respondent contends that appellant’s attempt to introduce extrinsic evidence to show that the support provisions of the agreement are subject to modification would in effect vary the terms of the writing and violate the parol evidence rule. (Civ. Code, § 1625; Estate of Gaines, 15 Cal.2d 255 , 264, 265 [ 100 P.2d 1055 ].) Appellant, however, does not seek to alter or change the terms of the agreement. On the contrary, his position is that the agreement by its terms is subject to modification because of the express power reserved to the court, or if not, it is ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain its meaning. From our examination of the agreement we have found it to be reasonably susceptible to the interpretation placed upon it by either of the parties. Without the aid of extrinsic evidence it is impossible to ascertain the true meaning of the language used or to determine the real intention of the parties. . As the court said in Woodbine v. Van Horn, 29 Cal.2d 95 [ 173 P.2d 17 ] at p. 104: “When the language employed is fairly susceptible of either one of two constructions contended for, extrinsic evidence may be resorted to for the purpose of explaining

The defendant relies upon Newhall v. Newhall, 157 Cal. App.2d 786 , 794-795 [ 321 P.2d 818 ], in which the court affirmed an order of the trial court which refused modification of a property settlement agreement. That case does not assert, however, that extrinsic evidence may not be received as an aid to the court in the interpretation of an ambiguous agreement. No extrinsic evidence appears to have been offered in that case. Moreover, and of decisive importance, the agreement in Newhall contained separate provisions relating to payments to be made to the wife, support for the children and custody of the children. The provisions in the agreement relating to custody and support of the children were each prefaced by the words “subject to any future order of any court having jurisdiction of the subject matter of the following. ...” No such language appeared in the paragraph relating to the payments to be made to the wife. The court said: “The words ‘subject to any future order of any court having jurisdiction of the subject matter of the following’ (custody and support of the children) recognized the power of the court to approve the agreement itself, the continuing jurisdiction of the court to modify the custody provisions, and the power to alter the child support provisions, upward only unless incident to a change of custody. That is all that the quoted words reasonably mean. They include no words of grant, no words conferring or reserving power to modify any of the terms of the agreement. The quoted words mean ‘subject to’ whatever power a court of competent jurisdiction may in its own right have (not derived from this agreement) to modify these child custody and support provisions of this integrated, inseverable property settlement agreement. ’ ’

In the case now before us the language “subject to the . . . appropriate further order of the Superior Court”

The order denying appellant’s motion is therefore reversed.

Draper, P. J., and Devine, J., concurred.