Majority
The plaintiffs, respondents herein, are three married couples, viz., McCue, Heuser and Green; respectively entered into a written contract with the defendant, appellant herein, a sub divider and builder, by which each agreed to purchase from the defendant a lot together with improvements constructed thereon, or to be constructed thereon, by the latter; and brought this action to recover damages on account of fraud and breach of warranty arising out of these transactions. In their complaint setting forth separate causes of action by each couple, the plaintiffs allege that they entered into the foregoing contracts in reliance upon false representations by the defendant that the dwellings upon the property they agreed to purchase were con
As indicated by their respective contracts: The plaintiffs Green purchased their home in July 1959, for $9,500; Heuser in November 1959, for $9,950; and MeCue in June 1960, also for $9,950. At the time of purchase, the Green home had not been built; the other two homes were completed. Each contract provided for the sale of a designated lot “with improvements thereon constructed or to be constructed in substantial conformance with plans and method of construction as set forth in plans and specifications on file with the Veterans Administration and/or Federal Housing Administration and described as Plan 2-A.” The subject sales were financed through the Federal Housing Administration program.
There was evidence from which the court could have concluded that prior to their respective sales each of the plaintiffs had been told by a salesman for the defendant that the property was within the city limits of the City of Indio and was “on city utilities.” The plaintiff, Mr. McCue, testified that the salesman stated: “You have the same utilities that you would have if you was living right up m town.” None of them was told that the properties were not connected to a city sewer. In fact, the sewage disposal system for each lot consisted of a septic tank and leach line as called for in the plans and specifications which were referred to in each of the subject contracts. The county health department determined the required capacity of the septic tanks and the required amount of leach line for each unit, which met the minimum standard fixed by the county ordinance and the Federal Housing Administration regulations. This determination was
The plaintiffs Green entered into occupancy of their place on November 1, 1959; commencing in November 1960, had trouble with their sewage disposal system due to an insufficient percolating area which caused the sewage to back up in the line and to flood their yard; and in March 1962, at a cost of $225, caused 150 square feet of leach line to be added to the system, which rectified the difficulty previously encountered. The plaintiffs Heuser moved into their place in December 1959; commencing in September 1960, had a sewer drainage problem similar to that experienced by the Greens ; and in March 1961, at a cost of $200, added 200 square feet of leach line which obviated the trouble. The plaintiffs McCue commenced occupancy on July 4, 1960; about two months later had similar drainage trouble with their system; transferred their property to a man named Otterson, a representative of the beneficiary under the deed of trust against said property, who caused an addition to the leach line to be installed at a cost of $200. The uncontradicted evidence shows that the Green and Heuser systems were working satisfactorily at the time of trial, viz., April 9, 1962. There was no evidence with respect to the McCue system at this time.
On the fraud issue, the court made no finding with respect to the misrepresentations alleged in the complaint. Instead, it found that the defendant “committed fraud against all of the plaintiffs” (1) by not advising them that their homes were not connected with a city sewer; (2) by failing to deliver to them a copy of the Real Estate Division report wherein it was stated that the houses were on a septic tank system; and (3) by selling them real properties with a septic tank and leach line, knowing that it had not prescribed a percolation test to ascertain whether the ground was sufficiently porous for such a system. In addition, the court found that the “value of each house belonging to the plaintiffs, and purchased from the defendant, is $8,500.00.” Judgment was entered in favor of each group of plaintiffs for the difference between the contract purchase price of the property they acquired and $8,500.
The defendant appeals and contends, among other things, that the court erred in adjudging it guilty of fraudulent concealment. The basis for this contention is that its agreement with the plaintiffs ivas to deliver a house constructed in accordance with plans and specifications on file with the Veterans Administration or the Federal Housing Administration ; that these plans and specifications provided for a septic tank-leach line sewer system; that the information contained therein was equally available to all parties; that it complied with its agreement in the premises; and, for this reason, the plaintiffs' claim of fraud cannot be sustained. In support of the judgment, the plaintiffs rely upon a fraudulent concealment occurring before the contracts were entered into; claim that except for this concealment they would not have executed those contracts; contend that in representing the properties which they were interested in purchasing were “on city utilities,” the defendant assumed the duty of disclosing the true status of all services incident to the use thereof for dwelling purposes; and urge that the failure to disclose the fact that the sewer facilities available to them were of a septic tank-leach line type was fraudulent.
