Majority
The defendant in this case was charged in the Municipal Court for the Los Angeles Judicial District on March 4, 1957, with a violation of section 502 of the
On January 11, 1963, a motion was made to set aside and vacate the judgment. The motion was denied on January 29, 1963, and an appeal followed. The Appellate Department of the Superior Court heard the matter and on May 16, 1963, rendered an opinion affirming the order denying the motion.
The cause was then certified to this court upon the motion of the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to settle two questions (1) did the defendant waive a jury or “at least, authorize his attorney, who did appear at that time, to waive one” and (2) did the delay of about six years bar the proceeding?
It seems to be presently asserted among other things that if the defendant exercises his privilege of absenting himself (which he had a right to do) then he thereby under the circumstances as here present waived a jury trial—that he by his absence necessarily indicated that he had given his attorney the power to waive a jury trial at the time of trial.
Neither side cited the case of People v. Holmes (1960) 54 Cal.2d 442 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 353 P.2d 583 ] which we think is dispositive of the matter at hand. In the Holmes ease, counsel for defendant and counsel for the prosecution each announced that he was ready to proceed to trial—the court in
The Supreme Court in People v. Rogers, 56 Cal.2d 301 , 307 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 660 , 363 P.2d 892 ], cited the Holmes case with approval.
In the case at bar the defendant, so far as the record before this court indicates, never said one word and admittedly if there was a waiver it must be implied from the defendant’s conduct in failing to appear at the trial and in waiting so long before questioning the judgment and similar conduct.
The method of waiver is provided in the Constitution and it must be strictly construed. Mere unexpressed implied acquiescence is not enough. It is the responsibility of the trial judge to see to it that the right is protected and it can be done within the framework of our system of jurisprudence with little or no inconvenience.
The judgment is void on its face and the invalidity appears from an inspection of the only record of the case, namely, the complaint and the minutes of the municipal court. Such a judgment may be set aside upon motion at any time. People v. Burke, 23 Cal.App.2d 141 , 142 [ 72 P.2d 261 ], In People v. Greene, 74 Cal. 400 [ 16 P. 197 , 5 Am.St.Rep. 448 ], where one of the questions was whether after a lapse of 12 years from the entry of judgment the court could set aside a void judgment, the Supreme Court said, at page 405: “A judgment which is void upon its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment roll to demonstrate its want of vitality, is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power so to do exists. It can bear no
The court below is directed to set aside and vacate the judgment heretofore entered on April 3, 1957.
Wood, P. J., and Lillie, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- People v. Holmes 54 Cal.2d 442 p. 768
- People v. Rogers 56 Cal.2d 301 at 307 p. 769
- People v. Burke 23 Cal.App.2d 141 at 142 p. 769
- People v. Greene 74 Cal. 400 p. 769