Because of the circumstances attendant upon the instant transactions, we need not determine whether in every instance a vendor is under a duty to disclose to a vendee the type of sewage disposal system servicing the property. (See Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal.App.2d 729 , 735 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 201 ].) Even though there may be no duty upon a vendor to speak upon a subject affecting the desirability of a sale to which he is a party, if he does speak, whether voluntarily or in response to an inquiry, he must make a full disclosure, and may not withhold or conceal any information within his knowledge bearing upon the subject about which he speaks, that materially affects the desirability of the property to be sold. (Civ. Code, § 1710, subd. 3; Rogers v. Warden, 20 Cal.2d 286 , 289 [ 125 P.2d 7 ]; Pohl v. Mills, 218 Cal. 641 , 654 [ 24 P.2d 476 ]; Buist v. C. Dudley DeVelbiss Corp., 182 Cal.App.2d 325 , 330 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 259 ]; Sanfran Co. v. Rees Blow Pipe Mfg. Co., 168 Cal.App.2d 191 , 202 [ 335 P.2d 995 ]; De Spirito v. Andrews, 151 Cal.App.2d 126 , 130 [ 311 P.2d 173 ]; Esau v. Briggs, 89 Cal.App.2d 427 , 434, 435 [ 201 P.2d 25 ].) When the vendor speaks, the law imposes upon him the duty to make a complete disclosure. Because of this duty,
In the instant ease, whether the statement that the subject properties were “on city utilities,” under the circumstances herein, referred to all of those services ordinarily incident to the use of a dwelling house, including sewage disposal service, was a question of fact for trial court determination. In any event, that court was entitled to find that the reference to “city utilities” was directed to services furnished by a city and concerned a subject requiring disclosure that the sewage disposal services incident to the properties offered for sale were not furnished by the city, but were supplied by use of a septic tank-leach line system.
The defendant’s contention, that there was no concealment because the contracts provided for construction in accord with plans and specifications that were available to the plaintiffs for inspection, neglects to take into consideration the fact that the failure to disclose the existence of the septic tank-leach line sewer system preceded execution of the contract by the plaintiffs in reliance upon the assumption that city sewer service was available. In substance, the plaintiffs accepted the defendant’s representation, implied in its failure to make a full disclosure in the premises, that the plans and specifications called for connection with the city sewer. In this regard, it is a matter of note that construction of the Heuser and McCue houses had been completed prior to purchase, and there was no occasion for the purchasers thereof to check the plans and specifications respecting such, for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of a connection with the city system. The evidence supports the conclusion that none of the plaintiffs knew the type of sewage disposal system provided for by the plans and specifications in question, or that actually had been installed; also that the defendant knew of the plaintiffs’ ignorance in this regard at the time they were told that the properties were “on city utilities”; and, for this reason, the information within the knowledge of the defendant with respect to the type of sewage disposal system to be installed, or that had been installed, was not within reach of the diligent attention and observation of the plaintiffs within the meaning of the rule requiring a vendor
The additional findings on the fraud issue, viz., failure to deliver to the plaintiffs a copy of the Beal Estate Division report and selling the subject properties without obtaining a percolation test, are without legal or factual foundation. The omissions in question did not constitute independent acts of fraud within the definition thereof as set forth in section 1710 of the Civil Code. The failure to deliver a copy of the Beal Estate Division report to the plaintiffs, although material to the issue of concealment, of itself did not constitute the fraudulent suppression of a fact. Likewise any omission to obtain a percolation test report did not constitute fraudulent conduct. Furthermore, the evidence establishes that the defendant did obtain a percolation test which the government authorities deemed sufficient basis for a determination that compliance with the septic tank-leach line minimum requirements prescribed by the county ordinance would suffice.
The court also found that the defendant breached the terms of a warranty given the plaintiffs at the time of execution of their contracts “in that the septic tanks and leach lines in each dwelling malfunctioned and failed to effectively dispose of the sewage and waste. . . .” The warranty in question was limited to a guaranty that the dwellings located on the properties sold were “constructed in substantial conformity with the plans and specifications . . . which have been approved in writing by the Federal Housing Commissioner. . . .” There is no evidence that the subject septic tanks and leach lines were not constructed in accordance with the plans and specifications referred to. On the contrary, the evidence establishes without conflict that construction of these items conformed to the plans and specifications; were inspected by the building inspector; and were approved. The finding in question premises the breach of warranty upon a failure of the septic tanks and leach lines to effectively dispose of the sewage and waste, and not upon any failure in the construction thereof to conform to the plans and specifications.
On the issue of damages the court made two findings, one of which was included in its conclusions of law; found that the “value of each house belonging to the plaintiffs, and purchased from the defendant, is $8,500.00”; and that “as a result of the said fraud and breach of warranty” the plaintiffs Green were damaged in the sum of $1,000, the plaintiffs Heuser in the sum of $1,450, and the plaintiffs McCue in the sum of $1,450. (Italics ours.) These amounts respectively represent the difference between the value of each of the “houses” as found by the court and the contract price of the property purchased. It would appear that the court was attempting to apply the “out-of-pocket” measure of damages prescribed by that part of section 3343 of the Civil Code which provides that: “One defrauded in the purchase ... of property is entitled to recover the difference between the actual value of that with which the defrauded person parted and the actual value of that which he received. . . .” The courts have declared that this code section “must be applied realistically so as to give the defrauded person his actual out-of-pocket loss.” (Garrett v. Perry, 53 Cal.2d 178 , 184 [ 346 P.2d 758 ]; Buist v. C. Dudley DeVelbiss Corp., supra, 182 Cal.App.2d 325 , 334.) Fundamental to such an application is the giving of due consideration to the established rule that fraud is not actionable unless it results in damage. (Gonsalves v. Hodgson, 38 Cal.2d 91 , 100-101 [ 237 P.2d 656 ]; Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal.2d 412 , 422 [ 159 P.2d 958 ]; Spencer v. Anderson, 193 Cal. 1 , 7 [ 222 P. 355 , 35 A.L.R. 822 ]; Roberts v. Karr, 178 Cal.App.2d 535 , 542-543 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 98 ]; Valdez v. Taylor Automobile Co., 129 Cal.App.2d 810 , 821-823 [ 278 P.2d 91 ]; Machado v. Machado, 66 Cal.App.2d 401 , 405 [ 152 P.2d 457 ]; Wheat v. McNeill, 111 Cal.App. 72 , 78 [ 295 P. 102 ].) The finding of the trial court that the value of each “house” purchased by the plaintiffs is $8,500 does not indicate that the use of the septic tank and leach line instead of a city sewer connection
Furthermore, “damages for fraud are to be assessed as of the date of the fraudulent transaction.” (Graf v. Sumpter, 207 Cal.App.2d 391 , 393 [ 24 Cal.Rptr. 590 ].) In determining the difference between the actual value of that which a defrauded person received and that with which he parted as the result of a fraudulent sale, the value of
In addition, the evidence establishes without conflict that the plaintiffs McCue had transferred their property to someone else prior to trial. The evidence does not disclose the total amount paid by them on their purchase nor the reasonable rental value of the property for the term of its occupancy. They made a down payment of $375 and executed a promissory note, secured by a deed of trust, in the sum of $9,650, payable in monthly installments of $56.46, which represented the balance of the purchase price. Mr. McCue testified that the property was “turned back” to the beneficiary under the trust deed. It is obvious that these plaintiffs did not pay or become liable for the full purchase price. These were factors which the trial court should have considered in determining the actual out-of-pocket loss sustained by them. (Garrett v. Perry, supra, 53 Cal.2d 178 , 184-186.) This is not a situation in which the difference between the value of the property sold and the purchase price determines the difference between the actual value of that which the plaintiffs paid and the actual value of that which they received and thus measures the actual out-of-pocket loss sustained.
The defendant contends that the findings on the issue of damages also are in error because there is no segregation of the amount of damages resulting from the fraud and that resulting from the breach of warranty. The findings in question require interpretation because of the uncertainty resulting from their declaration, in substance, that as a result of
The judgment is reversed.
Griffin, P. J., and Brown (Gerald), J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Lingsch v. Savage 213 Cal.App.2d 729 at 735, at 736, at 735, 737, 740 p. 27, p. 28, p. 29
- Rogers v. Warden 20 Cal.2d 286 at 289 p. 27
- Pohl v. Mills 218 Cal. 641 at 654 p. 27
- Buist v. C. Dudley DeVelbiss Corp. 182 Cal.App.2d 325 at 330, at 334 p. 27, p. 29, p. 30
- Sanfran Co. v. Rees Blow Pipe Manufacturing Co. 168 Cal.App.2d 191 at 202 p. 27, p. 29
- De Spiritu v. Andrews 151 Cal.App.2d 126 at 130 p. 27
- Esau v. Briggs 89 Cal.App.2d 427 at 434, 435 p. 27
- Bagdasarian v. Gragnon 31 Cal.2d 744 at 748 p. 29
- Garrett v. Perry 53 Cal.2d 178 at 184, at 185-186, at 184-186 p. 30, p. 32
- Gonsalves v. Hodgson 38 Cal.2d 91 at 100-101 p. 30
- Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co. 26 Cal.2d 412 at 422 p. 30
- Spencer v. Anderson 193 Cal. 1 at 7 p. 30
- Roberts v. Karr 178 Cal.App.2d 535 at 542-543 p. 30
- Valdez v. Taylor Automobile Co. 129 Cal.App.2d 810 at 821-823 p. 30
- Machado v. Machado 66 Cal.App.2d 401 at 405 p. 30
- Wheat v. McNeill 111 Cal.App. 72 at 78 p. 30
- Graf v. Sumpter 207 Cal.App.2d 391 at 393 p. 31, p. 32